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ABSTRACT

This report presents essays from a symposium held in the Netherlands in 1986 whose purpose was to study the theme: values in higher education. The symposium addressed the issue of cultural continuity and the importance of awareness of how higher education is developing and cultural values are maintained. Among the symposium's presentations are the following: (1) an analysis of the implications of the "Bildung" concept (the educational process that creates a "value-saturated" personality) in the German Tradition and its change of meaning between the 1800s and the 1900s; (2) a discussion of two historical concepts in education, vocational (competence based) and general (Allgemeine Bildung); (3) a discussion of the conflicts, tactics, and strategies which are used in a curriculum debate about general and vocational education pertaining to cultural values; (4) an examination of the functions, structures, and dilemmas of higher education when growing into a mass education system, including some examples of different options and solutions in a cross-cultural comparison; (5) a discussion of pluralism in society and education; and (6) a discussion of the impact of new technologies on educational goals, educational practices, and their availability. Contains 12 references. (GLR)

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Values in Higher Education

'Bildungsideale' in historical and contemporary perspective

W.J. Nijhof (Ed.)

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VALUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION

'Bildungsideale' in historical and contemporary perspective

W.J. Nijhof (ed.)

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Preface

Some research fellows were invited to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS) for the 1985/86 academic year to study the theme: values in (higher) education. The theme was chosen by Elly Cassee, the former Deputy Director of NIAS. The fellows concerned with this in-depth study and exchange of ideas came from Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany, The Netherlands and the USA.

1985/86 was quite a year for NIAS, being in the process of reorganizing its affairs as a result of the Ministry of Education's economic cuts, while at the same time celebrating its 15th anniversary as a research institute.

The group of fellows was confronted with questions on (higher) education, with the consequences of the changing working life of schools, and new technologies. There were some tough discussions on schooling systems, the concept of Bildung and Ausbildung and the role of information technology in a changing world.

The approaches to the theme were inevitably rather divergent in such an international and multicultural setting. But, in spite of this, the group worked enthusiastically and intensively and succeeded in organizing a symposium on 26th June 1986.

The main motive for this symposium was based on the criticism and resistance against "modern" banking policies in education based on extreme economical output and efficiency criteria and simple business management for schools and universities. Elly Cassee introduced the theme as follows: "Academic debate these days all too often tends to confront means rather than ends, and to concern itself with immediate problems rather than review the experience of the past or plan for a better future. The so-called Bildungsideale project deals with cultural values and (higher) education. It concerns the nature of cultural continuity and what might be called cultural memory. The nature of cultural memory, the relation between tradition and progress, the importance of awareness of how (higher) education is developing and cultural values are maintained, all this constitutes not only an important but an urgent subject of investigation by researchers in the humanities and social sciences."

The symposium was divided into two parts: past and future. Fritz Ringer, Heinrich Dilly and Christoph Lûth were given the opportunity to

explain historical aspects of the theme, while Konrad Jarausch closed this section with a discussion.

Ulrich Teichler, Cor van der Klauw and Wim Nijhof portrayed developments within the educational system and evaluated these as they stand in relation to future developments. Marcelo Dascal concluded the proceedings by debating these options.

We will highlight here some of the issues raised by the various presenters in order to tempt the reader to take the whole.

Fritz Ringer analysed the implications of the Bildungsconcept in the German Tradition (1890-1930). "The concept of Bildung (he says, WN), engendered cognitive positions that played a structuring role far beyond the formative field of discourse on education itself. My other main historical point is that there was a dramatic change in the meaning of Bildung sometime between 1800 and 1900, a change that is best described as a shift from a forward-looking or 'utopian' emphasis to a defensive or 'ideological' one." His contribution proves the evidence for this statement and explores and evaluates critical shifts of "the" Bildungsconcept and its users.

Under the intriguing title "Der Liebe Gott Steckt im Detail, Der Duce ist nicht aus Email" Heinrich Dilly portrays (in German) three episodes from 'the Warburg Institute', a famous historical institute of art, originally a private institute in Hamburg, later on in London. All three episodes prove to be fine examples from people counteracting the nazi ideology in Germany at the beginning of this century. This essay shows the possibility for art and artists to criticize through the medium of art and culture, by means of ideas, images and details, by means of aesthetic and analytical power.

Christoph Lüth discusses two historical concepts in education: vocational (competence based) education and general education (Allgemeine Bildung). The period from the 18th to the 19th centuries saw the integration of both concepts as a dominant theme in a period of turmoil. Based on the works of Theodor Litt and Herwig Blankertz, Lüth discusses the way the integration of general and vocational education is related to the bildungsconcept of Humboldt, and ends with a thesis: he could not accept the integration of these two aspects of education if it meant losing disharmony and tension.

Konrad Jarausch presents some critical comments on the papers of Ringer, Dilly and Lüth. He begins by discussing some methodological

considerations and then compares all three papers on the concept of Bildung itself. He concludes with an eloquent discussion of a constructive alternative.

The second part of this small book contains the papers of Ulrich Teichler, Cor van der Klauw and Wim Nijhof. Marcello Dascal discusses the assumptions and conclusions from a philosophical point of view.

Ulrich Teichler discusses the functions, structures and dilemmas of higher education when growing into a mass education system. He presents examples of different options and solutions in a cross-cultural comparison and concludes that non-élite higher education as mass education is best able to meet the highly distinctive needs of a pluralistic society.

Cor van der Klauw sketches some observations on the impact of new technologies on educational goals, educational practices and their availability. He believes that these developments do not necessarily lead to a new educational or cultural revolution. The future will prove if he is right.

Wim Nijhof highlights the conflicts, tactics and strategies which are used in a curriculum debate about general and vocational education pertaining to cultural values. Cultural values seem to have been lost in the 80's. Quality and efficiency closely related to market orientations will lead to a pragmatic, meritocratic view of utility. He criticizes this view and makes a plea for a personal and cultural orientation.

Pluralism in society and education is the leading thread of Marcelo Dascal's discussion of the papers of Teichler, Van der Klauw and Nijhof as he concludes the symposium. Following Paolo Freire he consistently strives toward the ultimate consequence of pluralism: decision making by persons and small communities based on their cultural values and knowledge base. "We may not need as much expensive and centralized training as we think we do."

The appearance of this small book has been delayed for several reasons. But the delay does not detract from the value of the texts which remain worthy of publication and will be useful to graduates and scholars.

Finally, I would like to say a word of thanks to Elly Cassee, the initiator of the symposium. This publication will be a document of a time that has come to an end but which, I hope, will show up a cultural future. In this sense, I personally hope, she will perceive this book as a gift.

Wim J. Nijhof (ed.) Enschede, July, 1990

BILDUNG AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE GERMAN TRADITION, 1890-1930

Fritz Ringer

The word Bildung in the German tradition means education in the large sense of self-development or 'cultivation'. A standard encyclopedia of the Weimar period provided the following definition.

> The fundamental concept of pedagogy since Pestalozzi. Bildung means forming the soul by means of the cultural environment. Bildung requires: (a) an individuality which, as the unique starting point, is to be developed into a formed or value-saturated personality; (b) a certain universality, meaning richness of mind and person, which is attained through the understanding and experiencing (Verstehen und Erleben) of the objective cultural values; (c) totality, meaning inner unity and firmness of character.[1]

This is how the term Bildung was actually used by German university professors in the humanities and social sciences during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[2] Certain features of the concept, however, are more fully articulated in a 1911 essay by the sociologist and philosopher Georg Simmel, from which the following passage is taken.

> Every kind of learning, virtuosity, refinement in a man cannot cause us to attribute true cultivation to him if these things function...only as superadditions that come to his personality from a normative realm external to it and ultimately remain external to it. In such a case, a man may have cultivated attributes, but he is not cultivated: cultivation comes about only if the contents absorbed out of the suprapersonal realm (of objectified cultural values) seem, as through a secret harmony, to unfold only that in the soul which exists within it as its own instinctual tendency and as the inner prefiguration of its subjective perfection.[3]

Both of the cited passages distinguish a process of Bildung from its starting point in the individual, and from its end effect, the state of being cultivated, which is also called Bildung. To look more closely at the formulations actually offered is in some sense to ask about their 'implications', with the proviso that we are not seeking strictly logical implications in a universal language, but looser relationships of analogy and affinity within a historically generated conceptual field. What, in this sense, did the concept of Bildung imply?

Both passages describe the process of Bildung as a relationship between a learner and a set of texts. The texts are objectively given; they make up a 'suprapersonal' realm of 'objective cultural values'. The learner 'absorbs' the 'contents' of the suprapersonal realm to become a 'value-saturated' personality. Obviously, his 'understanding' or 'experiencing' is more than analytical or intellectual; for his whole being is affected. Bildung transforms a unique 'individuality' into a unified 'totality'. Particularly Simmel insists upon the 'secret harmony' with which the cultural contents 'unfold' only what already 'exists' within the soul. He writes that this harmony seems to obtain between the end state of 'subjective perfection' and its anterior 'prefiguration'. The cultivated individual is at once a unified totality and in harmony with his prior 'instinctual tendency'. The teleological image of personal development as an 'unfolding' implies a narrative of the movement toward perfection that becomes fully coherent only when perfection has been reached, and when the soul's preexistent tendency can indeed be identified as a 'prefiguration'.

One way to 'translate' these sentences and to reduce the air of mystery that surrounds them is to follow the lead provided by the words Verstehen and Erleben. For they point to an interpretive or 'hermeneutic' relationship between reader and text. This relationship can be conceived as a dialectic interaction, in that the reader must actively posit possible interpretations, which the text then 'shows' to be more or less effective in clarifying and integrating what at first appeared obscure or incoherent. The more one stresses this active role of the reader in a dialectic of 'understanding' or Verstehen, the less mystery there is in the 'secret harmony' between the soul's 'instinctual tendency' and what it assimilates on the way to perfection. Yet particularly the encyclopedia definition strongly suggests a more passive account of the interpretive relationship as a repeated 'experiencing' or Erleben. Here the reader empathetically identifies

with the author and reproduces or 'relives' the inner states that gave rise to the text. Because he identifies in this way, he can be 'saturated' with the values embodied in what he reads. As Max Weber pointed out in a related context, the canonical sources of the tradition have charismatic or magical qualities that enrich and elevate those who 'make them their own'.[4]

If most German academics were more or less consciously committed to the concept of Bildung from the late eighteenth century on, then much is explained that would otherwise remain merely given. Thus the German research university of the nineteenth century drew some of its vitality from the neohumanist enthusiasm of the eighteenth century, which also inspired a new vision of education. The birth of the research seminar and the subsequent expansion of the 'philosophical' faculties were linked to the emergence of the philological and interpretive disciplines, which initially shaped the dominant paradigm of exact scholarship or Wissenschaft. In nineteenth-century German historiography, what may be called the principle of empathy demanded that historical epochs be understood 'in their own terms', or that the past-minded historian 'put himself in the place of' the historical agents he sought to comprehend. In philosophy, the post-Kantian Idealists were dedicated to the image of Geist or mind unfolding and comprehending itself in its creations. The word Geisteswissenschaft did not come into common use until the later nineteenth century, but the interpretive and philosophical tradition that really defined it was of course much older.[5]

The neo-idealist revival of the Geisteswissenschaften that began with the work of Wilhelm Dilthey in the 1880s was not so much a new departure as an effort to clarify a well-established pattern of interpretive practice. Georg Simmel was a major participant in this effort, and the main difficulty it encountered was precisely the one just raised. To what extent is interpretation based upon the 'reliving' of the experiences 'behind' the text, and thus upon the reproduction of inner states? Does the interpreter bridge the distance between himself and the text by intuitively identifying with the author, or is interpretation a less subjective but more complicated procedure? Support for the latter view can be found in Martin Heidegger, in the late works of Dilthey, and of course in the more recent elucidations of Hans Georg Gadamer.[6] Yet the tendency to construe the hermeneutic relationship as an empathetic Erleben has survived almost into our own day.

It was in fact particularly prevalent among German humanists and social scientists during the intellectual crisis of the interwar period.

Along with the principle of empathy and the hermeneutic tradition more generally, the two cited passages imply what may be called the principle of individuality. For Bildung is the self-development of a unique 'individuality', the 'unfolding' from within of a distinctive potentiality. Nothing 'comes' to the learner from 'outside'; his perfection is the actualization of a preexistent 'tendency'. Obviously, this conception of education differs radically, not only from any 'socialization' of the learner by an external agent, but also from any mere 'superaddition' of information or of analytical skills. The cultivated individual, too, is a unique and unified 'totality'. Almost literally incomparable, he cannot be defined merely by being located on a single, universally applicable scale of rationality. The fullness or wholeness of his personality transcends any 'abstract' or 'reductive' characterization that would make him a predictable agent in the manner of the utilitarian rationalist or of 'economic man'.

To be committed to this concept of individuality, whether in full consciousness or not, is to be guided toward certain analogous schemes of thought about change, about the relationship of the particular to the general, and of the individual to the group. Thus change is likely to appear the development of a unique whole 'from within', the teleological unfolding of a potentiality, or the actualization of a preexistent essence, not a 'mechanical' rearrangement of identical constituent units. On the analogy of a symphony, a grouping is likely to be conceived as a patterned whole, a configuration of unique elements in particular relationships to each other, a higher unity-indiversity, with a 'total' quality of its own, rather than a sum of similar parts or even an aggregate of dissimilar components.[7] Something like this symphonic analogy came into play, for example, when German academics of the decades after 1890 addressed the crucial relationship between the cultivated individual and his national culture. Merely aggregative views of that relationship could not seem adequate, especially since the creative genius was seen as a unique embodiment rather than an average representative of his culture. The symphonic analogy could also be used to criticize a merely additive view of knowledge as a sum of facts, or to point up the presence of Gestalt complexes in psychic processes, in opposition to more 'atomistic' accounts of these matters. In social studies, the analogy favored an emphasis upon the interpretable individual, upon

networks of interpersonal relationships, and upon unique 'wholes', rather than upon abstract sums of rational agents. In the German historical tradition, nation states and epochs as well as persons could be conceived as unique individualities, rather than as products of timeless laws. This view was codified in the philosopher Wilhelm Windelband's 1894 distinction between 'nomothetic' and 'idiographic' disciplines. A nomothetic discipline approaches its evidence with a view to subsuming it under general laws or regularities, whereas idiographic description focuses upon the unique and particular. Since a given historical situation is a unique constellation of unique particulars, moreover, historical change cannot even remotely resemble the lawful transformations of mechanicss.[8]

In a 1923 essay, the historian Ernst Troeltsch identified the 'concept of individuality' as the heart of the German Romantic critique of 'the whole mathematical-mechanistic West European scientific spirit'.

> (An individuality is) a particular concretion of the divine spirit in unique persons and in suprapersonal communal organizations. The basic constituents of reality are not similar material and social atoms and universal laws...but differing unique personalities and individualizing formative forces.... The state and society are not created from the individual by way of contract and utilitarian rationality, but from the suprapersonal spiritual forces which emanate from the most important and creative individuals, the spirit of the people or the religious idea.... (Similarly, humanity is) not the ultimate union of fundamentally equal human beings in a rationally organized total humanity, but the fullness of contending national spirits.... All (cultures) together in mutual complementation represent the totality of life.[9]

The passage makes quite clear how the idea of individuality was connected with distinctive schemes of change and of groupings. Like Simmel and others, Troeltsch meant to confront the uniform calculating agent of the French Enlightenment, or of the English utilitarians and classical economists, with a less 'atomistic', fuller and more qualitative model of the individual, and thus also to justify a form of cultural individualism that could be reconciled with the individual's obligation to his community. At the same time, he hoped to recommend a German view of the relationships among nations that seemed more supportive of cultural diversity than 'Western' conceptions of democratic internationalism. That was the point of

his distinction between 'the ultimate union of fundamentally equal human beings in a rationally organized total humanity' and 'the fullness of contending national spirits'. Bildung implied diversity and symphonic fullness.

The idea of self-cultivation profoundly affected the German concept of Wissenschaft, which broadly encompassed all systematic disciplines, including the interpretive ones, of course. There was a common belief that productive involvement in research usually would, and certainly should, have the effect of Bildung. The original scholar was meant to emerge from his activity enriched in mind and person. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this expectation was also expressed in the recurring proposition that Wissenschaft should engender Weltanschauung, a comprehensive and partly evaluative orientation toward the world.[10] The pursuit of truth was to lead to something like integral insight and moral certainty, or personal knowledge, or wisdom. Indeed, there is much to be said for the hope that some kind of convergence between Wissenschaft, Bildung, and Weltanschauung might ultimately take place, if only in an infinitely distant and perfect future. Particularly in the human sciences, to reach full and undistorted comprehension would presumably be to reach a social utopia as well. As an immediate and conscious aim, or as an ordinary standard for distinguishing adequate from inadequate Wissenschaft here and now, however, such visionary aspirations can be profoundly misleading. In any case, the yen to derive Bildung and Weltanschaung from Wissenschaft put a considerable burden on the ordinary life of the German universities during the decades after 1890.

Similarly strenuous was a traditional insulation of Wissenschaft from practical concerns. Although mathematics had a place in classical secondary education in Germany as elsewhere, hermeneutic studies clearly ranked as the primary source of Bildung. To the extent that Wissenschaft was linked to the objective of Bildung, therefore, practical and experimental knowledge was at least theoretically undervalued, and rather difficult to conceptualize. Laboratory science depends upon controlled intervention in an environment. Yet German treatises on Bildung and Wissenschaft rarely included positive references to practical activity. On the contrary, they usually inveighed against instrumental or 'utilitarian' conceptions of knowledge, and they tended almost automatically to identify 'pure' Wissenschaft as impractical.[11] It was as if a symbolic hierarchy extended from abstract theory to

experimental or causal analysis, and finally to merely 'technical' or 'applied' studies. Now it may in fact be perfectly reasonable to oppose premature demands for practically applicable research results, if only because they will tend to produce poor scholarship and bad science. But it is a long way from such a position to the methodological absurdity of a Wissenschaft insulated from all human interests, including practical ones. The German research universities of the nineteenth century certainly benefited from what limited protection they had against state control. Unfortunately, their commitment to academic freedom ultimately became less a defense of thorough criticism and of intellectual diversity than a repudiation of 'utilitarian' infringements upon the theoretical 'purity' of Wissenschaft.[12]

I shall say little here about the origins of Bildung as a concept, and I am skeptical of such intellectual ancestries in any case. Of course one can follow Troeltsch in tracing the idea of invidiuality to the German Romantics, if not to Leibniz before them. Or one can trace elements in Simmel's account of the hermeneutic relationship to the influence of the post-Kantian Idealists. But even at best, the pursuit of such intellectual influences leaves one with a scattering of discrete connections between particular writers and particular readers, when one really wants to understand a tradition, a network of partly implicit beliefs and practices. In other words, there was a certain unity in the currents of thought that converged in Germany during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and I suggest that the organizing principle behind this unity was an emerging set of partly conscious beliefs about education and learning. If that is true, then there is nothing surprising in the fact that Protestant and particularly Pietist notions of self-development helped to shape their more secular successors, or that German Romanticism differed in characteristic ways from its French and English counterparts, or that Schleiermacher was as much a hermeneuticist and an Idealist as a Romantic. Wilhelm von Humboldt is generally and rightly considered the intellectual founding father of the modern German university. Yet his theory of Bildung and of Wissenschaft was affected not only by the formal doctrines of German Idealism, but also by the pedagogical debates of his day, and by the philological and interpretive practices that converted the neohumanist impulse into a paradigm of systematic scholarship.

Even in France and England, education was an important intellectual issue during the eighteenth century, along with economic individualism and political rationality. In Germany, education became the predominant

concern of the new intellectual stratum, while economic individualism remained a comparatively minor theme. Much fruitful research has been done in recent years on the emergence of Bildung as a newly influential concept by around 1790.[13] I am not expert enough to form an independent opinion on these matters. Nevertheless, I am convinced that beliefs and practices in education decisively affected the wider German tradition that took shape during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The concept of Bildung, as I have tried to show, engendered cognitive dispositions that played a structuring role far beyond the formative field of discourse on education itself.

My other main historical point is that there was a dramatic change in the meaning of Bildung sometime between 1800 and 1900, a change that is best described as a shift from a forward-looking or 'utopian' emphasis to a defensive of 'ideological' one. Around 1800, the idea of self -enhancement through Bildung was, among other things, a socially progressive and universalist challenge to permanent social distinctions based on birth. Advanced education was not in fact available to everyone, but it seemed universally accessible in principle. The emerging educated middle class could in good conscience regard itself as an 'open' or 'merit' elite, a new aristocracy of intelligence and personal worth. To speak for education was in some sense to speak for all men against unjust and humanly irrelevant social barriers. By around 1900 or 1920, in sharp contrast, advanced education itself had taken on the character of a distinguishing social privilege. With the full institutionalization of secondary and higher education and of the credentials system, educational qualifications had become routinized sources of social status. An established educated upper middle class now sought to check the influx of new social groups into the universities, and thus to reduce competition for places in the 'academic' professions.

A color will look different against a changed background, and so it was with the meaning of Bildung. As its social environment was transformed, it took on an 'ideological' aspect almost of its own accord. This was possible, I believe, because it always contained an ideological aspect that merely had to be activated. To see this, one has to notice that the traits of the cultivated man are in fact very poorly defined. He is characterized by 'a certain universality, meaning richness of mind and person'. But what his richness actually encompasses can only be specified if he is imagined

passively 'saturated' by a tradition that is itself unbroken, and that can be itemized as a set of canonical texts. The only other clear definition that can be offered is the utopian vision evoked in Simmel's reference to perfection, to the full unfolding of a 'prefigured' self. But can we actually say whether perfection has been reached, or whether all possibilities of human fulfilment have truly been unfolded? To ask that question is to show that in its utopian aspect, full Bildung takes on a specific meaning only as an alternative or 'negation' of imperfections that are known. Our ordinary awareness is of an incomplete relationship to a tradition that is itself no longer or not yet fully coherent. We can imagine ourselves moving toward a state in which mere 'cultivated attributes' give way to the integration attained in 'subjective perfection', but we can scarcely imagine the actual achievement of that sense of 'totality'. The concept of perfect Bildung here plays the role of an orienting ideal.

The situation changes completely, however, if we suppose that there actually are cultivated men, and we then proceed to ask, not what their specific characteristics really are, but merely how they differ from the rest of mankind. In answer we are told that ordinary men may indeed have 'every kind of learning, virtuosity, refinement', but that these 'cultivated attributes' function in their case as 'superadditions' that 'ultimately remain external' to their personalities. In the cultivated man, by contrast, a 'secret harmony' obtains between the 'contents absorbed out of the suprapersonal realm' and the soul's anterior 'prefiguration'. The 'secret harmony' has here become a deeply mysterious difference between a 'cultivated' and an 'uncultivated' relationship to tradition. The cultivated man alone truly 'owns' his cultivated attributes; he is and always was what he knows. One is reminded of what Pierre Bourdieu calls 'aristocratic essentialism'. For what the aristocrat does (and knows) is the free expression of an essence that is 'anterior and superior to its manifestations'.[14] The doings and knowings of the non-aristocrat, by contrast, remain 'external' to him, which is why they may be both denigrated and appropriated as 'merely useful'. This is the ideological aspect of Bildung: its capacity to confirm the social miracle that elevates the 'truly' educated man above his fellows.

As the concept of Bildung took on a socially confirmative character during the course of the nineteenth century, some of its other implications changed as well. Thus there was an unmistakable shift in the relationship of the mandarin intellectuals to the state. In some of Humboldt's early writings,

he had insisted that human improvement can come only from the development of free individualities in interaction with each other. This was the cultural individualism that so impressed John Stuart Mill. Even in Humboldt's projects for the reorganization of Prussian higher education in 1809-1810, he saw the state as providing no more than a material environment for the autonomous life of Wissenschaft. Nevertheless, the institutional arrangements he actually made or conceded in fact gave considerable scope to state intervention in university affairs. Indeed, to several of his contemporaries, and to many German university professors of later eras, this did not seem troublesome; or it seemed less and less troublesome. For they tended to regard the existing state as an adequate embodiment of the 'cultural state' (Kulturstaat), the disinterested supporter and earthly representative of their national culture. Especially as they began to see themselves as a threatened minority, German academics moved toward an ever firmer commitment to the bureaucratic monarchy, which sustained their institutions, protected their social position, and accepted their claim to speak for their nation as a whole.[15]

Bildung, around 1800, moreover, had been invested with a collective and even transcendent significance that was gradually dissipated in the century that followed. The early German neohumanists had seriously looked to antiquity for universally and eternally valid cultural norms. The Protestant antecedents of German Idealism, too, had conferred an almost religious meaning upon the pursuit of Bildung. Though that meaning was affected by the individualist element in protestantism, it still linked Bildung to a universal vision of human salvation. In the metaphysical language of German Idealism, the self-realization of mind was the transcendent aim of human existence. As that spiritual connotation gradually faded, however, it became ever more damaging that neither Humboldt nor the great Idealists had taken a clear and consistent position on the material and social preconditions of individual Bildung, or on its this-wordly consequences for all members of a human community. Left in a kind of spiritual and social vacuum, the cultivation of the isolated self ultimately became a truly gratuitous and strictly private enterprise, a higher form of selfishness.[16]

From around 1890 on, German university professors in the humanities and social sciences expressed a sense of crisis that reached its greatest intensity during the interwar period. Among the causes of their concern, some were broad trends in the political and cultural life of their

time; others were changes in their more immediate environment, in the situation of the universities and of Wissenschaft itself. Included in this latter category were structural transformations in the educational system that were commonly perceived as forms of modernization and of democratization. Thus from the late 1870s to the turn of the century, public controversies took place in Germany as elsewhere over the accreditation of the so-called technical institutes (technische Hochschulen), and of the non-classical and incompletely classical secondary schools that were sometimes collectively termed Real-schulen. Whether rightly or not, contemporaries tended to regard the rapid growth of these 'realistic' and 'technical' institutions as a kind of modernization, a functional adjustment of the educational system to the requirements of a modern technological society. Even some of the opponents of the non-traditional programs considered them useful or even necessary; what they denied, at least until 1900, is that they ought to be accredited equally with the classical Gymnasium and with the universities themselves. Though the Realschulen and technische Hochschulen found a few energetic supporters among university professors, the prevailing sentiment in the 'philosophical' faculties was against granting them full equality of standing. In this context, it proved remarkably easy and effective to use the language of Bildung in defense of the status quo. Pushed to conceptually precarious limits, the inherited animus against 'utilitarian' conceptions of learning virtually dictated a hierarchic ranking of educational institutions according to their more or less exclusively theoretical or 'impractical' character. The traditional defense of 'pure' learning thus served to justify a social divide between the gratuitously cultivated and those schooled at best for useful employments.[17]

During the late nineteenth century, and especially during the Weimar period, German academics also faced the questions raised by a substantial growth in secondary and university-level enrollments. We have reason to doubt that these increases in inclusiveness actually brought about a notable advance in the progressiveness of German higher education. Nevertheless, contemporaries tended to perceive the marked expansion of enrollments as a form of educational democratization. Particularly during the 1920s, modest government measures to widen access to secondary schooling, as well as to the Abitur and thus to the universities, suggested a deliberate movement toward greater equality of educational opportunity.[18]

In these circumstances, the theory of Bildung was repeatedly brought forward to challenge the notion that school and university places might be distributed partly or wholly on the basis of tested academic aptitude. Since Bildung was a forming of the whole person and the fulfilment of a unique individual potentiality, statistical approaches to educability almost had to seem inappropriate. In 1917, the pedagogue and philosopher Eduard Spranger had this to say on that subject.

> I see a...symptom of the connection between democracy and rationalism in the growth of technical methods by which the intellectual characteristics are to be tested, and in accordance with which the choice of schooling is to be organizationally regulated.... For individuality is here ultimately looked upon as something measurable and numerically describable, not as a structural principle of the soul.... The human mind is not put together out of atoms of primitive acts, but (is) an organic unity.... Individuality can only be grasped through vital intuition.[19]

In a 1923 essay, the psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers distinguished four groups of requirements for university scholarship. The first encompassed the ability to learn, memory, and a variety of other functions we would associate with academic aptitude. While granting that these qualities might ultimately prove roughly measurable, Jaspers considered them far less important for scholarly work than 'intelligence as such', 'spirituality' (Geistigkeit), and 'creativity, genius', which could never be statistically assessed. On these grounds, Jaspers held that the selection of university students should be left to unguided social processes. He was no ranting reactionary; yet he reminded his readers that 'the masses' had always been known to have a low intelligence. A student's receptivity to learning would be low, he thought, unless he came from a 'cultured family'.[20] The classicist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf had taken a similar position even more firmly a few years earlier.[21]

Apparently, these views enjoyed wide influence within the German academic community as a whole. For in the late 1920s, the Corporation of German Universities passed and published several resolutions that put the case against a 'lowering of standards' in the following terms.

> (The Corporation) regards with grave concern the ever greater expansion of the circle of those admitted to the universities. (The universities are reached by students) whose preparation in general

> and whose language training in particular is insufficient.... This deterioration is caused as much by the whole orientation of our time as by certain pedagogical aims and methods.... Larger strata of the population (are entering secondary education). Thus one often succeeds only through an artificial and wearisome process of forced breeding (Höherzüchtung) in making the cultural values (Bildungsgüter) of the secondary schools accessible to a kind of public that comes from its home environment without any sort of deeper intellectual needs.[22]

The critique of language training implied the primacy of hermeneutic knowledge and was directed mainly against the non-classical schools. The complaint at the 'whole orientation of our time' condemned an excess of social ambition among the 'larger strata'. Those who were hard to teach were assumed to be identical with those from uncultivated backgrounds. And the overall assumption was that secondary education ought to be an almost undeliberate 'making available' of 'cultural values' to a public predisposed to absorb them.

The deepest concern of German academic humanists and social scientists after 1800, however, was the issue of scientific and scholarly specialization. The branching out of existing disciplines into increasingly autonomous subfields, and the decreasing topical breadth of the average product of scientific and scholarly work: these seemed to portend a kind of intellectual atomization, in which researchers would lose sight of the interrelationships among their several findings and hypotheses. Going even beyond this cognitive disconnectedness, however, specialization was widely held to threaten the theoretical unity of knowledge, or the relationship between empirical Wissenschaft and fundamental philosophy. Interpreted in the light of the German tradition, incoherence in specialized science and scholarship stemmed from the loss of the integrative framework that had once been provided by the Idealist systems.[23]

This helps to account for the almost automatic association of specialization with 'positivism'. The latter in turn was rarely described in detail. One has to remember that neither intellectual disciples of Auguste Comte nor self-confessed 'positivists' of any other kind were actually to be found among German university faculty between 1890 and 1930. The label 'positivist' was almost always used in a derogatory sense, and those charged with 'positivism' were typically thought guilty of unacknowledged fallacies.

Chief among the errors ascribed to positivists was the possibly implicit belief that the concepts of the natural sciences can be extended to the humanities and social studies, or that the search for lawlike regularities is the main task of the interpretive and historical disciplines as well. Indeed, even unreflected research practices could be viewed as positivist, if they were guided by a naive objectivism (envisaging a theory-free adding up of 'basic facts'), or by a strong causalist program. Obviously, all forms of determinism, 'materialism', or doctrinaire Marxism were considered positivist in inspiration or tendency, as were mechanical, 'atomistic' or otherwise reductive analyses of organic processes, complex mental states, cultural meanings, or social wholes.

According to a generally accepted historical thesis, the decline of Idealist philosophy set the stage for an era of positivism that extended from the 1840s into the 1880s. The 'positivism' of the intervening decades was less a set of stated theories than a cluster of vaguely scientistic attitudes, tacit assumptions, and research practices. This was of course a period of very high achievement for the German research university; but it also looked in retrospect like an unphilosophical epoch. An attack upon its assumptions was launched during the 1880s by a 'critical' and empiricist strand of neoKantianism that was eventually superseded by the more 'constructive' rationalism of the Baden neo-Kantians and allied schools. In a brief history of German philosophy, Wilhelm Windelband described the difference between the 'critical' neo-Kantians and his own later and more 'doctrinal' position in the following terms.

> This agnostic neo-Kantianism of the eighth and ninth decade of the nineteenth century had a decided bias toward positivism, because it neglected the rational element in (Kant's) critical philosophy. The empiricist epistemology that was read into Kant tended to replace philosophical criticism with a psychological and causal analysis (of experience). And because it confused Kantian a priority with psychic priority, it ended by leaning again toward David Hume on the one hand and toward Auguste Comte on the other. But the consequence of this empiricism...was the complete reduction of philosophy to epistemology. This had never been truly intended by Kant: He always saw his 'critical task'...as a prelude to 'doctrinal' work. The epistemology that partly identified itself with his name, however, was at bottom the deliberate abandonment of all Weltanschauung based on Wissenschaft. And in this abdication, in this empiricism, a certain

naive materialism probably also played a confused and unconscious role.[24]

The passage is not an unsophisticated polemic; it could easily be further elaborated and even partly defended. Yet it also shows quite plainly how broad the charge of positivism actually was, how thoroughly it was linked to an even broader case against untutored empirical research itself, and how the critique of naive empiricism in turn was informed be a determination to revive aspects of Kantian and post-Kantian Idealism. In sum, the widespread concern over the problematic consequences of excessive specialization that actually deepened from the 1890s to the 1920s reflected a sense that the eminent successes of the German research university during the nineteenth century were accompanied by a loss of philosophical coherence. Scientif ic and scholarly practice had lost touch with its theoretical foundations in German Idealism. To overcome the problems raised by specialization and positivism alike, it was commonly believed, there was an urgent need for a revitalization of philosophical Idealism that would also reinstate Wissenschaft as a ground for an integral and partly normative Weltanschauung.

Another way to understand the profound uneasiness expressed again and again in German academic comments on specialization is to return once more to Simmel's passage on 'cultivation', which in fact occurred in one of several essays he wrote between 1900 and 1910 on the concept and the 'tragedy' of culture.[25] In all of these essays, Simmel drew on the key definitions of neoIdealist cultural philosophy. In his use of a common terminology, 'personal culture' was identical with 'cultivation'; 'subjective mind' stood for the experience and thought of the individual knower and, by extension, of mankind in general; 'objective' mind or culture encompassed the external expressions of subjective mind, the social and material forms in which it is fixed and transmitted. Simmel emphasized that subjective and objective mind can only develop in dialectical interaction; a purely subjective life can never attain any degree of complexity or coherence. On the other hand, the inescapable need for objectification leads to consequences that have a tragic aspect. The fullness and elasticity of subjective culture give rise to the diversity and rigidity of objective mind. As the latter grows ever more extensive, there is an increasing 'incommensurability' between the subjective and objective poles in the dialectic of cultural development and of individual Bildung. An estrangement occurs as well; for the reified elements of the

objective culture acquire a necessity of their own. Man is oppressed by the artifacts, institutions, and theories he has invented; he does not recognize them as his creatures; they confront him as alien forces. The division of labor and intellectual specialization are the two great exemplars of the disjunction between subjective and objective mind. The subjective mind of the producer is drained into machines and commodities that empoverish and enslave him. Harmonious individual cultivation becomes ever more difficult; means overwhelm ends, and sensitive individuals acquire something close to a hatred of the objective culture that threatens to engulf them.

Though influenced by Marx, Simmel made no serious effort to distinguish between the timeless paradoxes of objectification and their historical embodiments in a particular place and time, or between their unavoidable and their malignant or curable forms. The neo-Idealist framework also obscured the need for a separation of causes from effects, or of the social from the intellectual dimensions of alienation. But I cannot here attempt a fuller discussion of Simmel's texts, or of their intellectual ancestry. All I mean to suggest is that his vivid portrait of modern dilemmas drew much of its force from the perceived tension between scientific specialization and personal Bildung. Simmel was certainly not alone in observing this tension. He merely articulated more completely what many of his colleagues also felt and feared: that objective and subdivided Wissenschaft was losing its former relevance to Bildung, to personal knowledge or wisdom. Thus the inherited distinction between inward 'culture' and outward 'civilization' was revived in the decades after 1890, and the word 'civilization' now took on a broader meaning as well. It no longer referred only to superficial good manners, or to mere 'virtuosity and refinement' in Simmel's terms; but also to merely external progress, to urbanization and technology, to scientific specialization and social rationalization, or to all those aspects of the modern environment that seemed inimical to man's inner development. Indeed, the perceived threat to personal culture sometimes gave rise to fearful and all-encompassing visions of 'civilization' as decadence and decline.[28]

Simmel's reflections on the 'tragedy of culture' convey the image of the sorcerer's apprentice who has raised spirits that now elude his control. This impotence in the face of alien forces was a recurrent theme also in what the mandarin intellectuals wrote specifically about their social and political environment after 1890. It seemed to many of them that their world was increasingly dominated by blind economic processes, by the power of money,

and by the weight of numbers. 'Mind' appeared to have lost its influence in public life; for ideas and principles played a shrinking role in the organized confrontation among organizations and political machines. Before 1918, most German academics liked to think, against strong evidence to the contrary, that the bureaucratic monarchy could 'rise above' class conf lict and reverse the disaffection of 'the masses' by pursuing a paternalist program of 'social policy'. Economic individualism and unrestrained capitalism found few supporters in the German academic community; the mandarin intellectuals were not 'bourgeois thinkers' in that sense of the term. Yet many of them identified with the conservative and national forces in Wilhelmian politics, distrusted potentially democratic alternatives, and directed their deepest hostility against Social Democracy and the 'materialism' of 'the masses'.[37]

During the Weimar period, the 'orthodox' majority of German university professors supported the 'national' opposition to the new regime. Unable to perceive democratic liberalism as a genuine political principle, and unwilling seriously to address the distributive questions that strained the Republic's parliamentary system, the orthodox mandarins became addicted to what a critic called 'merciless moralizing'. Striking a characteristically 'apolitical' pose, they preached the primacy of 'the whole' or of the 'national community' over its parts, or the need for an 'idealistic' alternative to economic class conflict. Some dreamed of an 'intellectual revolution' that would restore the empire of 'mind' in public affairs, and of course such 'apolitical' or 'idealistic' prophecies had very material consequences.[38]

In both the Wilhelmian and Weimar periods, to be sure, a substantial minority of German university faculty in the humanities and social sciences took less one-sided positions on the political issues of their time. They were more critical than their colleagues of the Wilhelmian political and social system, and they partly or wholly resisted the annexationist hysteria that infected the German academic community during the First Wold War. After 1918, they supported the genuinely republican parties. In this they were guided less by a genuine enthusiasm for democracy, not to mention socialism, than by a sense of realism, and by the hope that the Republic might be encouraged to pursue moderate policies. Among the members of this relatively progressive minority, some were determined cultural individualists and therefore 'liberals' in some sense of that term; others more closely resembled the type of the enlightened or reformist 'conservative'; only

a handful directed truly radical criticisms at the political assumptions prevailing among their colleagues. In short, the republicans among German academics of the Weimar period took a wide range of specific positions. Yet I chose to call them all 'modernists' or 'radical modernists', because they held one important belief in common. This was that the German intellectual heritage had to be systematically reexamined in the light of modern conditions, that patently outmoded or socially indefensible accretions had to be stripped away, so that the vital core of the tradition could be preserved and transmitted to a wider audience in an inescapably more democratic age.[29]

The modernists asked themselves, for example, how the ideal of selfcultivation might be relevant to the experience of a factory worker, or to a much enlarged system of secondary schooling, or to sources of Bildung other than those of classical antiquity. In pursuit of the modernist program, such scholars as Troeltsch and Simmel in fact became critical 'translators' of German Idealism and Romanticism, of the hermeneutic method, or of the 'principle of individuality'. In almost every discipline, and especially in the social sciences, some of the prominent innovators were modernists, and this is not surprising. For the modernists were open to the creative experience of intellectual incongruity. While the orthodox almost unconsciously perpetuated the ideology of Bildung in its socially confirmative form, the modernists had to raise that ideology to critical consciousness. Thus my distinction between 'orthodoxy' and 'modernism' is meant to capture something more than the divide between the right and the centre left in a political spectrum. It is also intended to point up the crucial difference between the unreflected transmission and the conscious clarification of a tradition.

During the 1920s, German academics have much attention to what they called 'the crisis of Wissenschaft'. In describing this crisis, they usually expressed the well-established view that excessive specialization posed a threat not only to the coherence of knowledge, but also to the interconnections between Wissenschaft, Bildung, and Weltanschauung. Moreover, the divide between the orthodox and the modernists, which deepened greatly after 1918, now came to affect methodological positions to an unprecedented degree. Thus the recurrent demand for 'synthesis', though initially expressed by some modernists as well, became ever more clearly an orthodox device. Indeed, 'synthesis' itself was more and more broadly

conceived. At first, it meant no more than cognitive integration, the attempt to interrelate research hypotheses and results; but it ultimately acquired much wider connotations as well. Thus the neo-idealist revival of the Geisteswissenschaften since the 1880s was reinterpreted to signify a more integral and spiritually profitable engagement with the values embedded in great texts. The rhetoric of Erleben was used to suggest an intuitive identification, just as 'phenomenological' methods were taken to authorize a direct 'viewing' of 'essential' meanings (Wesensschau). 'Synthesis' seemed to offer a cure for 'positivism', which occasionally came to stand for the analytical 'dissolution' (Zersetzung) of inherited convictions and moral certainties.[30]

Thus the 'crisis of Wissenschaft' tended to merge with the 'intellectual revolution', the 'idealistic' revolt against 'shallow rationalism' and modern 'materialism'. Even among the orthodox, there were those who resisted the siren call of Weltanschauung. But especially among the younger scholars, a number were tempted by what was plainly an irrationalist revulsion against the limitations of reason, and a caricature of the German conception of Wissenschaft and of Bildung.

NOTES

1. From Der grosse Brockhaus, 15th ed. (1928-35) as cited in Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community 1890-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 86; for German originals of texts cited, see the translation: Die Gelehrten: Der Niedergang der deutschen Mandarine 1890-1933 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1983).

2. What follows is not intended as an analysis of a few individual texts, but as a summary description of a 'random sample' of writings; the sample covers men holding full appointments in 'philosophical' faculties of selected German universities between 1890 and 1933, except for those in the natural sciences. See also Fritz Ringer, 'Differences and CrossNational Similarities among Mandarins,' Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. XX (1986), pp. 145-164.

3. Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, p. 107; see also note 25 below.

4. Ibid., p. 179.

5. Ibid., pp. 90-99, 102-103.

6. Ibid., pp. 315-334; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 4th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975).

7. Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 99-102, 108, 117-118.

8. Ibid., pp. 324-325.

9. Ibid., pp. 100-101 and pp. 160, 185-187, 195-196 for the context that follows. Troeltsch's essay was entitled 'Naturrecht und Humanität in der Weltpolitik.' Steven Lukes also draws on this essay, as well as on Simmel, in a very clear, comparative account of the German concept of individuality; see Steven Lukes, Individualism, Key Concepts in the Social Sciences (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), esp. pp. 17-32.

10. Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 103-107.

11. Ibid., pp. 109-113.

12. Ibid., pp. 141-143, 218-219.

13. See esp. Rudolf Vierhaus, 'Bildung,' in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck, eds., Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. I (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972), pp. 508-551.

14. Pierre Bourdieu, La distinction (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1979), p. 23. Bourdieu's work has had much influence on mine.

15. Humboldt's sense of 'reine Wissenschaft' was probably less formal than some of his later German interpreters have suggested; he thought the universities and research should not aim at usefulness, but might then

prove practically beneficial in fact. See Wilhelm von Humboldt, 'Uber die innere und aussere Organisation der hoheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin,' in Die Idee der deutschen Universität: Die fünf Grundschriften (Darmstadt: Hermann Gentner, 1956), pp. 377-386; David Sorkin, 'Wilhelm von Humboldt: The Theory and Practice of SelfFormation (Bildung), 1791-1810,' Journal of the History of Ideas (1983), pp. 55-73; Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 23-25, 110-111, 1 15-1 17, 126-127.

16. See W. H. Bruford, The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation: 'Bildung' from Humboldt to Thomas Mann (Cambridge University Press, 1975), and my review of this book in Central European History, vol. XI, no. 1 (March 1978), pp. 107-113.

17. Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 26-32, 48-51, 292-293. For a good account of changes in the accreditation of German secondary programs during the late nineteenth century, as well as of the public discussion on these issues, see James C. Albisetti, Secondary School Reform in Imperial Germany (Princeton University Press, 1983).

18. Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 67-74, 274-279.

19. Ibid., pp. 282-289 (quotation p. 287).

20. Ibid., p. 109.

21. Ibid., p. 288.

22. Ibid., pp. 77-79 (quotation p. 79).

23. Ibid., pp. 253-257, 295-307, including for what follows.

24. Ibid., p. 307.

25. Ibid., pp. 263-265, and note 22. The key essays are 'Persönliche und sachliche Kultur,' Neue deutsche Rundschau, vol. 11 (1900), pp. 700-

712; 'Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur.' Philosophische Kultur: Gesammelte Essais (Leipzig, 1911), pp. 245-277, and Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur: Ein Vortrag, 2. ed. (Munich, 1921); but see also 'Die Arbeitsteilung als Ursache für das Auseinandertreten der subjektiven und der objektiven Kultur' (1900), in Georg Simmel, Schriften zu Soziologie: Eine Auswahl, ed. H.-J. Dahme and O. Rammstedt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983).

26. Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins, pp. 261-263, 265-266.

27. Ibid., pp. 144-148, 234, 241-250.

28. Ibid., pp. 128-130, 213-227, 237.

29. Ibid., pp. 130-134, 203-213, 236-239, 269-282, including for what follows.

30. Ibid., pp. 334-351, 372-373, 380-403.

"DER LIEBE GOTT STECKT IM DETAIL DER DUCE IST NICHT AUS EMAIL"

Heinrich Dilly

Fritz Ringer hat in seinem Referat über die "Bildung and its Implications in the German Tradition, 1890-1930" über die Mehrheit der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftler in Deutschland gesprochen. Er ist von explizit vorgetragenen Ideen und Überzeugungen ausgegangen und hat diese auf ihren politischen, ideologischen und theoretischen Gehalt hin überprüft. Ringer interessiert sich für die Bildungstheorie; ich möchte über die Bildungspraxis berichten. Allerdings werde ich nicht über die Bildungspraxis der Mehrheit, sondern einer kleinen Minderheit sprechen.

Die handvoll Wissenschaftler, über deren Wirken ich seit langerem forsche, arbeitete in den zwanziger und noch zu Beginn der dreissiger Jahre an einem Institut, das heute in London steht. Ich meine das Warburg Institute, dessen Heimat bis 1933 die Stadt Hamburg war. Gegenüber Ringers Untersuchung verschiebe ich das zeitliche Gewicht an den Punkt, der auch deren Fluchtpunkt bildet. Es ist die von Ringer lediglich implizit ausgedrückte Frage: Warum haben hunderte, angesehende deutsche Professoren offentlich um Vertrauen zu Adolf Hitler geworben?[1] Warum haben sich tausende arglos in die nationalsozialistische Diktatur gefügt und so zu deren Stabilisierung beigetragen? Warum hat die ehrwürdige deutsche Universität klaglos versagt, als die Nazis wenigstens zweitausend ihrer Hochschullehrer aufgrund von politischen und rassistischen Wahnvorstellungen entlassen haben?[2]

Dieses wissenschaftssoziologische Problem wird seit langem diskutiert und auf eine Reihe unterschiedlicher Gründe zurückgeführt.[3] Mein Problem hangt damit zusammen, ist jedoch etwas anders gelagert. Was aus den Opfern der Nazis geworden ist, möchte ich wissen. Und: Wer hat die Sache weitergeführt, um die sich die besagte Minderheit bis 1933 forschend und lehrend bemüht hat?

Was die Warburgianer angeht, so kann ich vorab mit Fug und Recht sagen: sie haben inzwischen höchstes Ansehen erreicht. Zu Bildungsidealen sind sie geradezu geworden. Allerdings muss ich sofort einschränken: sie haben höchstes wissenschaftsethisches Prestige erreicht. Die besondere Kulturwissenschaft aber, um die es ihnen vor 1933 ging, wurde nur von einigen wenigen weitergeführt. Als überholt wird sogar ein Bereich ihrer Forschungen abgetan, der innerhalb dieser Kulturwissenschaft einen grossen Teil besetzt hatte, - die ikonologische Analyse. Der Grund dafür liegt meines Erachtens in einem geistigen Berufsbeamtentum, das auch nach der Befreiung vom Nationalsozialismus das Bildungssystem immer noch, ja: mehr denn je lähmt. Die Kulturindustrie, zu deren Entwicklung der Nationalsozialismus und der Faschismus schubkräftig beigetragen haben, lässt für überdisziplinare Forschungen, wie sie an der Bibliothek Warburg betrieben worden sind, fast keinen Raum und keine Zeit. Sie verlangt die Erfüllung kurzfristiger politischer Legitimationsbedürfnisse und verhindert so die Ausbildung einer historischen und systematischen Kulturwissenschaft.

Doch lassen Sie mich zunächst über die Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg in Hamburg und über das Kunsthistorische Seminar der Hamburgischen Universität erzählen. Und lassen Sie mich meinen Bericht zunächst noch gliedern.
In einem ersten Abschnitt (1) werde ich über die Bibliothek Warburg sprechen, über deren Eingang das Wort M N E M O S Y N E stand, - und noch steht. In einem zweiten Teil (2) werde ich über das Kunsthistorische Seminar berichten, das in ursprünglichen Sinne des Wortes als 'Pflanzstatte' der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Bibliothek Warburg 1926 gegründet worden ist. Im dritten Abschnitt (3) werde ich über die Studenten erzählen, die auch nach 1933 dem Beispiel ihrer Professoren Warburg, Panofsky und Saxl gefolgt sind und so gegen die nationalsozialistische Kulturpropaganda gearbeitet haben. Zuletzt (4) werde ich zwei Briefe zitieren, die 1946 verfasst worden sind. Sie bestätigen erneut: "Der liebe Gott steckt im Detail. Der Duce ist nicht aus Email."

1

Aby Moritz Warburg (1867-1929) hat selbst folgende Geschichte erzählt. Als er dreizehn Jahre alt war, verkaufte er sein Erstgeburtsrecht an

Max, seinen jüngeren Bruder. Gegen das Versprechen, jedes Buch, das er zu lesen wünsche, erwerben zu können, sagte sich Warburg vom Bankgeschaft seiner Eltern und Vorfahren los.

Er besuchte das Realgymnasium, eignete sich nach der Reifeprüfung die Kenntnis der alten Sprachen an, und studierte anschliessend Archäologie, Geschichte, Philosophie und Kunstgeschichte an den Universitäten in Bonn und in Strassburg. 1892 wurde aufgrund einer Dissertation über "die Vorstellungen von der Antike in der italienischen Renaissance" an der Universität Strassburg zum Doktor der Philosophie im Fach Kunstgeschichte promoviert. Die Arbeit, die er als Fortführung einiger Einsichten Jacob Burckhardts verstand, und die dieser auch als solche akzeptierte[4], trug den durchaus schon symptomatischen Titel Sandro Botticellis 'Geburt der Venus' und 'Frühling'.[5] An zwei einzelnen, wohlbekannten Gemälden hatte Warburg also den Versuch unternommen, "das" darzulegen, "was die Künstler des Quattrocento an der Antike 'interessiert'.[6] Dies war die "auf Grund des damaligen Wissens von der Antike ausgebildete Neigung", auf "die Kunstwerke des Alterthums zurückzugreifen, sobald es sich um die Verkörperung äusserlich bewegten Lebens handelte", wie Warburg am Ende des ersten Kapitels formulierte.[7]

Auch nach der Promotion setzte Warburg seine Studien fort. Er belegte zunächst psychologische Vorlesungen bei dem Berliner Gelehrten Hermann Ebbinghaus, der die Funktionsweise des Gedächtnisses mit Hilfe von Selbstversuchen experimentell erforscht, damit eine ganze Welle weiterer Untersuchungen ausgelöst und bei Warburg den Willen gestärkt hat, das soziale Gedächtnis der Völker zum Gegenstand seiner eigenen Forschungen zu machen.

Auf einer Reise durch die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika trieb Warburg dann ethnologische Studien bei den Pueblo-Indianern. Er entdeckte dabei für sich "den organischen Zusammenhang zwischen Kunst und Religion", und sah - wie er später schrieb - "seinen Glauben an ein idyllisch gemütliches Märchenland als gemeinsame Urheimat des Menschen vor dem Sündenfall der Aufklärung gründlich" zerstört.[8] In der Folgezeit hielt er sich vorwiegend in Italien auf. Er vertiefte sich in die historischen Hilfswissenschaften, insbesondere um im florentinischen Staatsarchiv die historischen Quellen zur Geschichte des kaufmännischen Bürgertums auswerten zu können. Dies nicht etwa um sie einer Wirtschaftsgeschichte, sondern der Kulturwissenschaft zu erschliessen.

Als ihm klar geworden war, dass er nicht zum ordentlich öffentlichen deutschen Universitätsprofessor tauge, machte er - 1902 nach Hamburg zurückgekehrt - vom Vertrag mit seinem jüngeren Bruder rigorösen Gebrauch. Warburg baute seine Bibliothek zu einer privaten Forschungseinrichtung aus. Ab 1908 benötigte er die Mitarbeit eines Bibliothekars. Und als 1912 die Büchersammlung auf ungefähr 15.000 Bände angewachsen war, engagierte er schon seinen zweiten, ausgesprochenen Forschungsassistenten: Fritz Saxl, der ein Kenner der alten Sprachen und zugleich Kunsthistoriker war.[9]

Ohne öffentliche Worte darüber zu verlieren, geschweige denn ein Programm zu publizieren, wandelten Warburg und Saxl die Privatbibliothek nach und nach in eine öffentlich zugängliche Forschungsstätte um. Dies war wie Ringer eben wieder belegt hat - just zu der Zeit, in der man in Deutschland über den lahmenden Massenbetrieb an den universitären Einrichtungen klagte, und - wie Dieter Wuttke 1984 schrieb - von sogenannten "Professoren-Seminarien" rückblickend schwarmte.[10] Man konnte sich dann aber doch nur zur Gründung der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft und somit allein zur Hilfe für die Naturwissenschaften durchringen. Um die Kulturwissenschaften bemühten sich damals in eben diesem Sinne allein Karl Lamprecht und Aby M. Warburg. - Warburg, wie schon angedeutet, ausgesprochen pragmatisch, in durchaus hanseatischer Geschäftstradition. Über derartige Stiftungen redete man nicht; man machte sie einfach.[11]

Die Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg - wie sie dann hiess war keine Fach-, sondern eine "Problembibliothek". Sie war ausserdem ein gesellschaftliches Forum für die in Hamburg ansässigen und die in die Stadt geladenen Wissenschaftler.[12]

Die Bezeichnung "Problembibliothek" ist Warburgs eigenes Wort. Trotz der hohen Anzahl der Bücher und auch der photographischen Reproduktionen übernahmen Warburg und Saxl nicht die Schemata anderer Bibliotheken. Sie stellten die Werke weder nach der Grösse noch nach dem im 19. Jahrhundert ausdifferenzierten System der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften auf. Die Aufstellung selbst sollte die speziellen Forschungsinteressen spiegeln, sollte die Forschungsprobleme aufzeigen und den Forschungsprozess unmittelbar am Regal fordern.[13] 1926, als die Bibliothek in einem eigenen Gebäude neben Warburgs Wohnhaus untergebracht wurde, war sie - den Stockwerken entsprechend - in vier

grosse Abteilungen getrennt. Im Erdgeschoss fanden sich Publikationen über die Problematik des Ausdrucks in Religion, Philosophie und Wissenschaften sowie über die Natur der Symbole. Im zweiten Stockwerk waren Werke der Kunstgeschichte und -theorie zu finden. In der dritten Etage waren sprach- und literaturwissenschaftliche Bücher untergebracht. Unter dem Dach stand die Abteilung "Soziale Formen des menschlichen Lebens".[15] Es handelte sich also keineswegs um eine - wie oft angenommen wird kunstgesschichtliche Bibliothek, sondern um eine Sammlung von Publikationen über die verschiedenen Formen des Wissens. Man darf diese Bibliothek wohl zu Recht als eine wissenschaftliche Sammlung ansprechen, deren Akzent auf dem Wissen über die Antike in den unterschiedlichen Bereichen des menschlichen Lebens lag.

Warburgs eigene Forschungen lagen damals im Grenzbereich zwischen künstlerischen Ausdrucksformen und astrologischen Vorstellungen der Renaissance. 1912 hatte er die Lösung für ein monumentales Bilderratsel - die Fresken im Palazzo Schifanoja zu Ferrara - gefunden und vor dem Internationalem Kongress für Kunstgeschichte in Rom vorgetragen. Mit einem Plädoyer zugunsten "einer historischen Psychologie des menschlichen Ausdrucks" hatte er seine Ausführungen beendet.[15] 1920 erregte dann seine Abhandlung über "Heidnisch-antike Weissagung in Wort und Bild zu Luthers Zeiten" wissenschaftliches Aufsehen. Warburg hatte entdeckt, dass von einem italienischen Astrologen - Lucas Gauricus - das Geburtsdatum des Reformators zurechtgerückt worden ist, und dass dies bei Melanchthon, Carion und bei anderen sternkundigen Wittenberger Gelehrten Verständnis und Rückhalt gefunden hat, obwohl sich Luther selbst dagegen aufs schärfste zur Wehr gesetzt hat. Mit seinen Ausführungen konnte Warburg zeigen, dass "die antiken Gotter ununterbrochen seit dem Ausgange des Altertums zu den religiösen Mächten des christlichen Europa" gehörten, und "dass man ein von der christlichen Kirche stillschweigend geduldetes Nebenregiment der heidnischen Kosmologie, insbesondere der Astrologie, nicht leugnen kann." Er fasste seine Ergebnisse in der markanten Feststellung zusammen: "Die klassisch-veredelte, antike Götterwelt ist uns seit Winckelmann freilich so sehr als Symbol der Antike eingeprägt, dass wir ganz vergessen, dass sie eine Neuschöpfung der gelehrten humanistischen Kultur ist; diese 'olympische' Seite der Antike musste ja erst der althergebrachten 'dämonischen' abgerungen werden."[16]

Warburg bedauerte dieses 'Vergessen' nicht, oder wie man heute vielleicht sagen würde dieses Verdrängen der Vergangenheit. Er stimmte auch nicht in die kulturpessimistischen Klagen vieler Zeitgenossen ein. Vielmehr spürte er diesem Prozess vor allem in den Formen bildlichen Ausdrucks nach und zeichnete ihn an symptomatischen Punkten auf. An hochgerühmten Werken der bildenden Kunst, aber auch an kaum beachteten Briefmarken konnte er zeigen, dass antikes Gedanken- und Bildgut bis in die Gegenwart gewährt worden sind. Es gab also ein soziales Gedächtnis an die Antike, das sich immer wieder andere und neue Ausdrucksformen schaffte. Insbesondere in den Engrammen leidenschaftlicher Erfahrung wurde es präsent. Warburg nahm also einen schon von Herder ausgesprochenen und dann von Nietzsche weitergeführten Gedanken über den "tyrannischen Dogmatismus unserer Kultur" auf, "die um der 'Vernunft' zum Siege zu verhelfen, alle anderen seelischen und geistigen Kräfte im Menschen knechten und unterdrücken muss".[17] Die Art und Weise, wie sich diese unterdrückte "Heterogenität"[18] des Menschen dennoch in der Homogenität der modernen Gesellschaften mittels der bildlich festgehaltenen Gebärdensprache Ausdruck, ja Luft verschaffte, - dies war das Problem der Gedächtnis-Arbeit Aby M. Warburgs. Daher liess er auch in den Sturz über der Tür zur Bibliothek den uralten Begriff M N E M O S Y N E meisseln. Hesiod schon hatte Mnemosyne die Mutter der Musen genannt; Aristoteles hatte sie nicht nur als eine seelische, sondern auch körperliche Kraft bezeichnet; Hölderlin hatte in Mnemosyne den Auftrag des Dichters erkannt: das Andenken an das Fremde und Vergangene hatte dieser zu wahren. Heidegger verwendete denselben Begriff, um damit das Andenken an alles, was jemals gedacht worden ist und gedacht werden kann, zu umreissen. Warburg gab ihm die empirisch erforschte soziale Funktion und Dimension.

Weil aber geistesgeschichtliche Forschung nicht nur Geld kostet, und weil sie nicht allein der Stille bedarf, sondern das Beste risikoreichen Gesprächen verdankt, stand die Bibliothek Warburg - in einem der guten Wohnviertel Wassenaars gelegen - allen Interessierten offen. Hinter dem vielsagenden und mehr noch verschweigenden Motto der
M N E M O S Y N E gingen Philosophen, Religions- und Literaturwissenschaftler, Kenner der Mythologie und der Astrologie, der politischen, der Wissenschafts- und der Kunstgeschichte den unterschiedlichen Formen des menschlichen Vergessens und Erinnerns

nach. In der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Bibliothek fanden sie nicht nur Hilfsmittel in Form von Büchern und Photographien vor; sie konnten dort auch arbeiten und vor allem im Vortragssaal immer wieder ihre Einsichten vorstellen, diskutieren und dann revidiert in eigens herausgegebenen Druckschriften der Bibliothek Warburg publizieren.[19]

Dass diese Arbeit auch auf Hindernisse stiess, kann man nur vermuten. Es gibt nur wenige Hinweise darauf. Einer davon ist dieser: wenn Max Warburg, der Inhaber des Bankhauses, sich aber die hohen Kosten beklagte, die Aby Moritz' Bibliothek verursachte, dann pflegte ihn dieser mit folgenden Sätzen zu beruhigen: "Erfolgreiche Bankiers halten sich sonst einen Rennstall und werden von ihren Jockies und Trainern betrogen. Du hälst eine Bibliothek und hast den Vorteil eines Herrenreiters; der bin ich."[20]

2

Der Arbeitsplatz hiess also Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg. Warburg selbst hatte aber auch von einer historischen Psychologie des menschlichen Ausdrucks gesprochen, die es zu entwickeln gelte. Der Philosoph Ernst Cassirer arbeitete in der Bibliothek an seiner Philosophie der symbolischen Formen.[21] Kunsthistoriker rühmten die typengeschichtlichen Analysen, die hier insbesondere von Erwin Panofsky erstellt wurden. Der Niederländer Godefridus Johannes Hoogewerff sprach von einer Ikonologie, an der in Hamburg gearbeitet werde.[22] Und Walter Benjamin schrieb über die "religionshistorischen Studien" der Bibliothek Warburg, die "die Randgebiete der Geschichtswissenschaft mit frischem Leben" erfüllten.[23] Der begriffliche Nenner, auf den man die zahlreichen Arbeiten bringen konnte, war also keineswegs klar. Doch gab es so etwas wie einen Warburg-Stil. Und damit komme ich auf eine wenig beachtete Seite wissenschaftlicher Arbeit zu sprechen, - auf die Wissenschaftsästhetik, die ja nicht nur die meisten wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten formal regiert, sondern auch inhaltlich vorbereitet.

Der Warburg Stil zeichnete sich durch dreierlei aus. Erstens pflegte man das distanzierende Gedächtnis der Gelehrsamkeit und trennte sich von der Hierarchie eines verinnerlichten Bildungskanons. Zweitens arbeitete man punktuell und war sich dabei bewusst, dass eine kulturgeschichtliche Synthese erst in ferner Zukunft erreicht worden kann. Drittens hatte man -

ganz einfach gesagt - Witz. Man wusste, dass das Lachen der beste Start auch für das wissenschaftliche Denken ist.

In den einzelnen Arbeiten kamen diese Merkmale zum Tragen. Sie sind in zahlreichen Berichten überliefert. Etwa in der Erinnerung Carl Georg Heises an dessen ersten Besuch bei Aby M. Warburg. Heise, damals Abiturient mit der Absicht Kunstgeschichte zu studieren, fragte den Privatgelehrten um 1910 nach Literatur, die ihm den nötigen Überblick über das Fachgebiet verschaffen könne. "Ob die Kunstgeschichte von Springer oder die von Lübke-Semrau die bessere sei," erkundigte er sich und wurde "belehrt, dass solche volkstümlichen Enzyklopädien nur gut seien als Konfirmationsgeschenke für 'höhere Töchter' oder als Zierstücke des Bücherschrankes für Kommerzienrate; der Inhalt sei oberflächlich, die Lektüre langweilig, und in summa gar nicht zu bewältigen, bestenfalls spende die Betrachtung der Abbildungen sogenannte 'Anregung', und das sei bekanntlich etwas, was keine Folgen habe. Einzig auf die Folgen komme es aber an. Die Beendigung des einen Buches müsse von selbst den Wunsch zur Lektüre des nächsten wecken. Fernblicke von Bergeshohen müssten erwandert werden. Stufe um Stufe. Nicht mit dem populären Handbuch, sondern mit der wissenschaftlichen Einzeluntersüchung sei zu beginnen," sagte Warburg, und Heise erinnert sich nicht exakt daran, "ob schon damals das berühmt gewordene Wort fiel: 'Der liebe Gott steckt im Detail'." Er weiss aber, dass Warburg dementsprechend handelte, als er ein ganz bestimmtes Buch, und darin wieder ein einziges Kapitel als einführende Lektüre empfahl.[24]

Wie punktuell die Freunde Warburgs selbst äusserst komplexe Werke und Probleme angingen, zeigt - um ein weiteres Beispiel anzuführen - Erwin Panofskys letzter in Deutschland verfasster Aufsatz über ein Gemälde Rembrandts. Über das Motiv des in Leningrad ausgestellten Bildes waren sich damals die Kunsthistoriker nicht einig. Verschiedene Titel wurden diskutiert. Panofsky ging zur Lösung dieses Problems von einem zunächst kaum auffallenden Detail - einem gefesselten und weinenden Putto über dem Bett der dargestellten Gattin Rembrandts - aus. Er verfolgte dieses Attribut in den unterschiedlichsten Bildern seit der Antike, und er konnte dann konsequent daraus schliessen, dass der holländische Maler in diesem Falle seine Frau Saskia als Danae repräsentiert hatte. Panofskys Aufsatz mit dem Titel "Der gefesselte Eros" enthielt somit zum einen eine Bildgeschichte der im Laufe der Jahrhunderte veränderten Beziehungen zwischen Eheleuten,

zum anderen aber auch eine Erklärung für die besondere formale Gestaltung, die Rembrandt für dieses Motiv gefunden hatte. Der Aufsatz war ausserdem zugleich eine Gelegenheitsschrift anlässlich des Geburtstages eines wissenschaftlichen Freundes - Walther Friedländer, der sich intensiv mit der Kunst des Barock auseinandergesetzt hatte.[25] Die besondere Qualität derartiger, vom Detail ausgehender Forschungen liegt wohl darin, dass sie in die verschiedenen Bereiche des historischen Diskurses aufgenommen werden konnten. Man konnte den Aufsatz allein motivgeschichtlich lesen, konnte ihn aber auch als einen Beitrag zur Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen den Geschlechtern begreifen, oder auch als Artikel verstehen, der erneut das Problem der Kontinuität und Diskontinuität zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit aufwirft. Ohne ausdrücklich mit dem Finger darauf zu weisen, war auch dieser Aufsatz wie viele andere - ein Plädoyer für die Aufhebung der "grenzpolizeilichen Befangenheit" zwischen den einzelnen historischen Disziplinen. Man arbeitete wissenschaftlich, nicht fachwissenschaftlich. Und man arbeitete - wie gesagt - mit Witz, der allein schon aus solchen plastischen Formulierungen wie "grenzpolizeilich" erfahrbar wird.

In der Voraussicht auf den weiten Weg, der noch bis zur Wissenschaftlichkeit der historischen Disziplinen zurückzulegen ist, sorgte sich der kleine Stamm der Gelehrten um jüngere Mitarbeiter. Daher wurden nach der Gründung der Universität in Hamburg auch Seminare in die Bibliothek Warburg verlegt. Ernst Cassirer übte dort bisweilen mit seinen Studenten. Noch enger wurde das 1926 offiziell gegründete Kunsthistorische Seminar der Hamburgischen Universität an die Bibliothek gebunden. Als Pflanzstätte wurde es ihr zugeordnet und Erwin Panofsky als dessen Direktor "an erster und einziger Stelle" in Vorschlag gebracht. Dieser ungewöhnliche Berufungsvorschlag wurde damit begründet, dass die Philosophische Fakultät im Falle der Kunstgeschichte die besondere Ausrichtung wünsche, die durch die Bibliothek Warburg für das Fach eingeschlagen worden sei: das "bildhafte Material der Kunstgeschichte" sollte "zu einer Dokumentensammlung für vergleichende Kulturwissenschaft" umgestaltet werden: "erst wenn das Bildelement durch das dazugehörige Wort um seine Dimension bereichert ist, verkündet das Kunstgebilde Aussagen über den Sinn des Phänomens bildhafter Orientierung in Raum und Zeit," - konstatierte die Fakultät.[26]

Sie erteilte Aby M. Warburg und Fritz Saxl Lehraufträge, so dass dann 1927 insgesamt fünf Professoren 30 Studenten der Kunstgeschichte betreuten.[27] Diese Zahl allein genügt, um anzudeuten, was damals einer Stadt wie Hamburg "Bildung" - wie Warburg betonte - wert war. Diese Relation macht auch klar, weshalb es keiner ausgearbeiteter Curricula bedurfte: Studenten und Professoren hatten für einander Zeit. Erwartungsvoll sprach man gleichberechtigt miteinander. Typisch ist der Bericht, den Claire Lachmann - heute Kunsthistorikerin in Israel - gab, als sie 1981 schrieb: "So ging ich - nicht wissend, wie unverfroren das war -, zu Dr. Saxl, ins Privathaus von Prof. Warburg und bat ihn, mich in sein Seminar aufzunehmen. Er lachte und meinte, das wäre fürs 2. Semester zu früh, schlug mir aber gleichzeitig eine Aufgabe vor, herauszufinden, woher die merkwürdige Schöpfungsgeschichte in Modena komme - vielleicht Beziehungen zu den katalanischen Bibeln, deren Publikation gerade erfolgt war, - kurz, diese Aufgabe verfolgte ich fünf Jahre," und man darf hinzufügen: zusammen mit Fritz Saxl fünf Jahre.[28]

3

Es war wohl im Herbst des Jahres 1933. Bei dem Archäologen Alexander Willem Byvanck in Leiden traf ein nicht datierter Brief aus Rom ein. Hugo Buchthal - so der Absender - berichtete dem "sehr verehrten Herrn Professor", er "habe im Juli dieses Jahres an der Universität Hamburg mit einer Arbeit über den Codex Parisinus Graecus 1939 promoviert". Angeregt durch seine Lehrer Panofsky und Saxl habe er sich daher mit Problemen beschäftigt, mit denen sich auch Byvanck auseinandersetze. Daher erlaube er sich, ihm zu schreiben und in Kürze die Dissertation zu senden. Allerdings betrachte er die Arbeit keineswegs als abgeschlossen. "Aus äusseren Gründen" habe er nämlich die Dissertation "früher einreichen müssen", als er "ursprünglich beabsichtigt habe." Mit ihrem Ausbau sei er jetzt in Rom beschäftigt; damit gab er zu erkennen, dass er von Byvancks Kommentar und Kritik weitere Anregungen erhoffe.[29]

Was die "äusseren Gründe" anging, die den vorzeitigen Abschluss der Dissertation erzwungen hatten, so kannte sie Byvanck nicht nur aus der Presse. Selbst an der Rijksuniversiteit Leiden war 1933 eine Flugschrift erschienen, die als "Förderung der Stunde" das nationalsozialistische "Juden raus!" propagierte. Mit "tiefer Abscheu und tiefer Verachtung" konnten die

Universitätsangehörigen in Leiden noch den Anfängen wehren.[30] In Deutschland war es zu diesem Zeitpunkt schon viel zu spät. Die nationalsozialistisch bestimmten Behörden entliessen die jüdischen, sozialistischen und kommunistischen Dozenten. So auch in Hamburg.

Bis auf einen Privatdozenten - Werner Burmeister - war zunächst allen Wissenschaftlern am Kunsthistorischen Seminar nahegelegt worden, im Sommersemester die Lehrveranstaltung nicht wieder aufzunehmen. Vor Beginn des Wintersemesters wurden sie dann offiziell entlassen. Daher hatte Panofsky Hugo Buchthal und zwei weiteren Studenten geraten, ihre Dissertationen so schnell es nur möglich war, abzuschliessen und einzureichen.

Als am 10. Mai 1933 deutsche Studenten Bücher verbrannten, war es für Fritz Saxl, Gertrud Bing[31] und die Familie Warburg - Aby M. Warburg war 1929 verstorben - klar, dass die inzwischen 60.000 Bände der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Bibliothek, aber auch das wissenschaftliche Forum, das sie geschaffen hatten, vor den Übergriffen der Nationalsozialisten nicht mehr sicher waren. Sie bemühten sich um die Rettung des Instituts ins benachbarte Ausland, was dann noch im Herbst 1933 gelang. Erwin Panofsky konnte im darauf folgenden Jahr in die Vereinigten Staaten nach Princeton emigrieren.

Damit endet im allgemeinen die Geschichte des Warburg-Instituts und die der Warburgianer in Deutschland. Man weiss: die meisten Freunde und Mitarbeiter an der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Bibliothek waren wie Warburg selbst, deutsche Juden. Lässt man hier aber die deutsche Geschichte des Warburg Instituts enden, dann wird man ihrer wissenschaftssoziologischen und wissenschaftspolitischen Reichweite nicht gerecht.

Dass es den Nazis auch darum ging, ganz bestimmte wissenschaftliche Orientierungen zu eliminieren, ist bekannt. Dass es ihnen auch im Falle der Kulturwissenschaft darum ging, geht aus einer ideologischen Auseinandersetzung und aus der universitätspolitischen Praxis hervor.

Zum ersten. Am 5. Januar 1935 erschien im Völkischen Beobachter ein Artikel von einem weiter nicht bekannten Autor namens Martin Rasch mit dem Titel: "Juden und Emigranten machen deutsche Wissenschaft." Rasch nahm die Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliographie zum Nachleben der Antike, die 1934 vom Warburg Institute in London herausgegeben wurde,

zum Anlass, deren Mitarbeiter zu diffamieren. Die ganze Arbeit hielt er für unnütz. Er charakterisierte sie als "fast schon Wissenschaft über Wissenschaft".[32] Er traf ins Schwarze, denn er hielt damit die kritische Funktion der Warburgianer fest. Kritik wurde, wo auch immer von den Nazis unterbunden, im Falle der bildenden Kunst, der Musik und der Literatur, dem Theater sogar ausdrücklich verboten. Dass die Nationalsozialisten in Hamburg daher auch die Arbeit der Bibliothek und des Seminars verhindern mussten, geht daraus hervor. Sie konnten eine wissenschaftliche Gemeinschaft nicht dulden, die es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht hatte, das Problem der bildlichen Orientierung in Raum und Zeit zu erforschen. Ein Regime, das unter anderem auf die Faszination setzte, die grosse Worte und bewegende Bilder auszulösen vermögen, konnte nicht Forschungen fördern, die in Bildern und Worten den Ausdruck und die Bedeutung unterdrückter Gefühle und Leidenschaften, ja die Spuren des Leidens erkannten.

Zum zweiten. Der Artikel im Völkischen Beobachter bleibt jedoch eine Marginalie gegenüber der universitätspolitischen Handlungsweise der Nazis in Hamburg. Der kunsthistorische Lehrstuhl wurde nämlich nicht nur nicht wieder besetzt, sondern für die Einrichtung eines neuen Ordinariats für Überseegeschichte verwendet. Die Studentenschaft wurde drastisch reduziert. Waren es im Sommersemester 1932 insgesamt 31 Studierende, die in Hamburg Kunstgeschichte und Klassische Archäologie studierten, so konnten sich schon zum Sommersemester 1933 nur noch 21 Studenten zurückmelden. Ein Jahr später - im Sommer 1934 - waren es nur noch neun Kommilitonen und Kommilitoninnen, im Sommersemester 1937 lediglich drei.[33] Verwaltet wurde das Seminar von zwei Privatdozenten. Der eine von ihnen - Werner Burmeister - stand voll und ganz auf der Seite der nationalsozialistischen Partei. Der andere - Ludwig Heinrich Heydenreich - suchte als Schüler Panofskys den Studierenden dadurch zu helfen, dass er - wie Willibald Sauerländer schrieb - eine "urbane, weltoffene Wissenschaft lehrte und auf verpflichtende Weise vorlebte."[34] 1936 musste aber auch er das Hamburger Seminar verlassen.

Offensichtlich war es die Absicht der nationalsozialistischen Behörden Hamburgs, die Erinnerung an die ehemaligen Lehrer erst zu tilgen, ehe sie dann - 1938 - wieder eine ordentliche Vertretung des Faches Kunstgeschichte an der Universität zuliessen, was allerdings praktisch erst im Jahre 1940 geschehen konnte.[35]

Fünf Jahre lang hielten die an der Universität verbliebenen Schüler der Bibliothek Warburg und des Seminars von Panofsky und Saxl an den Zielen fest, die sie mit ihren Lehrern abgesteckt hatten. Sie arbeiteten in kleinem Kreis am Seminar und in einer Villa an der Elbchaussee an ihren Themen weiter. Weil sie und ihre vertriebenen Lehrer von Werner Burmeister ständig diffamiert wurden und dann auch noch aus dem Seminar ausgeschlossen werden sollten, wagte es schliesslich einer der Studenten gegen Burmeister juristisch vorzugehen. Aber auch die wenigen, noch verbliebenen Rechte wurden ihnen genommen. Die Klage wurde niedergeschlagen.

Aus den erhaltenen Akten des begonnenen Verfahrens und aus einigen mündlichen Berichten, weiss man heute über diese "Panofsky-Gruppe" am Kunsthistorischen Seminar der Universität Hamburg. Zu ihr zählten Erna Mandowsky, Ursula Hoff, William S. Heckscher, Lotte Brand Philip, Pia von Reutter, Lise Lotte Moöler und Horst W. Janssen. Zu ihr dürfen auch Klaus Hinrichsen und Wolfgang Lotz gerechnet werden, die zwar erst 1933 zum Studium nach Hamburg gekommen waren, sich den 'Ehemaligen' jedoch sofort angeschlossen haben. Lotz war es, der den Zufluchtsort an der Elbchause zur Verfügung stellen konnte. Rudolf Hoffmann - von den Kommilitonen 'NasenHoffmann' gerufen -, der die Klage angestrengt hat, zählte offenbar nicht zum engeren Kreis der Panofsky-Gruppe.

Die ausserordentlich früh gezogene Konsequenz seitens der Bibliotheksleitung einerseits und die wissenschaftspolitische Insubordination der Studierenden andererseits zeugen dafür, dass gerade diese Wissenschaftler, die sich bis dahin von der Tagespolitik sehr fern gehalten hatten, sehr genau die Stunden politischen Handelns erkannt haben. Ich meine, dass sie diese Fertigkeit gewiss einem allgemein beobachteten Phänomen danken. Man weiss, dass höhe Spezialisierung zur Resistenz gegenüber anderen, auch aktuellen Aufgaben führt. Sie danken diese Haltung aber auch einem Bewusstsein, das die Begrenztheit - um nicht zu sagen die Borniertheit - wissenschaftlichen Wissens im Vergleich zu anderen Formen des verbreiteten Wissens reflektiert. Ich weiss keine Formulierung, die - auf die historische Situation um 1933 bezogen - diesen Sachverhalt besser dokumentiert, als der dadaistisch anmutende Reim: "Der liebe Gott steckt im Detail - Der Duce ist nicht aus Email." Ihn verfassten Studierende der Bibliothek Warburg anlässlich von Aby M. Warburgs 60.

Geburtstag im Sommer 1927. Indem sie einen der Wahlsprüche ihres verehrten Lehrers Warburg mit dem Hinweis auf das aktuelle Ereignis eines leider misslungenen Anschlags auf Mussolini poetisch verbanden, zeigten sie zweierlei auf: erstens, der modernen Barbarei kann nur mit Hilfe genauester Kenntnis aller Details widerstanden werden, und zweitens, das wissenschaftlich gesicherte Wissen macht innerhalb dieser Kenntnis nur einen winzigen Teil aus.

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1946 - also neunzehn Jahre nachdem dieser Reim in Hamburg die Runde gemacht hatte, dreizehn Jahre nachdem die Bibliothek Warburg nach London emigriert war, und zwölf Jahre nachdem Erwin Panofsky die Stadt verlassen hatte, ein Jahr nachdem sie von der Diktatur befreit war - schrieb der sicher republikanisch gesinnte Kultussenator einen Brief mit folgendem Wortlaut an Erwin Panofsky in Princeton: "Sehr geehrter Herr Professor, Es ist mit eine besondere Freude und Genugtuung, Sie hierdurch auf Vorschlag der Philosophischen Fakultat der Universitat Hamburg auf den vakanten Lehrstuhl für Kunstgeschichte zu berufen. Die Philosophische Fakultät und ich gedenken Ihres jahrelangen erfolgreichen Wirkens auf diesem Lehrstuhl, das in Hamburg unvergessen geblieben ist, und wurden es daher herzlich begrüssen, wenn Sie sich entschliessen könnten, auf ihren alten Lehrstuhl zurückzukehren. Ich ware Ihnen besonders verbunden, wenn Sie mir Ihre Entscheidung recht bald mitteilen konnten."[37]

Mit der Veröffentlichung dieses Briefes hoffte 1968 ein ehemaliger Beamter der Hochschulbehörde in Hamburg eine Behauptung entkraften zu konnen, die damals gegenüber der Wissenschaftspolitik in Deutschland erhoben worden ist, - die Behauptung und der Vorwurf nämlich, dass unmittelbar nach der Befreiung vom Nationalsozialismus nichts getan worden sei, um die 1933 und später vertriebenen Hochschullehrer zurückzugewinnen. Dem lieben Gott im Detail sei Dank, dass der ehemalige Beamte auch noch einen zweiten Brief veröffentlicht hat. Es ist die Antwort Erwin Panofskys, die am 15. Juni 1946 in Hamburg eingetroffen ist. Er lautet, und dem möchte ich im Augenblick nichts mehr hinzufügen: "Sehr geehrter Herr Senator, Erlauben Sie mir der Hansestadt Hamburg und ganz besonders der Philosophischen Fakultät der Hamburgischen Universität für die ausgesprochene Rückberufung auf den Lehrstuhl für Kunstgeschichte meinen

verbindlichsten Dank auszusprechen. Ich habe der Stadt Hamburg, der Hamburgischen Universität und vielen meiner ehemaligen Kollegen und Schüler stets ein ungetrübtes Andenken bewahrt. In so freundlicher Form dorthin zurückgerufen zu werden, ist mir eine herzliche Freude, und ich würde einer erneuten Zusammenarbeit mit so verzüglichen Männern wie Prof. Wolff, Prof. Snell und Dr. Heise mit wirklichem Vergnügen entgegensehen. Ich habe aber das Glück gehabt, in den Vereinigten Staaten, wo ich seit sechs Jahren eingebürgert bin, mit Freundlichkeit aufgenommen zu werden, einen befriedigenden Wirkungskreis zu finden, und meine Söhne ihre eigenen Hausstände begründen und ihre Tätigkeit an amerikanischen Universitäten aufnehmen zu sehen. Sie werden es daher verstehen, sehr verehrter Herr Senator, wenn ich den Wiederaufbau der kunstgeschichtlichen Studien in Hamburg einer jüngeren Kraft überlassen möchte. Ich möchte aber der Hoffnung Ausdruck geben, mit der Alma mater Hamaburgensis iterum renovata in der Zukunft in freundschaftlicher Verbindung zu bleiben. Mit wiederholtem Dank und verbindlichen Empfehlungen, Ihr Ihnen sehr ergebener Erwin Panofsky."[38]

ANMERKUNGEN UND LITERATURNACHWEIS

1. Am Vorabend des Plebiszits vom 12. November 1933 riefen auf einer öffentlichen Kundgebung in Leipzig etwa 100 deutsche Professoren insbesondere das Ausland dazu auf, Hitler Vertrauen zu schenken. Unter diesen Professoren waren der Philosoph Martin Heidegger, der Chirurg Ernst Ferdinand Sauerbruch und der Kunsthistoriker Wilhelm Pinder. cf. K.n. Bracher, G. Schulz und W. Sauer, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung, Koln/Opladen, 2. Aufl. 1962, S. 318.

2. Die Anzahl von 2000 Gelehrten ist folgendem Aufsatz entnommen: M. Funke, Universität und Zeitgeist im Dritten Reich, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, 22. Marz 1986, S. 6.

3. Manfred Funke hat in seinem eben zitierten Forschungsbericht die Thesen zusammengefasst.

4. W. Kaegi, Das Werk Aby Warburgs. Mit einem unveröffentlichen Brief Jacob Burckhardts. In: Neue Schweizer Rundschau, N.F. 1:15, 1933, S. 283-293.

5. Die Dissertation ist jetzt wieder abgedrückt in: Aby M. Warburg, Ausgewählte Schriften und Würdigungen, hrsg. von D. Wuttke, 2. Aufl. Baden-Baden 1980, S. 11-63.

6. Ibid. S. 13.

7. Ibid. S. 31.

8. A.M. Warburg nach G. Syamken, Aby Warburg - Ideen und Initiativen, in: W. Hofmann, G. Syamken und M. Warnke, Die Menschenrechte des Auges, Frankfurt am Main 1980, S. 29.

9. Fritz Saxl (1890-1948) hatte in Wien bei Max Dvorak und in Berlin bei Heinrich Wölfflin Kunstgeschichte studiert. 1911 lernte er über Wilhelm Waetzold, Warburgs erstem Forschungsassistenten, Aby M. Warburg kennen und übernahm 1913 Waetzoldts Stelle. Von 1922 bis 1933 lehrte Saxl dann auch an der Universität. Nach dem Tode Warburgs (1929) leitete Saxl die Bibliothek. 1933 gelang ihm die Rettung der Bibliothek nach London, wo er 1944 zum Universitätsprofessor ernannt wurde. 1931 umschrieb der Hamburger Anzeiger Nr. 167 Saxls Tätigkeit wie folgt: "In unermüdlicher Arbeit hat Professor Saxl die Idee des Gründers der Bibliothek Warburg weit über Hamburgs Grenzen hinaus getragen und der Bibliothek zu einem internationalen Ruf verholfen. Durch ihn wurde diese Einrichtung allmählich zum 'Institut des guten Europaers', in dem man kulturhistorische Probleme der Weltgeschichte von den verschiedensten Seiten aus betrachten lernte. Für das erst kürzlich in Hamburg errichtete Planetarium hat sich Professor Saxl stets mit ganzer Kraft eingesetzt. In diesem Sommer halt er dort vier Nachmittagskurse für die Lehrerschaft, um das Interesse für diese kulturelle Errungenschaft zu starken und in immer weitere Kreise zu tragen. Überhaupt interessiert Saxl das pädagogische Problem in

ebenso starkem Masse wie seine Forschungsarbeit - er gibt ein Werk über astrologische und mythologische Bilderhandschriften heraus -, und es ist zu hoffen, dass auch seine volksbildnerische Tätigkeit weiter reiche Früchte trägt."

10. D. Wuttke, Die Emigration der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Bibliothek Warburg und die Anfänge des Universitätsfaches Kunstgeschichte in Grossbritannien, in: Philobiblon XXVIII, Heft 3, 1984, 179.

11. Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915) gründete 1909 das 'Königlich Sächsische Institut für Kultur- und Universalgeschichte bei der Universität Leipzig' und 1914 die 'König-Friedrich-August-Stiftung für wissenschaftliche Forschung in Leipzig', in der elf weitere geisteswissenschaftliche Forschungsinstitute vereinigt waren. Seine an amerikanischen Vorbildern orientierte Idee privat finanzierter geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschungseinrichtungen musste Lamprecht in zahlreichen Vorträgen gegen die Leipziger Kollegen durchsetzen.

12. Erst 1919 wurde in Hamburg die Universität gegründet. Seit 1764 bestand jedoch in Hamburg ein 'öffentliches Vorlesungswesen' durch das insbesondere gegen Ende des 19. und zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts renommierte Gelehrte in die Stadt geladen wurden.

13. S. Setti, Warburg continuatus. Descrizione di una biblioteca, in: Quaderni storici LVIII, 1985, S. 5-38.

14. Ibid. S. 22.

15. A.M. Warburg, Italienische Kunst und Internationale Astrologie im Palazzo Schifanoja zu Ferrara, in: A.M. Warburg, Ausgewählte Schriften und Würdigungen, hrsg. von D. Wuttke, 2. Aufl. Baden-Baden 1980, S. 185.

16. A.M. Warburg, Heidnisch-antike Weissagung in Wort und Bild zu Luthers Zeiten, (19-20), in: A.M. Warburg, Ausgewählte Schriften und Würdigungen, hrsg. von D. Wuttke, 2 Aufl. Baden-Baden 1980, S. 202.

17. Ich nehme hier die Formulierung eines der wichtigsten Mitarbeiter der Bibliothek Warburg auf. E. Cassirer, Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften, Darmstadt 1971, S. 11.

18. Mit der Aufnahme dieses Begriffs der Heterogenität sei an dieser Stelle Georges Bataille gedacht, der fast gleichzeitig unabhängig von den Hamburger Forschungen entsprechendes auf dem Gebiet der erotischen und sexuellen Beziehungen des Menschen erforschte.

19. Seit 1921 wurden diese Ergebnisse in den Vorträgen und in den Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, hrsg. von Fritz Saxl, publiziert.

20. D. Wuttke, Die Emigration der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Bibliothek Warburg und die Anfänge des Universitätsfaches Kunstgeschichte in Grossbritannien, in: Philobiblon XXVIII, Heft 3, 1984, S. 174.

21. E. Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Berlin 1923-29.

22. G.F. Hoogewerff, L'Iconologie et son importance pour l'étude systématique de l'art chrétien, in: Rivista di Archeologia Christiana VIII, 1931, S. 52-82.

23. W. Benjamin, Strenge Kunstwissenschaft, (1933), in: Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Frankfurt am Main 1972, III, S. 374.

24. C.G. Heise, Persönliche Erinnerungen an Aby Warburg, New York 1947, S. 7/8. - Heise wurde später Direktor der Museen Lübeck und der Kunsthalle in Hamburg. Bei den genannten 'volkstümlichen Enzyklopädien' handelte es sich um geradezu die Lebenswerke bedeutender Kunsthistoriker des 19. Jahrhunderts Anton Springer und Wilhelm Lübke, die von deren Schülern und Freunden fortgeführt worden sind. Warburg empfahl dem künftigen Studenten das Kapitel über das Grabmal für Julius II. in Carl Justis Buch über Michelangelo, das eben in Berlin (1909) neu aufgelegt worden war.

25. E. Panofsky, Der gefesselte Eros. Zur Genealogie von Rembrandts Danae, in: Oud Holland L, 1933, S. 193-217. Der Aufsatz erschien

nicht, wie man zunächst annehmen möchte, aus politischen Gründen in der ältesten kunsthistorischen Zeitschrift der Niederlande, sondern weil die Freunde Friedlanders vereinbart hatten, dessen Namen und Werk in verschiedenen Zeitschriften - und nicht mit einer Festschrift - zu ehren.

26. Berufungsvorschlag der Philosophischen Fakultät der Hamburgischen Universität vom 16. November 1925 im Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Hochschulwesen II, Ai 3/27, Heft 15:0, S. 2-5.

27. Ausser Panofsky, Saxl und Warburg lehrten damals am Kunsthistorischen Seminar die Professoren Max Sauerlandt und Richard Stettiner. Sauerlandt war zugleich Direktor des Hamburger Museums für Kunst und Gewerbe, Stettiner Leiter der Hamburgischen Denkmalpflege. Ausserdem hatte Gustav Pauli, Direktor der Kunsthalle, eine Honorarprofessur inne, die er allerdings damals nicht wahrnahm.

28. Brief von Claire Lachmann an Axel Bernhart vom 18. Mai 1981.

29. Undatierter Brief von Hugo Buchthal an Alexander Willem Byvanck, in: Universiteitsarchief Leiden BPL 3007.

30. Protokoll der Sitzung der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Leiden vom 12.3.1933, in: Universiteitsarchief Leiden.

31. Gertrud Bing (1892-1964) war seit 1921 Assistentin Aby M. Warburgs. Auch nach dessen Tode arbeitete sie in der Bibliothek Warburg weiter. Von 1955-1959 leitete sie das Warburg Institute in London.

32. M. Rasch, Juden und Emigranten machen deutsche Wissenschaft, in: Völkischer Beobachter Nr. 5, 5. Januar 1935, S. 5.

33. Diese Angaben danke ich Ulrike Wendland, die die statistischen Monatsberichte des Stadtstaates Hamburg durchgesehen hat.

34. W. Sauerlander. Nachruf auf Ludwig Heinrich Heydenreich. 23.3.190314.9.1978. in: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Jahrbuch 1979. Munchen 1979. 236.

35. Nachdem 1938 das Reichsministerium erneut auf eine Besetzung der kunstgeschichtlichen Professor gedrängt hatte. wurde der 2. Lehrstuhl für Philosophie umgewidmet. Nach langwierigen Verhandlungen wurde schliesslich Hubert Schrade 1940 auf den Lehrstuhl berufen. Schrade (1900-1967) hatte sich von 1933 an zur nationalsozialistischen Ideologie sowohl in wissenschaftlichen als auch in populären Artikeln bekannt. Schrade blieb in Hamburg jedoch nur für ein Trimester. Im Frühjahr 1941 folgte er einem Ruf an die Universität Strassburg. In Hamburg nahm seine Stelle ab 1942 Kurt Wilhelm-Kastner ein. der ebenfalls als zuverlässiger Parteigänger galt.

36. Staatsarchiv Hamburg. Hochschulwesen II. Pf 17: Beschwerden. Klagen und sonstige Streitsachen. Streitsache Rudolf Hoffmann - Burmeister. Die Auseinandersetzungen zogen sich vom 16. Februar 1937 bis zum 14. Januar 1938 hin. Die Klage wurde niedergeschlagen. weil kein "offentliches Interesse" bestünde.

37. Staatsarchiv Hamburg. Hochschulwesen II. Dozenten und Personalakte IV. 1204 Erwin Panofsky.

38. Ibid. und wiederabgedrückt in Die Welt vom 27.5.1968.

INTEGRATION ALLGEMEINER UND BERUFLICHER BILDUNG - ZUR REVISION EINER DEUTSCHEN TRADITION

Christoph Lüth

In Robert Musils Erzählung: "Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törless" aus dem Jahre 1906 las ich folgendes Gespräch zwischen zwei Zöglingen eines vornehmen Internats in Österreich. Beineberg, ein Freund von Törless, sagt in einem Cafe einer Provinzstadt, in dem sie einen freien Nachmittag zubringen, folgendes zu den mathematischen Spekulationen von Törless: "Es ist so eine Art, mit dem Gehirn zu turnen; aber es hat doch keinen rechten Zweck." "Nein", sagte Törless und sah wieder in den Garten hinaus. In seinem Rückenferne - hörte er die Gasflammen summen. Er verfolgte ein Gefühl, das melancholisch, wie ein Nebel, in ihm aufstieg. "Es hat keinen Zweck. Du hast recht. Aber man darf sich das nicht sagen. Von alldem, was wir den ganzen Tag lang in der Schule tun - was davon hat eigentlich einen Zweck? Wovon hat man etwas? Ich meine etwas für sich haben - du verstehst? (...). Beineberg brummte etwas von üben, Geist vorbereiten - noch nichts anfangen können später ... "Vorbereiten? Üben? Wofür denn? Weisst du etwas Bestimmtes? Du hoffst vielleicht auf etwas, aber auch dir ist es ganz ungewiss. Es ist so: ein ewiges Warten auf etwas, von dem man nichts anderes weiss, als dass man darauf wartet ... Das ist so langweilig." "Langweilig ..." dehnte Beineberg nach und wiegte mit dem Kopfe." (S. 28).

Dieses Gespräch wollte mir nicht mehr aus dem Kopf: es ist klar, dass wir es hier mit möglichen Folgen einer allgemeinen Bildung zu tun haben, die von jedem konkreten Berufszweck entfernt ist. Damit bin ich bei meinem Thema: Wie sollen Allgemeinbildung und Berufsbildung, wie Bildung und Beruf aufeinander bezogen werden?

I

Im ausgehenden 18. und im beginnenden 19. Jahrhundert wurden in Deutschland allgemeine Bildung und berufliche Ausbildung pointiert einander entgegengesetzt. Die dieser bildungstheoretischen Position entsprechende organisatorische Unterscheidung in allgemeinbildende und berufsbildende Schulen besteht bis zur Gegenwart fort. Im Gegenzug zu dieser Tradition wurden in den späten 1940er bis zu den frühen 1970er Jahren in der Bundesrepublik Konzepte erarbeitet, die diese Entgegensetzung rückgängig machen sollen. Im Sinne eines dieser neuen Konzepte werden gegenwärtig in den beiden Bundesländern Nordrhein-Westfalen und Hessen Schulversuche durchgeführt.

Aus dieser bildungs- und schulgeschichtlichen Situation erklärt es sich, dass die angedeuteten Konzepte zur Integration allgemeiner und beruflicher Bildung in Auseinandersetzung mit dem Bildungsideal der deutschen Klassik entworfen wurden. Wenn dieses Bildungsideal auch nicht als Ursache der Entgegensetzung von allgemeiner und beruflicher Bildung verstanden wurde, so doch als deren Legitimation. Wollte man diese Entgegensetzung aufheben, so war es ein erster möglicher Schritt, ihre bildungstheoretische Legitimation in Frage zu stellen. Hier setzte Theodor Litt (1880-1962) ein, ein seit der Weimarer Republik bekannter Philosoph und Pädagoge. In einem zweiten Schritt wurden ausserdem die politischen Ursachen der Trennung von Allgemeinbildung und Berufsbildung thematisiert und kritisiert. Hier setzte Herwig Blankertz (1927-1983) ein, der bis zu seinem Tode (1983) Professor für Erziehungswissenschaft an der Universität Münster war.

Bevor ich die bildungstheoretischen Konzepte von Litt und von Blankertz rekonstruiere, möchte ich etwas zur Terminologie sagen: den Terminus 'Bildungsideal' werde ich nur zur historischen Bezeichnung der Bildungsvorstellungen der deutschen Klassik verwenden. Mit diesem Terminus drücke ich den hohen Anspruch aus, der damit formuliert wird. In diesem Sinne kennzeichnet Litt (1947) Entstehung und Anspruch von echten Bildungsidealen: " 'Bildungsideale' werden, wenn sie echt sind und nicht bloss ein papiernes Dasein führen, aus der Fülle und dem Überschwang geboren, sind Selbstdeutung eines zur Höhe seiner Bestimmung aufgestiegenen Menschentums. In ihnen spricht sich Wollen und Wesen eines Geschlechts aus, das seiner selbst sicher ist und mit dem Leben zu

einem klaren Einverständnis gelangt ist."[1] Auf diese normative Sicherheit, auf diesen hohen Anspruch weist bereits Eduard Spranger (1909) hin, wenn er den Terminus 'Bildungsideal' definiert: Dies sei "die anschauliche Phantasievorstellung von einem Menschen, in dem die allgemein menschlichen Merkmale so verwirklicht sind, dass nicht nur das Normale, sondern auch das teleologisch Wertvolle derselben (sc. der allgemeinen menschlichen Merkmale) in der höchsten denkbaren Form darin ausgeprägt ist."[2]

Gegenüber diesem Höhenflug von Idealen ist vom Standpunkt des Realismus und des normativen Relativismus Skepsis geboten. Daher prüften Litt und Blankertz die Legitimation des hohen Anspruchs, der mit dem klassischen Bildungsideal verbunden ist. Daher werde ich mit Blick auf die bildungstheoretischen Überlegungen dieser Autoren nicht von Bildungsidealen, sondern - neutraler - von Bildungszielen bzw. Bildungskonzepten sprechen.

II

Die bildungstheoretische Position Litts lässt sich mit der Formel "Bildung durch den Beruf und Integration von allgemeiner und beruflicher Bildung in den Berufsschulen" kennzeichnen. Um diese Position zu verstehen, muss zuvor seine Kritik am Bildungsideal der deutschen Klassik rekonstruiert werden.

In mehreren Aufsätzen und Büchern aus den Jahren 1947 bis 1958[3] rekonstruiert Litt das klassische Bildungsideal. Wenn er dabei auch auf die verschiedenen Ausprägungen dieses Bildungsideals eingeht, die alle in kritischer Abgrenzung von der bereits damals in den ersten Anfangen erkennbaren industriellen Arbeitswelt entworfen wurden (Herder, Schiller, Hölderlin, Goethe, Pestalozzi und Humboldt)[4], so konzentriert er sich doch auf Humboldts Fassung des Bildungsideals. Dieses hätte die nachhältigste Wirkung auf das allgemeinbildende Schulwesen gehabt.[5] Wie Humboldt mit anderen die Zerrissenheit der Funktionen in der Arbeitswelt - die Arbeitsteilung - und die daraus folgende Vereinseitigung des Menschen kritisiere, so stelle er diesen Zuständen seine Forderung nach Totalität und Universalität des Menschen entgegen: "Es ist die Sehnsucht nach dem ganzen Menschen, ... die sich gerade an dem Anblick von so viel fragmentarischem Menschentum zur Leidenschaft entzündet".[6] Diese Allseitigkeit

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des Menschen (Universalität), die kritisch der Spezialisierung im Beruf entgegengesetzt wird, soll innerlich zu einem Ganzen verbunden werden. Mit dieser Entgegensetzung gegen die Arbeitswelt - so interpretiert Litt die Bildungstheorie Humboldts - wird ein Beispiel für die Entgegensetzung von Mensch und Welt allgemein gegeben: Das Innere des Menschen wird von der Welt als dem Ausseren abgegrenzt.[7]

Für das Verständnis der Kritik Litts reicht es hin, sich seine Interpretation dieses Bildungsideals vergegenwärtigt zu haben; die Angemessenheit seiner Interpretation werde ich im folgenden nur zum Teil prüfen können.

Vom Realitätsprinzip ausgehend kritisiert Litt das humanistische Bildungsideal unter drei Gesichtspunkten: (1) die Industriegesellschaft habe im Zuge ihrer Entwicklung dieses Bildungsideal sachlich überholt. Unter den harten Anforderungen der arbeitsteiligen Industriegesellschaft würde die "verzärtelte Künstlichkeit (einer) 'inneren' Welt" zerbrechen, die im Sinne dieses Bildungsideals abseits von der Industriegesellschaft und ihrer Berufspraxis erbaut würde.[8] Die unabweisbare Sachnotwendigkeit der Arbeitsteilung sei von den Klassikern nicht erkannt worden, die Orientierung an dem Ideal einer ganzheitlichen Menschenbildung sei mithin nicht mehr realistisch.[9] Die Kritik an einer Innerlichkeit der Bildung wird (2) unter politischem Aspekt wiederholt: Möge das wirtschaftlich erstärkte Bürgertum unter den politischen Bedingungen in der Zeit der Klassik seinen Mangel an politischem Einfluss noch mit einem gewissen Recht durch Verinnerlichung seiner Bildung kompensiert haben, so falle diese Legitimation in einem demokratischen Staat fort. Der Verzicht auf Einbeziehung der äusserlichen Welt (Arbeitswelt, Politik) in die Bildung komme einem Verzicht auf politische Mitwirkung gleich.[10] Wie demzufolge das klassische Bildungsideal unter den bezeichneten historischen Bedingungen entstanden ist, so ist es nach Änderung dieser Bedingungen überholt. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt seiner philosophischen Anthropologie weist Litt schliesslich (3) eine Bildung zurück, die den Menschen in den Mittelpunkt stelle und die Welt zum Mittel der Menschenbildung abwerte. Aufgrund der prinzipiellen Antinomie von Mensch und Welt seien beide wechselseitig aufeinander als Partner angewiesen.[11] Dieser Antinomie wegen sei die klassische Vorstellung einer harmonischen Menschenbildung aufzugeben. Der Mensch sei nicht auf Harmonie hin angelegt, sondern sei das "in Gegensätze verfangene und gerade an Gegensätzen wachsende Wesen".[12]

Von dieser Anthropologie aus beurteilt Litt die moderne, arbeitsteilige Industriegesellschaft grundsätzlich positiv. In seiner Anthropologie unterscheidet er zwei einander folgende Formen der Beziehung zwischen Mensch und Welt: die ursprüngliche Einheit beider (mythische Phase, die Welt der Primitiven) und die Entgegensetzung von Mensch und Welt in der Form der Subjekt-Objekt-Spaltung. Aufgrund eines Denkens, das die Natur zur Sache umdenkt, grenzt sich der Mensch als Subjekt von der zum Objekt gedachten Welt ab. Prototyp des auf das Objekt gerichteten Denkens ist das naturwissenschaftliche Denken, das die Voraussetzung für die technische Bearbeitung der Natur schafft.[13] Ergebnis dieses Denkens sei die moderne arbeitsteilige Industriegesellschaft. Da dieses Denken eine typisch menschliche Leistung sei, ist es nur konsequent, dass Litt die Industriegesellschaft grundsätzlich positiv beurteilt.[14]

Mit einer solchen Beurteilung der industriellen Arbeitsordnung unterscheidet sich Litt deutlich von den Vertretern des klassischen Bildungsideals, das er daher durch ein alternatives Bildungskonzept revidiert. Zum Verständnis seiner Revision ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass Litt auch negative Seiten der arbeitsteiligen Tätigkeiten sieht: die Gefahr der "radikalen Vereinseitigung" des Menschen und die Gefahr einer ganzlichen Unterordnung des Menschen unter die Sachanforderungen.[15] Anders als die Vertreter des klassischen Bildungsideals scheidet er die Berufsarbeit dieser negativen Folgen wegen aber nicht aus dem Bereich der Bildung aus. Von welchem Bildungsverständnis geht er dabei aus?

Es war mehr als Höflichkeit und mehr als eine Reaktion auf die wirtschaftliche Not der ersten Nachkriegsjahre, dass Litt in seinem Vortrag, den er im Jahr 1947 vor Berufsschullehrern hielt, zur Bedeutung der Berufsarbeit für die Bildung folgendes feststellte: Heute (1947) sei der "Beruf doch ganz sicher diejenige Lebensbetätigung, in deren Ausübung sich der Gehalt der Bildung in erster Linie entwickeln und bewähren muss. Gelingt es uns nicht, in der Sphäre der Berufsarbeit selbst die menschenbildenden Motive zu entdecken und zur Wirksamkeit zu bringen, so heisst es jeglicher Hoffnung auf Bildung entsagen. Dass von oben her die Sonne der Menschenbildung ihre Strahlen in die Beschranktheit der Berufswelt entsenden werde - das zu erwarten haben wir jedes Recht verloren."[16] Aus dieser These, dass n u r in der Berufsarbeit "die menschenbildenden Motive zu entdecken" seien, folgt die Vorrangstellung der auf Berufe vorbereitenden

Berufsschule im Schulsystem. Sie solle Vorbild für die allgemeinbildenden Schulen sein.[17]

Worin bestehen die dergestalt in das Zentrum gerückten bildenden Wirkungen des Berufs? Litt beschreibt sie unter dem Begriffspaar "Sachbeherrschung und Menschenbildung".[18] Die Tätigkeit der Versachlichung der Welt (theoretisch durch die Naturwissenschaft, praktisch durch die technische Arbeit) habe ethisch und kognitiv folgende 'bildende Rückwirkungen auf das Subjekt:

(1) Steigerung der Willenskraft durch die Anstrengung einer Konzentration auf die Sache.[19]

(2) "Emporläuterung" des Menschen zum "Organ des reinen, des allgemeinen Denkens", d.h. zugleich Entindividualisierung des Menschen.[20]

(3) Über die formale Übung der Willenskraft hinaus wird eine inhaltliche Willensentscheidung dadurch provoziert, dass durch die Versachlichung Mittel bereitgestellt werden, über deren Zweck zu entscheiden ist.[21]

Erst diese Entscheidung führt zur erwähnten Sachbeherrschung. Erst dadurch kann verhindert werden, dass der arbeitende Mensch unter einem vermeintlichen Sachzwang zum reinen Funktionär gemacht wird.[22] Die Möglichkeit einer Sachbeherrschung ist um so mehr zu betonen, als Litt bisweilen den Eindruck erweckt, als ob die naturwissenschaftlich-technische Entwicklung und das daran gebundene Arbeitssystem einer Gesetzmässigkeit folgten, gegen die alle Eingriffe erfolglos seien. So spricht er davon, dass der an einer bestimmten Stelle des Arbeitssystems arbeitende Mensch "an ein Sachgefüge gleichsam angeschmiedet ist", dass der " 'Fortschritt' ihm zum Zwingherrn geworden (ist)".[23] Dagegen steht jedoch seine These, dass es die Freiheit gebe, über verschiedene und gegensätzliche Ziele und die zu ihrer Realisierung erforderlichen Mittel zu entscheiden. Durch diese Entscheidung sei von Fall zu Fall die Antinomie zu lösen, "dass die Bemühung um die Sache ihn gleichzeitig als Menschen bildet und doch auch in seinem Menschsein bedroht."[24]

Diese Bedrohung komme dadurch zustande, dass das auf die Sache gerichtete Denken und Handeln unaufhaltsam mehr Mittel produziert, die dem Menschen über den Kopf zu wachsen drohen. Diese unvermeidbare Antinomie von Mensch und Sache verdeutlicht Litt am Beispiel der Atomkraft, die - als Sache - die Existenz der Menschheit bedroht.[25] In der

Auseinandersetzung in solchen problematischen Entscheidungssituationen über die Verwendung von Mitteln, die immer die Möglichkeit der Fehlentscheidung enthalten, bilde der Mensch sich.[26]

Es ist nicht zu übersehen, dass solche Entscheidungen ein hohes Mass an Sacheinsicht voraussetzen, dass sie demzufolge in höherem Grade den theoretisch am meisten Ausgebildeten zufallen.[27] Litt wehrt aber eine elitäre Abwertung der Tätigkeit der ausführenden Arbeitskräfte dadurch ab, dass er auch bei ihnen zumindest den Willen zur Sache voraussetzt und ihnen die daraus folgenden bildenden Wirkungen ebenfalls zuschreibt. Der Masse der ausführenden Arbeitskräfte eine nur mechanische Tätigkeit zuzuschreiben, sei nicht angemessen, zeuge vielmehr von der elitären Meinung jener, die ihren "Tempel der Humanität" auf der Arbeit der Masse errichten wollen.[28]

Wenn durch die beschriebene Sachbeherrschung die Gefahr einer gänzlichen Unterordnung des Menschen unter die Sache abgewehrt wird, so bleibt die andere Frage noch unbeantwort, was gegen die "radikale Vereinseitigung"[29] des Menschen in der spezialisierten Berufstätigkeit zu tun sei. Litt sieht darin - insofern in der Tradition des klassischen Bildungsideals einen Mangel. Nur dadurch - so Litt -, dass man die spezialisierte Berufstätigkeit in das "umfassende Ganze des Lebens" bewusst einbeziehe, könne diese Berufstätigkeit bildend wirken.[30] Litt entspricht damit nicht nur der Forderung jener von ihm zitierten "führenden Köpfe der Wirtschaft" nach leitenden Fachleuten mit Überblick, nach 'Persönlichkeiten', die mehr als Fachleute seien.[31] Dass sein Bildungskonzept auch in diesem Punkt einen grösseren Kreis von Berufstätigen meint, wird aus seinen Überlegungen zur schulischen Bildung deutlich.

Der Übergang zu seinem Schulkonzept bietet sich hier aus folgendem Grund an: Teils kann jetzt nach der notwendigen schulischen Vorbereitung auf eine solche ganzheitliche Einordnung der Berufstätigkeit gefragt werden, teils umgekehrt nach den Anforderungen an die schulische Bildung, die sich aus den Bedingungen einer bildenden Berufstätigkeit ergeben. Im ersteren Fall spielt die Schule eine grössere Rolle, im zweiten Fall die Berufe.

Litt beschränkt seine Überlegungen auf die Berufsschule. Die traditionell allgemeinbildend genannten Schulen (wie zum Beispiel die Gymnasien) bezieht er nicht ein. Welche Folgen es für die allgemeinbildenden Schulen haben soll, dass die Berufsschulen ihr Vorbild werden sollen, bleibt unklar.

Was Litt zur Einordnung der späteren beruflichen Tätigkeit in ein grösseres Ganze durch eine Integration beruflicher und allgemeiner Bildung sagt, gilt also nur für Berufsschulen. Für Litt scheidet eine Zuordnung der Allgemeinbildung zu besonderen Fächern und eine Addition solcher allgemeinbildender Fächer zu den berufsbildenden Fächern aus.[33] Das entspricht genau seiner Behauptung, dass in den Berufstätigkeiten die bildenden Prozesse stattfinden und nicht getrennt davon in einer Welt jenseits der Arbeit (zu denken ist an Freizeit, Volkshochschule und Ähnliches). Im Sinne einer Integration der Fächer soll der Unterricht beispielsweise in Politik und Geschichte von den jeweils angestrebten Berufen ausgehen, um diese in das grössere Ganze von Staat und Gesellschaft einzufügen[33]: "Es muss so gut vom Fach (sc. dem berufsbildenden Fach) her der Blick ins Allgemeine eröffnet wie vom allgemeinen (sc. den allgemeinbildenden Fächern wie Geschichte und Politik) her der Blick auf das Fach hingelenkt werden."[34] Auf diese Weise soll die auch für die Berufstätigkeit gefordete Einbeziehung in ein grosseres Ganze in der Schule vorbereitet werden.

Sollen solche Ganzheitsvorstellungen die Industriegesellschaft stabilisieren, indem ihr in organologischer Denkweise[35] eine positiv bewertete Ganzheit zugeschrieben wird? Sollen die einzelnen Individuen durch das Angebot einer solchen Ganzheit für den Verlust ihrer Ganzheit in der arbeitsteiligen Tätigkeit entschadigt werden? Nur Litts antinomisches Menschenbild, das jede Harmonisierung ausschliesst, schliesst auch die Annahme einer solchen Ideologie aus.

Wird damit zumindest die Richtung bezeichnet, in der die Berufsschule die erwähnte Einordnung der jeweiligen Berufstätigkeit in ein Ganzes vorbereiten und dieser damit Sinn verleihen kann, so sucht man vergebens nach didaktischen Aussagen zur Steigerung der Willenskraft durch Sachorientierung, zur Einübung in das "reine, allgemeine Denken" und zur Vorbereitung auf inhaltliche Entscheidungen über Ziele und Mittel bereits in der Berufsschule. In diesem Verzicht auf eine didaktische Konkretisierung seiner bildungstheoretischen Vorstellungen liegt - so behaupte ich - eine der Ursachen dafür, dass Litts Konzept einer Integration von Arbeit und Bildung, von Berufs-und Allgemeinbildung in der Schulrealität wirkungslos geblieben ist. Erst recht blieb seine allerdings vage Anregung, die allgemeinbildenden Schulen nach dem Vorbild der Berufsschulen zu gestalten, in seiner Zeit ohne Wirkung. Ein Indikator für die Ablehnung berufsbildender Elemente

für allgemeinbildende Schulen ist der bekannte Rahmenplan für das "allgemeinbildende öffentliche Schulwesen", den der Deutsche Ausschuss für das Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen - ein Beratungsgremium auf nationaler Ebene - im Jahr 1959 vorlegte. Zwar ist dort wiederholt eine Annäherung an die moderne Arbeitswelt zu erkennen, die Abwehr einer direkten Berufsvorbereitung ist aber eindeutig: "Das Gymnasium soll nicht der Berufsbildung dienen, aber es soll zur Erkenntnis der Gesetze führen, die der modernen Berufswelt und der Technik ihre Gestalt geben."[36]

Die entscheidende Ursache dafür, dass Litts Konzept nicht realisiert wurde, liegt aber nicht in dem Mangel an Konkretisierung seines Bildungskonzepts; sie liegt vielmehr darin, dass ein solches gegen die traditionelle Schulstruktur gerichtetes Konzept in der Restaurationsphase der 1950er Jahre[37] keine Chance zur Realisierung hatte. Wenn Litt aus seiner Kritik an Humboldts Bildungsideal nicht die Konsequenz zieht, auch für die allgemeinbildenden Schulen die Integration allgemeiner und beruflicher Bildung zu fördern, so ist das paradox. Denn in der Trennung eben dieser allgemeinen von der beruflichen Bildung hat auch nach Litts Auffassung das Bildungsideal Humboldts seine tiefsten Spuren hinterlassen. Offensichtlich hat die Restaurationsphase die konstruktive Phantasie Litts in diesem Punkt gelähmt.

III

Eine völlig andere Beziehung auf Humboldts Bildungsideal ist im Kollegschulkonzept zu erkennen. Das Kollegschulkonzept wurde 1972 vom nordrheinwestfalischen Kultusminister als Ergebnis der Beratungen jener Kommission veröffentlicht, die er 1970 unter Leitung von Blankertz eingesetzt hatte. Schulorganisatorisch geht es darum, alle Bildungsgänge auf der Sekundarstufe II - also die gymnasiale Oberstufe und die verschiedenen Formen beruflicher Schulen - zu Schulen mit unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten zu integrieren. Bildungstheoretisch bedeutet das eine Integration allgemeiner und beruflicher Bildung. Die so entstehenden neuen Bildungsgänge führen zu doppeltqualifizierenden Abschlüssen, d.h. zu einer Kombination eines beruflichen Abschlusses und des Abiturs bzw. der Fachhochschulreife. Daneben sind weiterhin Bildungsgänge möglich, die nur zum Abschluss einer beruflichen Ausbildung führen. Das Kollegschulkonzept wird gegenwärtig in NordrheinWestfalen und in Hessen

erprobt; in Nordrhein-Westfalen bestehen zur Zeit 22 Kollegschulen (mit insgesamt 52.291 Kollegschülern). Die Kollegschule ist ein Beispiel für jene Reformen, die nach der Restaurationsphase der 50er Jahre in den 60er und frühen 70er Jahren im Rahmen der Prinzipien der Demokratisierung, der Verwissenschaftlichung und der Praxisorientierung der Bildung vorbereitet wurden. Sie ist in der Bundesrepublik stark umstritten; Nachrichten, dass Bayern die Abiturabschlüsse der Kollegschule über den vereinbarten Zeitraum des Kollegschulversuchs hinaus nicht anerkennen wolle, drängen bis in die niederländische Presse.

Die Beziehung auf Humboldts Bildungsideal ist im Kollegschulkonzept genau umgekehrt wie im Fall Litts. Litt kritisiert dieses Bildungsideal, da es die Arbeitswelt ausschliesse, zieht daraus aber nicht die zu erwartende Konsequenz, die Arbeitswelt in Form der Berufsbildung mit der Allgemeinbildung in den allgemeinbildenden Schulen zu integrieren. Genau umgekehrt halten die Autoren des Kollegschulkonzepts an dem Prinzip dieses Bildungsideals fest; sie halten die Integration allgemeiner und beruflicher Bildung für die zeitgemässe Realisierung dieses Bildungsideals. Eine solche Konsequenz wäre unverständlich, hielten auch die Autoren des Kollegschulkonzepts dieses Bildungsideal und die Arbeitswelt für unvereinbar. Die verwirrende Situation löst sich dadurch auf, dass im Kollegschulkonzept eine ganz andere Interpretation von Humboldts Bildungsideal vertreten wird. Blankertz hat diese andere Interpretation in früheren Schriften vorbereitet.

Im Anschluss an Adorno interpretiert Blankertz Humboldts Prinzip der "allgemeinen Menschenbildung" als kritische Antwort auf den Zustand der rein utilitär und berufsständisch ausgerichteten Berufsausbildung im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus und der Aufklärung. Mit der allgemeinen Menschenbildung habe Humboldt die "Idee der Menschheit ohne Status und Übervorteilung" vor Augen. Die rein utilitäre Berufsausbildung des 18. und des beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts habe eine Menschenbildung - d.h. eine Herausbildung der jeweiligen Individualität im Rahmen einer jeweils anders ausgeprägten Formung aller menschlichen Kräfte zu einer ganzheitlichen Gestalt - nicht ermöglicht. Nur mit Blick auf diese rein utilitäre Berufsausbildung (z.B. in den Industrieschulen des 18. Jahrhunderts) habe Humboldt die Berufsbildung aus dem Bereich der allgemeinen Menschenbildung ausgeschlossen. Diese Ausschliessung - und das ist für das Kollegschulkonzept entscheidend - gelte also nicht für die Berufsausbildung

überhaupt; sofern sie den angedeuteten Kriterien der Bildung entspreche, gehöre sie zur allgemeinen Menschenbildung.[38]

Von einem solchen Verständnis des Bildungsideals Humboldts aus war es nur ein zeitgemässer Schritt, dass Blankertz im Kollegschulkonzept das Prinzip der allgemeinen Menschenbildung im Sinne von allgemeinen Lernzielen konkretisiert. Diese allgemeinen Lernziele werden im Umkreis der Prinzipien der Wissenschaftsorientiertheit allen Lernens und der Kritik beschrieben. Mit dem Prinzip der Kritik ist gemeint, dass "alle Inhalte der fachlichen Lernziele ... mit Voraussetzungen ... und Konzequenzen zu lehren (sind), so dass dem Lernenden die Möglichkeit des Widerspruchs gegen die ihm zugemutete Intentionalität offen bleibt."[39]

Die hier gemeinten fachlichen Lernziele können alle denkbaren sein, also auf den Gebieten der traditionellen Gymnasien und der beruflichen Schulen liegen bzw. - bei Entwicklung neuer Berufsabschlüsse etwa - neu hinzugefügt werden. Diese fachlichen Lernziele sind alle gleichrangig, sofern sie den beiden genannten Prinzipien der Wissenschaftsorientiertheit und der Kritik genügen. Gegenüber dieser Gleichrangigkeit fällt der traditionelle Unterschied zwischen allgemeinbildenden und beruflichen Schulen fort. 'Allgemeinbildung' wird nämlich nicht mehr inhaltlich festgelegt, sondern nur noch formal auf der Ebene der genannten allgemeinen Lernziele. Eine inhaltliche Festlegung von Allgemeinbildung sei nicht mehr möglich, da das einen weltanschaulichen und kulturellen Konsens einer Gesellschaft voraussetze, der in der modernen Industriegesellschaft nicht mehr vorhanden sei.[40] Wünsche nach einer solchen inhaltlichen Allgemeinbildung seien nur Ausdruck von "Sehnsucht nach verlorenen Ganzheiten", die sich gegen die Spezialisierung der Wissenschaften und der Berufe wende.[41] Durch die nur noch formale Definition von Allgemeinbildung auf der Ebene allgemeiner Lernziele werden die bisher 'allgemeinbildend' genannten Fächer aus dieser traditionellen Fessel gelöst; sie können jetzt je nach angestrebtem Schulabschluss mit den beruflichen Fächern kombiniert und integriert werden.

Die erläuterte und in aller Kürze begründete Integration der traditionellen allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildung soll die materiale Chancengleichheit in der Sekundarstufe II realisieren. Dieser im Kollegschulkonzept explizit verfolgte "gesellschaftspolitische Auftrag" zielt auf eine inhaltliche Verbesserung der Bildungschancen, indem nun die Wege sowohl zur Berufsausbildung als auch zum Abitur allen in gleicher Weise

offenstehen. Die Betonung dieses gesellschaftspolitischen Auftrages der Demokratisierung macht deutlich, dass die von Blankertz unter Beziehung auf Humboldt vertretene Bildungstheorie einen auch politischen Charakter hat. Diese politische Kritik richtet sich gegen jene gesellschaftliche Ungleichheit, die unter Berufung auf statische Begabungstypen über das hierarchisch aufgebaute Bildungssystem reproduziert würde.[42]

Wird hier noch Humboldt interpretiert oder soll das Kollegschulkonzept nur die Weihe jener Tradition erhalten, auf die sich die Vertreter des Gymnasiums so oft bezogen? Anders gefragt: Revidiert Blankertz die Bildungstheorie Humboldts selbst, um sie zur pädagogischen Legitimation der Kollegschule nutzen zu können? Oder revidiert er nur jene traditionelle Dichotomie in allgemeinbildende und berufliche Schulen, die nur irrtümlicherweise auf eine ganz anders zu verstehende Bildungstheorie Humboldt zurückgeführt wird?

Ich kann diese Fragen hier nur in einer These beantworten: Zwar ist die Berufsarbeit nach Auffassung Humboldts unter bestimmten Bedingungen (Freiheit, Selbsttätigkeit und Vielseitigkeit) bildend; insofern stimme ich Blankertz' Interpretation zu und lehne ich zugleich die entgegengesetzte Interpretation Litts ab. Eine solche Bildung durch Arbeit ist nach Humboldts Auffassung aber nur möglich, wenn in der vorhergehenden allgemeinen Schulbildung alle Kräfte des Menschen bereits unter diesen drei Bedingungen ausgebildet und gestärkt worden sind.[43] Humboldt war der Auffassung, dass dies nur möglich ist, wenn die allgemeine Schulbildung j e d e Beziehung auf einen Beruf ausschliesst: "Durch die allgemeine (sc. Bildung) sollen die Kräfte, d.h. der Mensch selbst gestärkt, gelautert und geregelt werden; durch die spezielle (d.h. berufliche Bildung) soll er nur Fertigkeiten zur Anwendung erhalten." Für die eine wird die "vollständige Einsicht der ... Gründe" der Kenntnisse und Fertigkeiten verlangt, für die andere nur die Beherrschung von Fertigkeiten ohne Einsicht in ihre Gründe.[44]

Wenn in einer beruflichen Bildung mehr als nur Fertigkeiten zur Anwendung vermittelt wird, wenn also die vorhin genannten Prinzipien der Wissenschaftsorientiertheit und der Kritik die berufliche Bildung prägen, dann halte ich eine sinngemässe (nicht wortgemässe) Beziehung des Kollegschulkonzepts auf Humboldts Bildungstheorie für möglich. Allerdings wird in der Kollegschule zugleich auf einen bestimmten Beruf hin ausgebildet. Diese konkrete Orientierung hat nach Blankertz' Auffassung

den motivationspsychologischen Vorzug gegenüber den gymnasialen Bildungsgängen, dass sie einen klaren Orientierungspunkt zur Strukturierung der Bildungsgänge liefert.[45] Eine solche Orientierung ist aber mit Humboldts Grundsatz unvereinbar, dass es in der schulischen allgemeinen Bildung nur um den Menschen gehen soll, nicht um irgendeinen Beruf.[46] Das ist deswegen bemerkenswert, weil hier auch die Vorbereitung auf einen gelehrten Beruf ausgeschlossen wird. Es geht also nicht um die bereits bekannte Zurückweisung der untheoretischen Ausbildung auf handwerkliche Berufe aus dem Bereich der allgemeinen Bildung. Dieser Grundsatz der reinen allgemeinen Bildung wird durch die Prägung auch der berufsbezogenen Ausbildungselemente nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftsorientiertheit und der Kritik nicht ganzlich, sondern nur zum Teil erfüllt. Insofern revidiert Blankertz also das Bildungsideal Humboldts.

Dem dargestellten Kollegschulkonzept hat Litt durch sein Konzept einer Integration allgemeiner und beruflicher Bildung in den Berufsschulen zwar vorgearbeitet. Das Bildungskonzept der Kollegschule ist aber im Kern nicht Litt, sondern Adorno verpflichtet: der Bildungstheorie Adornos zufolge würde eine Ausgrenzung der Arbeitswelt aus den Bildungsprozessen von dieser Arbeitswelt ablenken, diese damit verhüllen und so der Kritik während der Bildungsprozesse entziehen. Eine rein geistige, von der Arbeitswelt abgetrennte Bildung würde damit zur Ideologie.[47]

Dichter wie Robert Musil sind keine Bildungstheoretiker und Bildungstheoretiker wie Theodor Litt und Herwig Blankertz sind keine Dichter. Der eine hat das Problem einer rein allgemeinen, vagabundierenden und potentiell anarchischen Bildung einprägsam in seinem Törless dargestellt. Die anderen haben eine Lösung für dieses Problem angeboten. Sollte diese Lösung jene Spannung und produktive Disharmonie zerstören, die zwischen dem Allgemeinen der allgemeinen Bildung und dem Speziellen der Berufsbildung besteht, so würde ich dieser Lösung nicht zustimmen.

ANMERKUNGEN

1. Th. Litt, Berufsbildung und Allgemeinbildung (1947). Heidelberg 1969, S. 13. Vgl. Ders., Das Bildungsideal der deutschen Klassik und die moderne Arbeitswelt. Bonn 1955, S. 11-12.

2. E. Spranger. Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Humanitätsidee. Berlin 1909, S. 7.

3. Th. Litt. Berufsbildung und Allgemeinbildung (1947). Heidelberg 1969. - Ders., Das Bildungsideal der deutschen Klassik und die moderne Arbeitswelt. Bonn 1955 - Ders., Technisches Denken und menschliche Bildung. Heidelberg (1957)^4 1969. - Ders., Fachbildung und Menschenbildung in: Ders., Berufsbildung, Fachbildung, Menschenbildung. Bonn 1958, S. 47-89.

4. Litt 1955, S. 33-63.

5. Litt 1955, S. 54.

6. Litt 1955, (s.Anm 3), S. 35.

7. Bei der Rekonstruktion von Litts Interpretation des Bildungsideals W. v. Humboldts beziehe ich mich auf folgende Schriften: Litt (1947) 1969 (s.Anm.3), S. 20-22. - Litt 1955 (s.Anm.3), S. 14, 17, 35, 55-59, 107-108; 110-114, 117. - Litt (1957)^4 1969 (s.Anm.3), S. 9, 64-65, 80. - Litt 1958 (s.Anm.3), S. 50-51, 74.

8. Litt 1947 (s.Anm.3), S. 7-8, 21 (Zitat), 22. - Litt 1955 (s.Anm.3), S. 15-17, 33-34, 65, 103-105, 112-113. - Litt 1957 (s.Anm.3), S. 21-25, 61-62, 64. - Litt 1958 (s.Anm.3), S. 52-53, 65, 74.

9. Litt 1957 (s.Anm.3), S. 15-17, 21-25.

10. Litt 1947 (s.Anm.3), S. 20-21. - Litt 1955 (s.Anm.3), S. 115-116. - Litt 1958 (s.Anm.3), S. 53.

11. Litt 1955, S. 55.

12. Litt 1955 (s.Anm.3), S. 107-111 (Zitat S. 109), 124. - Litt 1957 (s.Anm.3), S. 64.

13. Litt, Sachbemeisterung und Selbstbesinnung. In: studium generale. 6. Jahrgang (1953), H. 10, S. 553-559. - Litt 1955 (s.Anm.3), S. 15-20, 65, 87-89, 125-131. - Litt 1957 (s.Anm.3), S. 17-19.

14. Litt 1957, S. 15, 20-21, 62, 81-82.

15. Litt 1955, S. 31-32, 35-36 (Zitat S. 35).

16. Litt 1947, S. 23.

17. Litt 1947, S. 25.

18. Litt 1955, S. 90.

19. Litt 1955, S. 92-94. - Litt 1957, S. 36-39.

20. Litt 1955, S. 92 (Zitat). - Litt 1958, S. 78.

21. Litt 1955, S. 99. - Litt 1957, S. 62-64, 83-88.

22. Litt 1957, S. 81-85.

23. Litt 1955, S. 31-32 (Zitat S. 31).

24. Litt 1955, S. 124.

25. Litt 1955, S. 110-111.

26. Litt 1955, S. 98-100, 106-111. - Litt 1957, S. 62-65.

27. Litt 1955, S. 23.

28. Litt 1955, S. 101 (Zitat), 114-116. - Litt 1957, S. 41-42.

29. Litt 1955, S. 35-36 (Zitat S. 35).

30. Litt 1947, S. 26-29 (Zitat S. 26). - Litt 1958, S. 73.

31. Litt 1958, S. 55-56 (Zitat S. 55), S. 73.

32. Litt 1957, S. 92-93.

33. Litt 1947, S. 27-33.

34. Litt 1957, S. 93.

35. Eine solche organologisch-biologische Vorstellung über die Ganzheit einer Gesellschaft ist zumindest angedeutet durch die Metaphorik des "inneren Lebens ..., das in ihnen (sc. den Dingen, die zusammen einen "menschlichen Gesamtzustand" ausmachen) p u l s i e r t" (Hervorh. von mir). Sie ist ebenfalls angelegt in der Aussage über die "innere Bewegtheit, diese S e e l e des gemeinsamen Daseins" (Litt, 1947 (s.Anm.3), S. 29).

36. Deutscher Ausschuss für das Erziehungs- und Bildungswesen: Rahmenplan zur Umgestaltung und Vereinheitlichung des allgemeinbildenden öffentlichen Schulwesens (1959). Stuttgart 1966 (Nachdruck), S. 45-46.

37. Vgl. W. Klafki, Die fünfziger Jahre - eine Phase schulorganisatorischer Restauration. Zur Schulpolitik und Schulentwicklung im ersten Jahrzehnt der Bundesrepublik. In: D. Bänsch (Hrsg.), Die fünfziger Jahre. Tübingen 1985, S. 131-162.

38. H. Blankertz, Berufsbildung und Utilitarismus. Dusseldorf 1963, S. 24, 88-113, 117-119; H. Blankertz, Bildung im Zeitalter der grossen Industrie. Hannover 1969, S. 45-51 (Zitat "Idee der Menschheit ohne Status und Übervorteilung" ebd. 1969, S. 51; Blankertz zitiert damit Th.W. Adorno, Theorie der Halbbildung (1962), In: J.E. Pleines (Hrsg.), Bildungstheorien. Freiburg 1978, S. 92. Dieses Zitat findet sich dann wieder In: Kollegstufe NW Ratingen (1972) 1974, S. 20-21). Zu Blankertz' Interpretation Humboldts vgl. auch seinen Artikel 'Bildung-Bildungstheorien', den er nach Entwicklung des Kollegschulkonzepts veröffentlichte und der als weitere bildungstheoretische Begründung

des Kollegschulkonzepts verstanden werden kann (In: Chr. Wulf (Hrsg.), Worterbuch der Erziehung. Munchen (1974)^3 1976, S. 65-69).

39. Kollegstufe NW (= Strukturförderung im Bildungswesen des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Eine Schriftenreihe des Kultusministers, Heft 17). Ratingen (1972) 1974, S. 19-23 (Zitat ebd. S. 23).

40. Kollegstufe NW. Ratingen (1972) 1974, S. 21-22.

41. Kollegstufe NW (1972)1974, S. 30.

42. Kollegstufe NW (1972) 1974, S. 19-21, 24-25 (Zitat ebd. S. 19).

43. Chr. Lüth, Arbeit und Bildung in der Bildungstheorie Wilhelm von Humboldts und Eichendorffs. Zur Auseinandersetzung Humboldts und Eichendorffs mit dem Erziehungsbegriff der Aufklärung. In: H.-G. Pott (Hrsg.), Eichendorff und die Spätromantik. Paderborn 1985, S. 181-201.

44. Wilhelm von Humboldt, Unmassgebliche Gedanken über den Plan zur Einrichtung des Litthauischen Stadtschulwesen (1809). In: W. v. Hlumboldt, Werke Bd. IV (hrsg. von A. Flitner und K. Giel), Darmstadt^2 1969, S. 1 88.

45. H. Blankertz, Die Verbindung von Abitur und Berufsausbildung. In: Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, Jg. 23 (1977), S. 333-334, 337-338.

46. W. v. Humboldt 1809 (s.Anm.44), S. 188-189.

47. Blankertz, 1969 (s.Anm.38), S. 48-51; Blankertz (1974)^3 1976 (s.Anm.38), S. 65-68; Th.W. Adorno (1962) 1978 (s.Anm.38), S. 90-93.

BILDUNGSIDEALE, SOCIETY AND POLITICS: SOME CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS[1]

Konrad H. Jarausch

On first glance, it may seem quaintly old-fashioned to focus today's symposium on the notion of educational ideals. Several decades ago much of the discourse about education centered on pedagogical philosophies. But more recently the methodological shift to the social sciences has redirected debate towards the functional processes and social structures of education, dismissing intentional statements unless they could be construed as "theory." For instance, the "new history of education" has succeeded in illuminating the social recruitment of pupils, the economic role of the qualification of labor or the political implications of the curriculum. But it has tended to disregard educators' pronouncements about what they thought they were doing and focused on other more fundamental processes.[2] Such neglect seems puzzling since educational rhetoric is rife with ideals; legal frameworks habitually refer to them; institutional structures claim to derive from them; curricular content or teaching techniques are justified through them; and the very concept of scholarship seems to be steeped in them. Putting conceptions of education formally back onto the agenda offers the chance to rethink the question of their importance: Are they merely window-dressing, a pious set of platitudes, doing little harm but also bringing no benefits? Or are they so central to the educational enterprise that they permeate and color its every dimension?

Within the Western tradition of humanistic education, German Bildungsideale have been particularly influential and problematic. The very usage of this untranslatable term by NIAS suggests something at once significant and elusive. Not only Dutch but also Russian and American institutional adaptations demonstrate that the renown of the Central European ideal of cultivation around the turn of this century was so great,

that other countries attempted to borrow essential features from it.[3] The close juxtaposition of Bildung and Wissenschaft in the slogan cultivation through scholarship combined two central aspects of higher learning in an attractive synthesis that revitalized universities as institutions. But already at the turn of this century internal critics and foreign observers never tired of pointing out certain, the lack of integration of student subculture (leading to drinking and duelling) or the political illiberalism fostered thereby.[4] The preceding papers provide a stimulating basis for reexamining the German case by addressing first the implications of the core notion of Bildung, discussing the cultivating potential of an innovative Wissenschaft and finally analyzing the rhetorically neglected but practically important aspect of vocational training. By critically confronting the effects of humanistic education, these essays also raise the question of the impact of educational ideals in general.

Fritz Ringer's reflections on the implications of Bildung for the German tradition between 1890 and 1930 are an authoritative restatement and further elaboration of his thinking of the last two decades. They are based on a rich and sophisticated reading of key texts by those professors in the philosophical faculty, concerned with the humanities and social sciences, who considered themselves guardians of cultivation. By analyzing the field of discourse of these "German mandarins," he explains the implications of the concept of Bildung such as hermeneutic understanding, cultural individualism and idealistic Wissenschaft.[5] Particularly new and interesting is his focus on the inherent substantive vagueness of the notion which rendered it more a cultural style, elevating the educated above the masses and tying them closely to the state. This reading helps to make sense out of the "crisis of scholarship" reaction to specialization which equated the fragmentation of philosophical unity of knowledge with the erosion of culture, because specialized Wissenschaft was losing its power to create Weltanschauung. The paradox of how the initial emancipatory intent of Humboldtian cultivation could have led to an anti-democratic defensiveness among the majority of "orthodox" mandarins during the 1920s is largely to be explained by the ideologization of Bildung. Fritz Ringer, therefore, presents both a probing reappropriation of the strengths and a ringing indictment of the weaknesses of the German tradition of cultivation.

By virtue of his clarity and force, this interpretation raises challenging methodological and substantive questions. Since the changing connotations

of cultivation can only be reconstructed through a hermeneutic reading of texts. Bildung apparently requires a Gebildete to interpret it. But which statements make up the universe? Ringer touches upon theologians or jurists only parenthetically and consciously excludes the medical, scientific and technological members of the cultivated elite. While the former may be presumed to have gone along with the mandarins, many of the latter had different, more modern ideas of cultivation, threatening the very vision of the traditionalists. Moreover, how is one to deal with the tremendous variety of discourse, its shadings and contradictions? After great labors, Ringer identifies two ideal types, concentrating on their key features while downplaying the rest. In those instances when his abstractions of modernist versus orthodox mandarins are reified in the text, they risk blurring crucial distinctions. Though differences (such as republican versus reform conservative modernists) are subsequently reintroduced, they no longer affect the fundamental thrust of his argument. Finally, the analysis of the rhetoric of education confronts the inherent problem of confounding language with motives. While it is obvious that German mandarins talked about their perceived crisis in terms of Bildung, it does not necessarily follow that their notion of cultivation lay behind their unwillingness to come to terms with Weimar's educational, social and political problems. Without comparison with other causal factors, one may well wonder whether the effects of the ideal of cultivation were as defensive, unidirectional, and powerful as they appear to be.[6]

The second presentation of this cluster by Heinrich Dilly looks not at the whole picture, but at one smaller area within the larger canvas. Dealing with Warburg's private "problem-library" as well as with the art historical seminar of Hamburg university and its unusual students, this paper is more concrete and specific. Moreover, Dilly focuses on the personal and institutional background of a minority counter-tradition, often apostrophized as typical of Weimar Culture's new departures. Steeped in the methodology of art history, he investigates "implicit ideas" rather than explicit statements and uses a deceptively simple narrative technique which is alive to ironies and unintended consequences. Since art history was a central element of the neohumanist quest, Aby Warburg's and Erwin Panofsky's Kulturwissenschaft derived from an innovative self-reflection on the tradition of Bildung that was more interested in exploring the creation of the olympian image of the classics rather than in perpetuating it. As cultural avant-garde

the professors and students of this group were incompatible with National Socialism; they were either forced to emigrate or to resist the Third Reich. Dilly is therefore less interested in the question implicitely raised by Ringer's paper, the contribution of cultivation to the Nazi seizure of power, than in the different creative continuity of its victims. Ultimately, this promising research intends to go beyond the rehabilitation of the Warburg name to a revitalization of the scholarly legacy of iconology.[7]

While differentiating Ringer's broad brush-strokes, Dilly's finer lines present some difficulties of their own. While an individual case study can bring greater specificity, it raises the question of representativeness. Even promoters of Weimar's cultural legacy such as Peter Gay or Walter Laqueur acknowledge the exceptionalism of the Warburg Institute. The small but talented group around Panofsky therefore presents at best an important alternate current, but not the mainstream.[8] A second underexplored issue is the role of Bildung in the creation and constitution of this cultural avant-garde beyond ironic self-distancing. Was the reorientation of art history as a key discipline of cultural interpretation in some way still inspired by the aesthetic aspects of the initial neohumanist vision? If this is the case, the linkages to its progressive elements need to be specified, since orthodox mandarins laid claim to the same tradition but derived an opposite set of artistic standards from it! Similarly, the connection between scholarly innovation and political orientation is handled somewhat anecdotally by describing the incompatibility of the "Warburg style" with Nazi ideology. But it is not clear why this scholarly specialty was more politically sensitive than the Fachidiotentum of the apolitical traditionist majority. Finally, Dilly's disarming reference to "my Bildungsideal Warburg" raises the intriguing issue of the continued relevance of educational ideals - an inevitable question about personal biases, lurking behind the keynote paper, these presentations, this comment and the likely reactions of the audience.

The final essay of this group, Christoph Lüth, deals with the third side of the educational triangle, namely vocational training. Since this aspect is usually ignored in the concentration on Bildung or Wissenschaft, his paper is a valuable complement to traditional emphases. Exploring post-war West German attempts to make this an equally important dimension of educational ideals, his presentation examines three important pedagogical thinkers who criticized and refashioned the Humboldtian legacy. In contrast to received wisdom, their alternative envisaged "cultivation through work as

well as integration of general education and job training in the vocational school." While Theodor Litt faulted the tradition of Bildung for being inappropriate to industrial society, politically blind and excessively harmonizing, Heinrich Weinstock took it to task for being too aristocratic. Lacking didactic specification, their educational concepts could only serve as legitimizing ideology for the Berufsschulen in the 1950s and 1960s. In contrast, Herwig Blankertz' subtle redefinition of the neohumanist legacy led to an experimental integration of cultivation with work in the twenty-two Kollegschulen of North Rhine Westfalia in the 1970s. Lüth not only presents a sensitive reading of his attempted conceptual departure from tradition and a perceptive critique of the correctness of its reinterpretations.[9] But he also offers interesting comments on the eventual institutional implications of these conceptual debates.

Since the vocational critique of cultivation reveals some of its social limits, Lüth's scrupulous paper demonstrates the difficulties of transcending this legacy. The unusual juxtaposition of neohumanist rhetoric with reformist post-war conceptions makes one curious about the evolution of the Ausbildung discussion in the intervening century and one half. Educational reformers such as G. Kerschensteiner, labor spokesmen and Weimar ministries, just to mention a few, prefigured much of the later debate. This leftist counter-emphasis on cultivation through work strongly influenced the creation of the polytechnical school in East Germany as well. Not that this made West German innovation easier during the Cold War - but it was one unacknowledged background factor which both blocked and hastened reform. Repeatedly, Lüth also refers to the socio-political context of the pedagogical discussion - but when coming to the brink of making explicit connections, he retreats into the ethereal realm of ideas. That reticence is regrettable, since in contrast to its arguments, the sources of the vocational critique of the neohumanist tradition remain obscure. While the egalitarian and democratizing purpose of the fusion of general education with vocational training is made clear, focusing on the accuracy of the Humboldt interpretations instead of examining the alternative in its own terms leaves the impression that it might merely be a counterideology. While the Warburg example illustrates an alternative process of cultivation and the vocational training debate demonstrates some of its social limitations, both unwittingly underscore the power of the diffuse mainstream tradition of cultivation.

Taken together, these stimulating papers suggest some concluding reflections on educational ideals that go beyond their individual findings. As Lüth correctly points out, the very term Bildungsideale is a product of the idealistic German tradition of cultivation, dominated by the neohumanist legacy. The problematic evolution of the German version of the European conception of liberal education has raised many questions about its peculiar nationalistic flavor or its relative color-blindness to the natural sciences and technology.[10] In this context it is only important to recall that the ambiguity of Humboldt's terse formulations encouraged continual efforts at reinterpretation which became precisely more frequent towards the turn of this century when the growing discrepancy between universalistic rhetoric and specialized practice increasingly strained the tradition.[11] As Manfred Fuhrmann demonstrated provocatively in his Uhlenbeck-lecture, the defense of cultivation often acquired a certain narcissistic and nostalgic flavor that put a higher premium on gazing backward than on looking ahead. Nonetheless, the appropriation of the tradition was so far from uniform that innovative endeavors like Warburg's or Panofsky's Kulturwissenschaft could also claim to derive from Humboldt's liberal individualism. At the same time attempts to break out the neohumanist circle either had to reject the legacy altogether, a dangerous enterprise if one wanted to be listened to, or to refashion it in different direction. The pervasiveness of the rhetoric of Bildung, therefore, creates the impression that this ideal was all-powerful. Since things are, however, rarely what they seem, one should confront the claims of cultivation with additional, previously neglected dimensions of evidence.

An essential test for the impact of Bildung is a look at its purported recipients, namely the students who are supposed to imbibe it. Institutions of higher learning usually take them for granted, professors consider them a necessary evil, and even students rarely take themselves seriously. Ignoring students as much of the literature does can be dangerous, since young people are not just passive receptacles into which ideas are poured, but active participants in the process - as the student rebellion of the late 1960s demonstrated all too dramatically. Through the ages, most have, indeed, been Brotstudenten interested primarily in getting a marketable degree and having a good time. But this very rejection of cultivation's higher aims, limited its effects to certain shared outer forms. The minority of academic youths that was ready to respond to the challenge of self-cultivation tended

to be frustrated by the bewildering variety of courses without intellectual coherence. Hence their quest for Bildung often proceeded by sampling famous names from different disciplines rather than by absorbing a fixed canon, thereby acquiring the vocabulary of the cultured elite instead of a cohesive outlook. The small coterie of real adepts of Wissenschaft was usually preoccupied with specialized problems at the cutting edge of scholarship rather than with building an over-arching Weltanschauung. Moreover, the informal curriculum of student subculture, dominated by duelling corporations, was intent on character-building rather than on cultivation in the higher sense. On the operational level, the process of Bildung therefore seems more prosaic and its hold more tenuous than one might expect.[12]

A second layer of evidence for probing the imprint of cultivation are the akademische Berufsstande, known as professions. After all, if Bildung has some influence, it ought to be evident in the thoughts and actions of former university graduates. While this may seem elementary, it is essential to understand that professional practitioners do not just echo professorial ideology but form conceptions of their own which relate to their occupational situation rather than to what they have learned at the academy. For a lawyer or doctor, Allgemeinbildung is a mandatory prerequisite for entering an academic occupation and belonging to the higher stratum of society. But the acquisition of scientific knowledge and the learning of practical skills have higher priority in professional training than some vague notion of general cultivation. Not only in Germany the process of preparation stresses practical experience, to be gained in quasi-apprenticeship setting, over university instruction. This is not to say that cultivation did not weave a common bond among the educated strata which in Central Europe formed a distinctive Bildungsburgertum with few common institutions, but a shared cultural style. Moreover, it is residually important in professional self-conceptions as guardians of health, justice and culture of the like. But the continual failure of attempts at collective action by the akademische Berufsstande in the Weimar Republic demonstrates that individual professional loyalties proved more powerful. The comparative evidence suggests that shared cultivation operated as a background variable while more immediate concerns such as income, status, practice and organization determined the great majority of professionals' decisions.[13]

Hence one ought to be careful not to attribute too much political effect to the common cause of Bildung. A variety of different formulations such as the "unpolitical German," "the German mandarin," or "academic illiberalism" assert some connection.[14] One might want to speak of a cluster of attitudes, idealizing cultivation for its own sake, feeling socially superior to the uncultured masses, shrinking from an involvement in politics, while vigorously supporting national causes. However, there were also neoliberal countercurrents, not to mention Socialist and Catholic alternatives. It is, therefore, an over-simplification to make the German conception of cultivation directly responsible for the Nazi seizure of power. In the late Weimar Republic the political attitudes of educated Germans divided into a number of distinctive camps, including communist or socialist intellectuals, genuinely democratic to apolitical centrist academics and monarchist or volkish professionals with some obvious skewing towards the Right. But as the Interessenrepublikanismus, if I am allowed to coin a term, of the bulk of professionals shows, these attitudes were not fixed, but rather performance-oriented, responding to the Republic's success in meeting their desires. The evidence of the university graduates indicates that it was less the erosion of the tradition of cultivation but a set of concrete crises from the First World War through the inflation, stabilization and Great Depression that made professionals hesitant to embrace and eventualy ready to desert the Republic. Certainly, the mainstream legacy of Bildung did not strengthen Weimar, since it pointed towards neo-conservative authoritarianism. But the intellectual ancestors of the volkish New Right were rather to be found among the critics of cultivation, starting with Lagarde, than with its neohumanist defenders.[15]

Should one now abandon Bildung altogether and retreat into pure scholarship of vocationalism? The vagueness of the ideal of cultivation, the narrow-minded traditionalism of its focus on the classical languages, the social arrogance of its supporters and the lack of political judgment often inherent in it, make jettisoning the tradition an understandable choice. Vestigia terrent. While ritualistic repetition of symbolic phrases (such as Einsamkeit und Freiheit) mocks cultivation's aims, yet another effort to reinterpret its governing texts is likely to be attacked as a misreading and thereby doomed to failure. Since Bildungsideale are like all values, ultimately personal, the argument about the meaning of the tradition is likely to be endless. Instead of lamenting the disappearance of humanistic

Allgemeinbildung, let me try to suggest a more constructive alternative. Some of the progressive aspirations of the original Humboldtian vision remain valid and inspiring: The neohumanists sought to set man free from theological and ideological bondage; they also wanted to liberate him from material necessity and break down estate barriers; finally, they intended to make him capable of self-determining his fate politically. But the means which they used to achieve this goal such as the classical Gymnasium or the traditional Ordinarien-universität seem dated, since they belong to a different social world.[16] The challenge for today is to find appropriate institutional forms and curricular methods to realize the creative aspects of these original aims. In that search, the very real failures of the tradition should encourage humility about future successes. Only by being self-critical about cultivation, can one begin to realize the promise stated in the naively touching slogan of a popular library a century ago: Bildung macht frei!

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NOTES

1. This essay originated as NIAS LUSTRUM comment on the papers of F.K. Ringer, H. Dilly and C. Lüth on June 26, 1986.

2. K.H. Jarausch, "The Old 'New History of Education': A German Reconsideration," History of Education Quarterly 26 (1986), 67-83.

3. K.H. Jarausch, "The Universities: An American View," in J. Dukes and J. Remak, eds., The Other Germany (forthcoming in 1987).

4. J.H. Jarausch, Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of Academic Illiberalism (Princeton, 1983).

5. F.K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933 (Cambridge, 1969), translated as Die Gelehrten: Der Niedergang der deutschen Mandarine 1890-1933 (Stuttgart, 1983).

6. S.-E. Liedman, "Institutions and Ideas: Mandarins and Non-Mandarins in the German Academic Intelligentsia," as well as F. Ringer, "Differences and Cross-National Similarities among Mandarins," Comparative Studies in Society and History 28 (1986), 119-168.

7. H. Dilly, "Der gefesselte Eros. Ikonologie im Nationalsozialismus" (MS, NIAS, 1986).

8. P. Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York, 1968); W. Laqueur, Weimar Culture; and W. Sauer, "Weimar Culture: Experiments in Modernism," Social Research 39 (1972), 254ff.

9. C. Lüth, "Arbeit und Bildung in der Bildungstheorie Wilhelm von Humboldts und Eichendorffs," in H.-G. Pott, ed., Eichendorff und die Spätromantik (Paderborn, 1985), 181ff.

10. R. Vierhaus, "Bildung," in O. Brunner et al, eds. Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Stuttgart, 1972), 1: 508-551; and W.H. Bruford, The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation: 'Bildung' from Humboldt to Thomas Mann (Cambridge, 1975). These issues were once again addressed in the oral discussion of the papers.

11. B. Gebhardt published Humboldt's academy and university fragment and R. Spranger his reinterpretation of Humboldt's educational ideals in the decade before the First World War. Cf. C. Lüth, "Wilhelm von Humboldts Schulpläne im Licht kontroverser Interpretationen," Pädagogische Rundschau 36 (1982), 259ff.

12. J. Gillis, Youth and History (New York, 1981, 2nd ed.) and K. H. Jarausch, Deutsche Studenten 1800-1970 (Frankfurt, 1984).

13. Essays on German, Russian, British and American professions by C.E. McClelland, C.E. Timberlake, A. Engel and D. Light in K.H. Jarausch, ed. The transformation of Higher Learning (Stuttgart and Chicago, 1983). Cf . also W. Conze and J. Kocka, eds., Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1985).

14. The notion of the "unpolitical German" was popularized by F. Stern, the mandarin concept elaborated by Fritz K. Ringer and academic illiberalism suggested by myself. Cf. "Illiberalism and Beyond: German History in Search of a Paradigm," Journal of Modern History 55 (1983), 268ff.

15. K.H. Jarausch, "The Crisis of the German Professions, 1918-1933" Journal of Contemporary History 20 (1985), 379ff; and "The Perils of Professionalism. Lawyers, High-School Teachers and Engineers in Nazi Germany," German Studies Review 10 (1986), 107ff.

16. C. Menze, Die Bildungsreform Wilhelm von Humboldts (Hannover, 1975); K.E. Jeismann, Das preussische Gymnasium in Staat und Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, 1974); C.E. McClelland, State, Society and University in Germany, 1700-1914 (Cambridge, 1980).

CULTURAL VALUES AND MASS HIGHER EDUCATION: CONTRADICTION OR CHALLENGE?

Ulrich Teichler

EXPANSION AND SYSTEMATIZATION OF A NON-ELITE SECTOR OF MASS HIGHER EDUCATION

Higher education seems to be confronted with a more or less continuous change in its functions. Observers might emphasize different aspects and correspondingly claim slow or fast developments; they might point at the inertia of higher education or its inclination to rapid moves. But in any event, some kinds of change seem to occur even if the dominant debates about the functions of higher education in a given period do not perceive major challenges or pressures for change, nor even the occurrence of substantial changes. There are, however, periods in which the need for substantial changes, as well as perceptions of far-reaching change seem to be perceived by almost all actors and observers of higher education. A review of the functions of higher education seems to be indispensible at certain points.

The growth of higher education in the 1960s was accompanied by a process of reflection and action regarding tasks and patterns of higher education. First efforts were made to shape higher education to blend with major goals emphasized at that time: Higher education ought to contribute in a stronger and more systematic manner than in the past, both for the stimulation of economic growth and for the reduction of social inequalities.

Second, the increased quantities - especially of the absolute number of students and of their share of the corresponding age groups - seemed to necessitate a debate on the required changes of either the character of the total higher education system, or at least those segments which are especially responsible for absorbing the growing numbers of students. Martin Trow, whose views on such reconsiderations of the function of higher

education became especially well-known, phrased the latter phenomenon in the following way: "Countries that develop a system of elite higher education in modern times seem able to expand it without changing its character in fundamental ways until it is providing places for about 15% of the age grade. At about that point the system begins to change its character; if the transition is made successfully the system is then able to develop institutions that can grow without being transformed until they reach about 50% of the age grade."[1]

There seemed to emerge a consensus that "mass higher education," as Trow termed it, "differs from elite higher education not only quantitatively but qualititatively."[2] The additional students entering higher education in this process of expansion were conceived to be different from the traditional ones as regards their socialization, expectations and motivations, as well as prospective careers. Thus, new approaches to curricula, teaching and learning were considered a necessary response, either through institutions and courses specifically serving the non-elite sectors, or through a change in the function of all institutions of higher education. In addition, "elite" higher education was felt to be too costly to be spread according to the growing "social demand" for higher education.

If we look back on the debates about the functions and structures of higher education since the 1960s[3] we can notice also one far-reaching consensus regarding the solutions to be chosen in the face of the increasing student numbers: traditional "elite" higher education ought to be preserved in its more or less unchanged character. There were primarily divergent views regarding the following issues:

- whether non-elite higher education ought to differ substantially from elite higher education, or only to a limited extent,
- whether higher education for the "masses" ought to strive for the same goals as elite higher education, which would render the latter somewhat less demanding and of lower quality, or ought it to have a distinct set of goals,
- whether distinct sectors of higher education for the elite and for the masses were desirable or whether the boundaries ought to be gradual or even blurred.

A major focus of the debate on the relationships between elite and mass higher education was the structural pattern of institutions and courses,[4] whereby the establishment or expansion of a non-university sector of higher education, and of short courses, played a prominent role.[5] In this debate, neither a clear segmentation of sectors as one extreme seemed to be appropriate, nor, on the other hand, did the view of the "unitarians," as Trow described them, prevail that a "single system" ought to be established.[6] Rather, models of "a relatively open, differentiated, and flexible tertiary education system"[7] gained momentum. As experts agree, a "diversified" structure became most popular which stresses clear differences of levels or characteristics of goals between institutions of higher education but avoids clear segmentation, whereas an "integrated structure" favouring intrainstitutional diversity rather than inter-institutional diversity and trying to keep differences of goals and levels in bounds, remained an exception.[8]

Concepts regarding the structural development either imply or explicitly address the qualitative tasks of the respective sectors of higher education. In this respect most concepts name three categories of curricula, teaching and learning, which might be phrased differently and which are, of course, considered to be closely linked:

- the occupational orientation: whether or not a non-elite higher education differs from elite higher education in terms of stronger emphasis on preparation for an occupation, in a more direct preparatory role, in preparing for a distinct set of occupations, or overlapping in a range of occupations etc.;
- the intellectual and cognitive emphasis: whether elite higher education differs from mass higher education primarily in the degree of intellectually demanding teaching and learning, of research-related teaching and learning, of fostering problem-solving abilities etc., or whether the non-elite sector promotes a different kind of thinking and learning which emphasize the understanding and application of knowledge, but not the ability for innovative thinking and generating new knowledge;
- the cultural dimension of learning.

The definition of the "cultural" dimension of learning, which will be the focus of this essay, is very divergent and in many cases not very clear. On the one hand, one addresses the teaching and learning as far as it might

serve the transmission and creation of "culture."[9] On the other hand, the term refers to shaping all the competencies of students except in the narrow domain of cognitive and occupational skills, thereby including value orientation, political and social views and attitudes, styles of thinking, working and learning, personality, broad understanding of one's occupation and social role, cultural knowledge, manners etc.[10]

CULTURAL VALUES AND THE TRADITIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION: THE BASIS OF CONCEPTS REGARDING THE NON-ELITE SECTOR

Views about the educational functions of mass higher education or nonelite higher education - the latter expression might be better suited if distinctions to the elite sector are emphasized - in each country reflect the functions of higher education performed before the expansion reached the point of urging a reconsideration and re-arrangement of those functions. This is frequently overlooked in concepts aiming to describe international developments of higher education. Four aspects of the traditions of higher education seem especially important for the debates on non-elite higher education since the 1960s.

(a) First, one has to take into consideration how broad a range of social elites the institutions of higher education, especially the prestigious sectors of higher education, had traditionally served. In some countries, educational institutions played a considerable role in the upbringing of nobility, landlords and warriors, in other countries the role of formal educational institutions was negligible in this respect. For example, the high meritocratic esteem of present-day education in Japan has been attributed to the fact that in Japan these dominant social groups of pre-industrial periods were more likely to be formally educated than in European countries.[11] Also, English universites served the pre-industrial commercial elites, whereas most continental institutions of higher education were primarily responsible for the state-related occupations of public administration, the medical field and clergy. Finally, engineering quickly became an integral part of the higher education system especially in the United States, Japan, Russia - countries which were late-comers to industrialization among those conceived as being industrial societies today.[12] Contemporary views about which sectors of contemporary occupational elites are considered to be the conveyer of culture are largely

influenced by the range of occupational elites traditionally served by the system of higher education. The smaller this range has been, the more likely are we able to observe nowadays narrow concepts of culture which exclude major areas of knowledge.

(b) Second, the role of higher education in the overall pre-occupational education and socialization process has traditionally differed from one country to another. The shaping of cultural values might have been a task of the universites, of pre-university courses or of socialization processes strongly influenced by the family. What might look like a different concept of general versus professional education for the elite, might turn out as merely different division of functions between secondary and higher education. For example, U.S. experts involved in educational reforms in Japan after World War II were convinced that the lack of a general education at the universities was one of the causes of narrow-mindedness and lack of political maturity of the Japanese elite. Given a far-reaching criticism of that kind, it is very surprising to find that these experts considered the upgrading for former high schools and pre-university courses to general education divisions of universities serviong the first two years of university education as major steps toward the establishment of an education system which shapes well-rounded personalities.[13] Or another example that underlines the issue of the allocation of various functions of elite education inside or outside higher education. Bourdieu emphasized the limitations of higher education in status-distribution because of its preoccupation with cognitive training, whereas the socialization of the elite continues to be transmitted by families.[14]

(c) Third, systems of higher education differ substantially regarding the range of disciplines traditionally being incorporated in universities, or being established in separate colleges. For example, English universities have traditionally covered a far broader range of disciplines than French universities. Although it is frequently claimed that universities were not very successful in transcending the borderlines of disciplines, the institutional allocations of disciplines seems to play an important role in each country for concepts of cultivating the potential of individual disciplines.

(d) The traditional pattern of reputation of universities also had a strong impact on discussions on the function of the non-elite sectors taking place since the 1960s. In countries in which a steep hierarchy of reputation and prestige of universities is generally perceived - for example Japan and

the U.S. - non-university higher education tends to be considered as gradually differing in level from university sectors, whereas in countries in which a fairly homogeneous university system exists - for example in Germany - nonuniversity higher education tends to be considered distinct in its characteristics from university education.

These four dimensions of traditional higher education had a strong influence on national debates in the last few decades about the functions of non-elite higher education. However, one element common to all industrial societies can be observed: In spite of all debates about the desirable shifts of emphasis regarding general or specialized education, breadth or depth etc., there was a strong belief that in elite higher education fostering of the intellect, occupational training and the promotion of a cultured, well-rounded personality are at least compatible in principle; it is merely the issue of finding a proper balance between such a set of only partially conflicting goals. Regarding the emerging and expanding sector of non-elite higher education, however, the dominant view in many countries appears to hold that these goals are compatible at most only to a very limited extent, and that definite choices have to be made in favour of vocational emphasis, the learning of application, or any other kind of a "narrow" choice.

IMPACT OF THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF NON-UNIVERSITY HIGHER EDUCATION

The debates on the goals of non-elite higher education in each country were not influenced merely by the traditions of the universities on the one hand and the perceptions of new challenges for higher education on the other hand. In addition, the existing types and functions of non-university higher education played a role. For in most countries, efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to systematize higher education and to establish a non-university sector as a stable component of the higher education system, were not intended to create completely new institutions of non-university higher education, but rather to transform existing ones.

Three major types of forerunner-institutions of a systematized nonuniversity higher education can be named:

- "other colleges,"
- higher vocational schools,
- "junior colleges."

"Other" colleges usually provide a smaller range of fields of study than do universities. Some of them are conceived to be of lower status than the universities because of the lower level of admissions requirements, less demanding courses, a more specialized training programme or less involvement in research and graduate training. But typically, other colleges tend to overlap in status with universities in a given country; there is no clear hierarchical dividing line between universities and other colleges.[15]

As opposed to this, the incorporation of higher vocational schools in the higher education system - this was the case in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and other countries - resulted in a substantial upgrading, but usually did not lead - at least not immediately - to a considerable overlap of status and functions. Institutions which were considered part of the vocational training sectors, or of the secondary education sector, were expected to change substantially over the years.

"Junior colleges" traditionally have not emphasized a completely distinct set of educational goals from those of the university, but rather, a somewhat less demanding course programme of a fairly general nature than the universities.[16] In many cases, they served as a "finishing school" for women.

In the process of systematization of the non-university sector of higher education, these ties to the tradition of previous institutional settings were in most cases somewhat slackened, but not completely severed. If, in a given country, general courses had previously dominated in a non-university higher education, vocational courses were substantially expanded. If goals and programmes had been very distinct from that of a corresponding university programme, some degree of assimilation was introduced. Nevertheless, the historical routes of non-university higher education in each country seem to be very important in shaping the expectations regarding common elements and differences between "elite" higher education and "non-elite" higher education. Especially the extent to which non-university institutions of higher education are viewed - in comparison to universities - as "lower-ranking" colleges or "vocational" colleges is largely determined by such roots.

In order to avoid misunderstandings: non-university higher education has experienced quite different developments from one country to another in the last two or three decades. In some countries this sector grew substantially, in others the growth remained far below expectations during the period of systematization. In some countries the search for an identity and pride remained unresolved, in others a fairly stable concept emerged. In some countries the distinctions between this sector and universities is most strongly emphasized, in others the similarities or overlaps are more pronounced. As a general trend, one can state that the employment problems of graduates in many university fields since the early, or mid-seventies, have strenghtened the position of the non-university sector, because what emerged was at least an overlap of the "value" of choosing certain institutions of higher education: Whereas the "academic" reputation of all university courses might have remained higher than that of non-University higher education in almost all cases, the labour market value of several non-university courses surpassed that of some university courses.[17]

But in spite of such changes, the cultural role of non-university higher education continues to be perceived largely on the basis of two images which, as we have already said, tend to prevail: that of a "lower-ranking" or "lower level" college, and that of a "vocational" college.

CULTURAL VALUES AND THE "LOWER-RANKING" COLLEGE

In many countries, non-university higher education is characterized as "less demanding" than university education, or as serving "new students," (those who did not achieve access to higher education while access to it was more selective) or as an "open door" to higher education. No matter what terms are preferred, the emphasis is on levels of academic standards in explaining the difference between elite and non-elite higher education. Thus, the "lower-ranking" college seems to be by definition a bad copy of the higher ranking one. Cultural advancement and personality development can also be achieved only at a lower level according to such views.

This does not mean, however, that non-university higher education in those countries, in which differences between non-university higher education and universities are emphasized in terms of level rather than "vocational" orientation, is more "vulnerable" due to the constant comparison with the universities as the OECD has expressed it: "... the very powerful and

traditional norms emanating from universities make it difficult, if not impossible, for the new members to acquire sufficient prestige and parity of esteem without following these norms and thereby rejecting their own specific functions."[18] For, on the one hand, also non-university higher education with "vocational" emphasis has tended to be considered the inferior version of higher education and has tried to compensate for this by reducing these differences ("academic drift") which, in many cases, leads to the fact that the remaining differences were more strongly felt than the prior differences, because the closer different institutions become the more likely they are to compare themselves to the others.[19] On the other hand, "lower-ranking" colleges might be protected by norms which will allow a certain degree of self-esteem. In the U.S., for example, some representatives of lower-ranking colleges emphasize that they provide a higher "value added", i.e. higher growth of achievement at college, than Harvard.[20] Also, the emphasis on the diversity of higher education at least reduces the pressure on lower-ranking colleges to continually compare themselves with institutions at the top of the scale based on cognitive elitism.

In spite of these reservations, the "lower-ranking" college tends to be conceived as "the second best:" The claim for excellence in its own right in a given diversified system of higher education is unable to prevent this constant comparison, and the self-perception as an inferior solution. This can be demonstrated by a well-known book which tried to emphasize just the opposite: "Excellence" by Gardner; the famour subtitle of the book reads: "Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too?" The lack of stabilization by a plurality of goals might be demonstrated by a few citations. On the one hand, Gardner seems to share such a view: "But we cannot hope to create or maintain such diversity unless we honor the various aspects of that diversity. Each of the different kinds of institutions has a significant part to play in creating the total pattern, and each should be allowed to play its roles with honor and recognition."[22] "We must develop a point of view that permits each kind of institution to achieve excellence in terms of its own objectives."[23] On the other hand, the prevailing cognitive elitism also shapes Gardner's views; he recommends the striving for excellence at a lower level: "We must never make the insolent and degrading assumption that young people unfitted for the most demanding fields of intellectual endeavor are incapable of rigorous attention to some sort of standards.... College should be a demanding as well as an enriching experience - demanding for the brilliant youngster at a high

level of expectation and for the less brilliant at a more modest level.... And we must expect each student to strive for excellence that is within his reach."[24]

CULTURAL VALUES AND THE "VOCATIONAL" COLLEGE

The "vocational" approach of non-university higher education in many countries seems, according to widespread views, to contradict the aims of cultural enhancement and a broad personality in several respects:

- First, many non-university sectors of higher education have large student numbers in business and engineering - fields shaped by narrow functionalism rather than by broad culture according to traditional views. For example, it is not surprising that Trow mentions as one of the major changes in the transition from elite to mass higher education: "...the emphasis shifts from the shaping of character to the transmission of skills for more specific technical elite roles."[25] "Technical" has a broader meaning here than "engineering," but it is indicative that "technical" is chosen for describing the mere functional roles. One other example might be interesting: The only visible outcome of the debate in postwar Germany about the need to promote general education at university was the introduction of a "studium generale" for engineering students in West-Berlin; because of this studium generale, the institution was named "Technische Universitaet", whereas all other engineering institutions continued to be named "Technische Hochschule" until the 1960s: When the role of higher education to stimulate economic growth was finally emphasized as a general aim, this difference could be blurred.

- Second, non-university higher education is not considered to be a preparation for other kinds of occupations, those on the so-called semiprofessional level, in a similar way that the universities prepare for the professions, but rather a more direct preparation; a lesser amount of initial training in the early career stage will be needed in order to take over a productive role.[26] Thus, a non-university higher education is frequently so directly geared to occupational preparation that no room is left to gain knowledge of fields outside one's domain. This reinforces the image of the "narrow" specialist viewed as the antipode to the cultured member of the elite.

- Third, "vocational" emphasis of non-university higher education is frequently considered to teach the application of knowledge or to serve applied fields of knowledge. "Applied" might only be a disguise for less demanding learning and work. For example, the OECD stated that the shortcycle higher education in most European countries was expected to provide manpower in terms of "qualifications and skills for which university education is of too high and theoretical a level, and secondary education insufficient."[27] Or it might be considered as a different type of understanding: not consisting of innovative and critical views and problem-solving, which a well-rounded academically-trained person is supposed to be able to cope with, but rather, the utilization of set knowledge for given purposes is aimed at. As was once stated in the Federal Republic of Germany, Fachhochschulen ought to create an "auftragstreues Mittelmass."[28]

It might be added that the Anglosaxon terminology of "professional" versus "vocational" is frequently used to depict the lack of cultural enhancement and personality development in non-elite higher education. "Professional" education is considered to be specialized training of the elite, which is at least considered compatible with cultural enhancement and a broad development of personality, whereas "vocational" education is frequently used as the antonym to a "liberal" education.

EFFORTS TO COUNTERBALANCE THE DEGRADING VIEWS ON NON-ELITE HIGHER EDUCATION

Non-university higher education - no matter whether its prime emphasis is university education at a lower level, or high-level "vocational" education tends to be considered as "the second best," i.e., education which lacks standards according to the powerful yardsticks of the traditional university. This is not only true in terms of cognitive standards or regarding the status of occupations the respective institutions of higher education are preparing for, but also regarding the "cultural" functions of institutions of higher education. One might have assumed that this latter function is not as clearly determined as other functions by the existing meritocracy and inequality of society; on the contrary, it transpires that the "cultural" function of higher education institutions is more closely embedded in institutional hierarchies than the preparatory function for jobs, because the

latter hierarchy might at least be shaken to some extent by turbulences on the labour market.

There have been various efforts, however, to counterbalance the traditional view that non-elite higher education cannot be more than a bad copy of elite higher education. For instance, the emphasis on diversity. In the U.S. this notion shapes the views on the higher education system so greatly that it has a powerful impact.[29] There is a widely shared view that "a diverse educational system affords students a wider choice, is best able to meet the highly distinctive needs of a pluralistic society, and should be most adaptable as these needs change."[30] This difference is remarkable in comparison to the Federal Republic of Germany where efforts of the Federal Ministry of Education and Science to promote diversity and competition in higher education were re-interpreted by the Science Council and many others involved, as mere competition within a steep academic hierarchy.[31] But also in the U.S. the emphasis on diversity serves primarily as a buffer for lowerranking colleges but not as a vehicle to promote a genuine plurality of goals. This is because a corresponding plurality, or relativism, regarding the goals of elite higher education does not exist[32] and diversity is therefore primarily a claim for respect regarding the level of targets of the non-elite institutions, as the above discussed views of Gardner demonstrate.

The second kind of effort emphasizes the commonality of goals of all institutions of higher education. Many reports of international organizations on higher education stressed a common set of goals for all institutions of higher education.[33] The Framework Act for Higher Education in 1976, aimed at coordinating state laws in higher education in the Federal Republic of Germany, emphasized as the goal of all institutions of higher education to "contribute to the fostering and development of the sciences and arts through research, teaching and studies."[34] However, individual state laws were required to specify their own functions of non-university higher education. Given the fact that differences between sectors of higher education are again more strongly emphasized in the 1980s, one tends to doubt whether the statement of goals which intended to reduce traditional distances between institutions turned out to be influential. For differences of levels tend to be continuously emphasized - no matter whether they become smaller[35] and whether they are very
vague.[36]

A higher esteem of the cultural function of mass higher education and stronger emphasis on cultural enhancement and personality development in mass higher education can only be successful if the norms of the traditional elite higher education are no longer considered to be perfect yardsticks. If the deficiencies of an elite higher education are taken into consideraton - for instance the lack of confrontation between theory and practice, splits between functional knowledge and culture, lack of understanding of other disciplines etc., there might be a re-appraisal of a non-elite higher education in terms of genuinely specific functions and a re-appraisal of jobs at a semi-professional level in terms of autonomy, problem-solving etc: this might become the basis of genuine diversity. Proposals such as those which have been made in Japan and the Netherlands to open advanced courses to both university graduates and graduates from non-university institutions of higher education[37] seem to be at least the first steps in this direction. For those measures aim to create a new balance between institutions, which in the long run might lead to a mutual acceptance of different goals.

NOTES

1. Trow, Martin: "Problems in the Transition from Elite to Mass Higher Education," in Policies for Higher Education. Paris: OECD 1974, p. 63.

2. Ibid., p. 2.

3. See the overview in Teichler, Ulrich: "Strukturentwicklung des Hochschulwesens im internationalen Vergleich," in Eroeffnung, ed. by Praesident der Gesamthochschule Kassel. Kassel: Stauda 1985, pp. 195-221.

4. See especially OECD: Policies for Higher Education. Paris 1974; Council of Europe: Reforms and Development of Tertiary Education in Europe: Recommendations. Strasbourg 1982.

5. OECD: Short-Cycle Higher Education: A Search for Identity. Paris 1973. See also Hornbostel, Stefan, Oehler, Christoph and Teichler, Ulrich: "Aspects of Higher Education Planning in Market Economies,"

in Planning in Higher Education. Bucharest: CEPES/UNESCO 1986 (forthcoming).

6. Trow, op. cit., p. 86.

7. Hermanns, Harry and Teichler, Ulrich: "Integration of Higher Education: Concepts and Models," in The Compleat University, ed. by Hermanns, Harry, Teichler, Ulrich and Wasser, Henry. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman 1983, p.7.

8. See the overview in Hermanns, Teichler and Wasser, op.cit; for a "taxonomy of differences" between institutions of higher education as discussed in the 1960s, see Watts, Anthony G.: Diversity and Choice in Higher Education. London/Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Keegan Paul 1972, pp. 24-34.

9. See for example the categories of "cultural and community function" on the one hand and "personal growth" on the other hand in Council of Europe, op.cit., pp. 10-11.

10. See, for example the analysis of non-occupational benefits of higher education in Bowen, Howard: Investment in Learning. San Francisco, Cal.: Jossey-Bass 1977. See also the broad range of goals of higher education in the U.S. as discussed in Thompson, Jo Ann G.: The Modern Idea of the University. New York: Lang 1984.

11. Dore, Ronald P.: Education in Tokugawa Japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Cal.: University of California Press 1965.

12. See Teichler, Ulrich: Geschichte und Struktur des japanischen Hochschulwesens. Stuttgart: Klett 1975, chapter 2.

13. Ibid., pp. 155-6.

14. Bourdieu, Pierre and Passeron, J.-C.: Die Illusion der Chancengleichheit. Stuttgart: Klett 1971.

15. See, for example, the patterns of higher education in Southern European countries as described in Council of Europe, op.cit., pp. 64-8.

16. Yarrington, R. (ed.): International Development of the Junior College Idea. Washington, D.C.: American Association of Junior Colleges 1970.

17. See OECD: Policies for Higher Education in the 1980s. Paris 1983, pp. 172-4; Furth, Dorothea: "New Hierarchies in Higher Education," in European Journal of Higher Education, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 1982, pp. 145-7.

18. Furth, Dorothea: "Short-Cycle Higher Education: Some Basic Considerations," in Short-Cycle Higher Education, op.cit., p. 39.

19. Teichler, Ulrich, Hartung, Dirk and Nuthmann, Reinhard: Higher Education and the Needs of Society. Windsor: NFER Publishing Company 1980, pp. 110-19.

20. See Teichler, Ulrich: Admission to Higher Education in the United States: A German Critique. New York: International Council for Educational Development 1978, chapter X.

21. Zwerling, L. Steven: The Second Best: The Crisis of the Community College. New York: McGraw-Hill 1976.

22. Gardner, John W.: Excellence: Can we Be Equal and Excellent Too? New York: Harper & Row 1961.

23. Ibid., p. 100.

24. Ibid., p. 101.

25. Trow, op.cit., p. 64.

26. See for example, Wissenschaftsrat: Empfehlungen zu Aufgaben und Stellung der Fachhochschulen. Koeln 1981; see also Goldschmidt,

Dietrich and Huebner-funk, Sibylle: "Von den Ingenieurschulen zu den Fachhochschulen," in Gutachten und Materialien zur Fachhochschule, ed. by Deutscher Bildungsrat. Stuttgart: Klett 1974, pp. 81-3 and 96-107.

27. Furth: "Short-Cycle Higher Education ...," op.cit., p. 22.

28. Kroeber-Kenneth, Ludwig: Zuviel Akademiker? Freiburg i.Br. 1972.

29. See Clark, Burton R.: "The Benefits of Disorder," in Change, Vol. VIII, No. 10, 1976, pp. 31-7; Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education: Three Thousand Futures. San Francisco, Cal.: Jossey-Bass 1980.

30. Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching: More than Survival. San Francisco, Cal.: Jossey-Bass 1975, p. 125.

31. Wissenschaftrat: Empfehlungen zum Wettbewerb im Hochschulsystem. Koeln 1985.

32. Cf the interpretation of B. Bloom in Thompson, op.cit., pp. 261-2.

33. Bundesminister fuer Bildung und Wissenschaft: Framework Act for Higher Education (Hochschulrahmengesetz). Bonn 1976, p. 11.

34. See for example OECD: Policies for Higher Education, op.cit., p. 156.

35. See the cycle of 'depreciation' and 'upgrading' as discussed in Teichler, Hartung and Nuthmann, op.cit., pp. 95-6.

36. "Although it is difficult to define what prestige is, it is not difficult to identify the institutions that have it." (Ben-David, Joseph: Trends in American Higher Education. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press 1972, p. 38).

37. Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen: Naar samenhang in het post hoger onderwijs: Concept-beleidsnotitie, s.l. 1985: see also the proposal for educational reforms by the education council established by the Japanese Prime Minister.

EDUCATIONAL CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

C.F. van der Klauw

ABSTRACT

Society is on the threshold of the information society new techniques and technologies become dominant. As part of society higher education becomes influenced by these developments. But higher education is also one of the most important producers, transmitters and transformers of information. As such higher education will be affected very strongly. Consequences are already visible. But in the future teaching and learning will undergo big changes in several aspects: its goals, its teaching procedures, the availability of education.

INTRODUCTION

During the last forty years technical and technological developments have deeply changed our society. The most important development has taken place in the field of information and information technologies. Since the book "Megatrends" of John Naisbitt we know that the industrial society wears out. The information society moves in. In the information society the production of goods and the with the production of goods connected technologies are no longer dominant. In the information society the dominant processes are: production, storage, manipulation, transformation, dissemination of information and all kinds of information services. The dominant technologies are the technologies of production, storage, retrieval and transportation of information. The information society has become possible because of developments in audiovisual devices, computers and telecommunication.

Those developments have not by-passed higher education. Changes have taken place in different areas: in administrative procedures, data

storage and data analysis in university research, in dissemination and acquisition of information by means of computer-networks, by the creation of data bases for bibliographic research, in text-processing and in teaching and learning.

In my contribution to the symposium "Advanced Education: Concepts and Values" I will analyze the impact of the developments on one of the main tasks of higher education: its teaching and learning. As there is only a limited amount of research in this area, I am obliged to do this at the hand of descriptions of what is going on in the field and by tracking down the relations between the developments and the procedures and traditions in teaching and learning.

TECHNICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Audiovisual apparatus has undergone a metamorphosis during the last ten years. The transformation concerns the techniques for storage and retrieval of images and sound: t.v. -camera and other apparatus for registration of sound and images; video- and audio-recorders, video-disc players and audiovisual displays. Especially the development of the carriers of information has become impressive: magnetic tape, floppy-disc, laser-video-disc, compact-disc, ROM-disc and, in the near future, the CD-I: the interactive compact-disc which carries pictures, sound, computer data and conventional text. All kinds of information can be combined on the CD-I. All information is randomly accessible. This added to the large amount of information on the carriers (600 MB on a Compact Disc: this is 300.000 pages A4, 7000 full color pictures, 16 hours of sound of normal speech quality. A large encyclopedia combined with a written and spoken dictionary can be put on one CDI). Miniaturisation by chips and transistors and lowering of prices has made the devices popular and within reach of education.

The computer has been started as a device for storage and retrieval of data and for computing in administration and research. Little by little the computer is inserted in very different processes and activities: signalizing, measurement, recording, steering and control, monitoring and feedback, robots in production processes, support in design and construction, word-processing, translation. The computer has been introduced in all areas of society: banking, traffic control, industry, medical care, science, research,

social welfare, arts, education, etc. Computers become larger and complexer. Extrapolation of the log-linear plot of chip/memory capacities versus time suggests the availability of machine with a memory capacity equalling that of the human brain at circa 2034 AD (Hammer & Rouse, 1982). But computers became also smaller and cheaper. The personal and mini-computer made the introduction in education possible on a large scale.

New applications of the computer are developed, for example in education. The progress becomes more intelligent. The model of relational database has been introduced. A special branch of intelligent programming is called Artificial Intelligence. Within the field of artificial intelligence the development of expert systems is an important, relatively new activity.

In traditional computer-programs information is handle on two levels: data and programs. In expert systems there are at least three levels: data, programs and knowledge base. The knowledge base exists of two subsystems: 1) a representation of the knowledge elements in a certain area and the relations between the elements; 2) a representation of the rules by which knowledge elements in that field are deduced from each other or related to each other. By means of this second subsystem, the inference engine, the knowledge base will be searched when the computer gets the order to solve a problem. "Normal programs" work according to previously fixed patrons. Artificial intelligence makes use of logical and probablistic relations even if they are not built in but have to be deduced from knowledge existing in the expert system.

Knowledge representation is one of the most important and promising research areas at this moment. It is often called: knowledge engineering. In knowledge engineering 4 techniques are used and sometimes integrated:

- Semantic networks: the development of linguistic representation schemes according to the models of human memory developed in cognitive psychology.
- Predicative logic: the assertion or affirmation of statements about objects and their relations.
- Development of frames: according to the frame-theory in psychology previous experiences give birth to expectancies on new experiences. It is in a way a theory of stereotyping.

- Development of production schemes or rule-based systems. Knowledge gets represented in the form of production rules of the type if. . . then: (if the temperature increases, then the pressure also increases).

Knowledge engineering is an interdisciplinary field of information system experts, psychologists, linguistic experts, philosophers and subject matter experts. Their objective is the technical realisation of intelligent human information processing. This information processing has psychological, semantic, logical and empirical aspects as we find in processes like perception, thinking, problem solving, decision making and learning. Products of knowledge engineering are, for example: decision support systems, language translation systems, natural language interfaces, design systems, planning systems.

Telecommunication is developing very fast. We already have data-networks, satelite and beam connections, optical cable connections and the integration of computers, audiovisual devices and telecommunication networks.

The sketched developments, in audiovisual devices, computers and telecommunication, have implications for society in all its aspects. Because of the interdependency of the subsystems in society, we may also expect secondary and tertiary consequences. What are the implications for higher education?

THE IMPACT OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES

Many scientists think that we are confronted with a development comparable with the introduction of printing. The introduction of book-printing cannot be separated from the cultural and social history and structure of the society at that time. So it is difficult to conclude what the first and what the second cause is in the changes, that took place in that particular period. Changes take place gradually. For example Bantock (1980) asserts that with the humanists the written word had a close affiliation with the spoken word. "So initially one enters a world where the spoken word still has a certain priority over the written word and before the printed had helped reorient the whole psychic structure of the human individual" (p.4) and "But writing was, for long enough, to bear the rhetorical marks of the speech from which it emanated and whose models (until, indeed,

'mathematical plainness" of the seventeenth century) dominated the form of the written word (p. 79).

Printing has had a strong influence on the cultural, social and economic life or at least is attended with developments of individualism, industrialism and democracy. Printing developed at the time when the rational, scientific, Cartesian-Newtonian world view came to live. This technology was consonant with the new approach of reality in this world view: objective; linear, sequential, analytical. (Bantock, 1980; Eisenstein, 1979). Writing is according to Bantock more objective than spoken words. This objectivication is furthered by printing: it ensures greater permanence, necessitates planned reordering, is spatially objectified and tied to technical restrictions. By the printing process standardisation is imposed. The printed book gradually led to a reorientation of the psychological attitude: objectivation of things and persons (p. 154-155).
Not only the attitude and thought processes have been influenced by printing. Printing also had a profound influence on the popularisation of education and on teaching practises (Eisenstein, 1979).

Many scientists think that in the long run the introduction of the new technologies (computers, audiovisual devices and telecommunications) will have a comparable impact on society and especially on education. At this moment, we have no proof for this thesis. Underneath I will sketch some observations on the impact of the new technologies on educational goals, educational practices and the availability of education. From this observation we cannot conclude that we are confronted with a new educational and cultural revolution. But I believe they make clear that the impact of the new technologies on education will be strong.

EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Of course new programs and courses have to be developed to teach and train students in the technology and techniques of information processing. This is not different from the introduction of other topics at the university, for example in electronic engineering or business administration.
But all students must learn to use the computer as a tool: for their research or as an instrument for word-processing. We must realize that next to that, students in the future must live in a society where information technology will be dominant. In such a society, where data storage and data processing

are normal, educational objectives such as "acquisition of knowledge and use of knowledge" have obtained a different meaning.

Quite a number of writers argue that the new technologies and especially the computer will have a large impact on thought processes and experience. The computer alters the knowledge base on which we work and the operations with which we work.

Information will become available for students and teachers in increasingly multiple forms. It will become available on demand with minimal time constraints. The timing and sequence of information will increasingly come under the control of the user. The availability of information is no longer an educational problem. The real problem will be the selective filtering of information and the way in which one deals with the uncertainty, which follows from the probabilistic character of the information. At the same time one should realize that the computer is not just a tool. Computers are intelligent in their own right. The task of education is to couple the resources of the mind with the resources of the computer.

Norton argues that with the use of computers we no longer experience our environment as "isolated building blocks ... but as a web of relations between parts of the whole". The lineair (?) presented subject matter can now be supplemented or replaced by learning tasks based on patterned and interconnected knowledge bases.

Writing creates a meaning problem much more than spoken words. "That is preserving language as an object raises what we may call the problem of interpretation-awareness of the ambiguity of language, the question of intended meaning, the question of whether one was asserting, declaring, claiming, or merely conjecturing, and so on" (Olson, 1984 p.5). If explicitness of meaning is important to writing, it is absolutely central to computing. Computers can only decode the meaning explicit in the text. Computer science attempts to handle the interpretation problem by research on "scripts" and "frames". We do not know the outcome of this research. But in the meantime and probably also in the future, computers require a greater degree of explicitness in language. Education should create conditions to meet those demands.

An important meta-cognitive thought process is the translation between symbol systems (e.g. verbal, mathematical, logical, statistical, etc.). A symbol system can be defined as a set of elements, interrelated according

to syntactic rules or conventions, referring in specifiable ways to domains of reference. Computers, whether in combination with audiovisual aids or not, have the ability to present different symbol systems at the same time or next to each other. The user has the opportunity to manipulate the systems and to compare them. In studying physiological processes, for example, the construction of artificial experiments makes it possible to present to a student the appearance and behaviour of an animal and the graphical representation of the processes. By manipulation (administering artificial pharmaca) changes can be observed in both representations. Experience in translating between symbol systems, especially to the extent that the learner is aware of the process, may contribute to the development of metacognitive awareness and higher-order problem-solving skills (Dickson, 1984).

Simulation of complex processes as a replication of reality and the possibility to manipulate the different variables offers a risk free environment. We already know simulation in business administration, war gaming and group decision making. Computer simulation resolved the drawbacks of a large amount of paper-based background information and the time needed to input decision data for computer analysis. The computer simulation engages the learner through actual participation in real world problems. The learner tests out his own assumptions and receives feedback as to the correctness or worth of his decision. Simulations are meant to test the correct use of knowledge (Findley, 1963) .

In the examples given here, we observed that the computer opens up new opportunities and at the same time makes new demands on higher education. Often people think that the computer only plays a role in the sciences. We have chosen the examples in such a way that we hope it makes clear that the implications of the new technology apply to all curricula.

EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES

The computer in combination with audiovisual aids becomes more and more used as an instrument in teaching and learning in higher education (Van der Klauw & Timmermans, 1984; Harkins et. al., 1978; SCOOR, 1986; Leiblum et al., 1986). In the foregoing paragraph we mentioned some characteristics of the computer, of importance for the objectives of higher education. Two other characteristics of computer based

learning can possibly contribute to the quality and efficiency of higher education: interactivity and adaptability.

- Interactivity of a learning situation can be defined as the extent in which the learner and teacher or teaching device react adequately on each other in function of the learning process. The Socratic dialogue is an example of an interactive learning situation. A computer based course of high quality contains a subsystem called 'student coach'. By means of this subsystem the computer is able to analyse the responses or reactions of students and to generate an answer. The adequacy of the interaction depends to a large extent on the information the computer is able to combine in his analysis and reaction.
- Adaptability is a measure for the extent in which a course can take into account the individual needs and abilities of students and the demands of the content of the course. For example previously acquired knowledge of students, their intelligence, the way in which students must use the knowledge taught in the course.

From the research on individualized study systems (sometimes called: personalized study systems or self paced systems) we know that the fulfillment to some degree of those three characteristics, has a positive influence on study outcomes (Van der Klauw & Plomp, 1973; Plomp, 1974; Robin, 1974; Rookbuijzen et al., 1976). The computer makes the fulfillment of these characteristics in fact rather easy.

What are the underlying mechanisms for the positive study outcomes? We think that next to the individualizing aspects three mediating variables are responsible: 1) The student becomes activated and involved in his own learning; 2) The student becomes aware of the management of his learning or his learning process becomes regulated by the external environment; 3) Teaching takes place synchronous with the learning activities.

An explanation of the first point can be found in Astin (1985). He holds the view that involvement of students determines to a high degree the amount of physical and psychological energy the student devotes to the academic experience. Stimulation of active participation is necessary to-this end.

In our own research we found that a low degree of internal regulation of study activities is related to the experience of a high number of study

problems and also related to low study outcomes. The management of study activities is an important criterium for the quality of teaching and learning.

As stated earlier, a number of computer based programs are developed in higher education. My own department had developed programs in medicince, law, economics and philosophy. The purpose of those programs is to learn students to use and integrate knowledge. The dominant technology employed in teaching in higher education continues to be the lecture. A lecture is practical, inexpensive and embedded in a strong tradition. But in a curriculum, dominated by lectures, it is hardly possible to realize educational goals directed on the use of knowledge. Even the study of medicine and engineering, where practical work takes a considerable part of the teaching time, the ability of students to apply their knowledge in problem solving, is often criticized. On account of our experience, we may expect that the new technologies create new opportunities for the realization of educational goials directed on the use and integration of knowledge.

The realization of the aforementioned opportunitiesis dependent on the quality and availability of course-ware. The hardware is hardly a problem. Universities must create organizational and personnel circumstances to fulfill the conditions for the design and construction of computer based learning programs of high quality. Design and construction must be founded on research. And universities must take their educational goals seriously.

AVAILABILITY OF EDUCATION

The availability of education is changing. The development in the field of telecommunication brings educational networks within reach. The Task Force on Educational Technology of the E.E.C. discusses the possibility of a European satelite for education. The new connections make it possible to create global universities. For example in the U.S.A. an information university is founded in which more than 20 universities participate. Courses will be given by satelite and computer networks.

If we can believe the predictors of our future (see e.g. Hocking, 1967) then education will be relatively time and place independent in the future. Even the dependency on teachers will become less. Courses can be bought from other universities. Telecommunication takes care of the transport. The consequences for the universities will be tremendous. Faculties can concen-

trate themselves on a small number of topics in which they excell. They can hire other courses from elsewhere. The centre of education becomes the individual. Education will be available wherever the individual happens to be. Higher education will become a marketable product. Universities will have to compete with private enterprises.

CONCLUSION

Higher education is changing. Higher education is not an island, but a part of the social, cultural, political and economical world. In the past higher education has often played a determining role in our western world, sometimes as a revolutionary pioneer, sometimes as a conservative traditionalist, but always as a creator and transmitter of culture and science.

In my paper I have sketched only one variable in the process of change of higher education. But the input of the new technologies in higher education will be strong: on the educational goals, the educational practices and the availability of education. At this moment we do not have enough evidence to predict exactly the outcome of this process. Much depends also on the creativity with which the universities will handle the opportunities and the risks of the new technologies. One thing must be clear: "...the computer is not just another mechanical device. It is a powerful technological advance that will change education as radically as it will change all aspects of our lives" (Hocking, 1967).

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CONFLICTING CONCEPTS AND VALUES IN EDUCATION: THE ROLE OF ACTORS AND THEIR ARGUMENTS

Wim J. Nijhof

Curriculum decision-making is a highly political issue throughout the educational system. There have always been a variety of pressure groups proposing competing values concerning what should be taught, but nowadays we can also observe pressure groups telling us how to teach - the computer as the panacea for individualizing instruction. And, there are even groups who are ready to tell us at what level we must graduate: they advocate fixed norms for everybody at every level of schooling. Standardization and control are the keywords for "modern" education.

The standardization of what is to be taught will create a confrontation between conflicting values as is the case in the USA, where fundamentalists are even now trying to enforce teaching the creation of the earth by means of Genesis, as they attempt to ban the theory of Darwin: origin of the species.

Learning as an individual process based on instrinsic motivation and oriented to personal goals with no fixed purpose has been changed into a fixed concept. It is an instrumental concept of teaching in which flexibility and mobility as personal characteristics are more important than personal identity, and identification with problems having a high political load.

Klafki[1], for instance, sums up a considerable number of controversial issues which have arisen as a consequence of modern society - issues which remain unresolved. Even worse, we have ourselves created many more problems in this highly technological society. The application of scientific knowledge in technology has led to:

- questions of peace and war as a consequence of military technology;
- environmental questions as a consequence of nuclear and industrial technology. Tsjernobyl is only one example of possible world-wide disasters;
- the relationship between rich and poor: a long-standing unresolved problem, not only at the individual level but, nowadays, even at the level of states and continents: the northern countries versus the south;
- social inequality and the economic power of societal groups;
- work and unemployment and their meaning for social and individual identity;
- work and leisure time: are we really striving for a society of increased leisure time? Does schooling prepare individuals for freedom and free time as is the original meaning of "scholae." Will new technologies lead to more freedom and "enlightenment?"
- multi-cultural relations;
- sexuality and sexual relations are controlled by states, sometimes as a consequence of decreasing birth rates (as in Western Germany and The Netherlands). By means of technological products and economic decisions governments are trying either to stabilize, or to increase the "production of manpower," whereas other states are trying to discourage or prevent an increased birth rate, as in India.[2]

Klafki claims that everybody within the educational system, whatever his age, should be confronted with these key-problems of modern-day society. However, he cautions us not to allow consciousness of these types of problems to lead to monolithic opinions or to one-sided solutions. His plea for a general education for everbody is focussed on three important competences and instrumental skills on different values:

(a) the competence to make decisions on one's own future, or the right to self-determination in terms of personal relationships and the interpretation of personal values, social stuctures, professional relationships, ethical and religious convictions.

(b) the competence to co-operate in decision-making: the democratic right of co-determination in societal and political issues and balances.

(c) the competence to throw in one's lot (solidarity).The justification of self-determination and co-determination is restricted by means of identification with the group to which one belongs.

The above three competencies will automatically lead to certain skills: the skill to practice criticism; the skill to use arguments (Klafki does not specify what kind of arguments); and role-taking, the skill to accept the perspectives of others.

Considerations of this kind will lead to very concrete actions and decisions in state-level curriculum formulation (national level), the local level, and at school level. The relationship between the concept of a general education and teaching practice is complicated by the fact that transformation takes different forms, and the whole process of operationalization is not as logical as we are sometimes led to believe by curriculum-theorists.[3] There is more deliberation and bargaining and the results will be practical and eclectical. But is this really the necessary result of partners playing games in an arena? Let us examine the structure of participants in the process of political decision-making on the curriculum.

PROFESSIONALIATION OF REFORM AND STABILITY FACTORS

"The notion that efforts to change the American social system (including schools) have in recent years been undertaken by persons whose profession is to do just that. (...) Professional reformers tend to measure their success by the number of changes they get started, for instance introducing sex education, the introduction of Man a Course of Study (Bruner) a curriculum on science education forced by academics and their political friends, reading programmes, programmes for excellence.[4] Professional reformers are building a new controversial force into educational policy-making by pursuing their visions of equal opportunity and a more just society while being convinced of their expertise and its prerogatives, assisted by an educational research establishment with its built-in incentive to discover which justifies even more research supplied by federal and foundation funding and stimulated by the civil rights discovery of new classes."[5]

The whole issue appears to be a conspiracy. In The Netherlands educational reform is also tied to professional reformers although they are

encapsulated by institutions - the denominational structure and their organizations - and the tradition of compromise and bargaining.[6] The debate on comprehensive education in The Netherlands since the sixties highlights this complex and puzzling process of pacification. The real effect will be that changes will be minimal and superficial or, perhaps, only verbal.

Stability in the educational system plays a very heavy role. School boards, school administrators and teachers are more interested in maintaining the social values of the current curriculum and the structure of the schools. Recent findings indicate that Dutch primary teachers are only happy when they teach in the way they always have taught, and they prefer direct classroom teaching. They do not believe in the importance of new subjects like computer literacy and English (introduced in 1985 as a consequence of a new law on primary education) as a second language. (If necessary they are prepared to follow in-service training (sic.))[7]

This example shows that non-decision-making is a constraint on curriculum innovation. However, it appears more like conflict avoidance (an unwillingness to introduce curriculum changes which conflict with community values, and are therefore likely to arouse controversy and opposition): the threat of controversy (a technique used by a minority to control the majority) and loose coupling (the recognition that goals set by reformers will not be faithfully followed by school boards and by teachers in the classroom.[8] Teachers are political brokers par excellence. They control their own teaching, concepts being taught, timing and scheduling, the kinds of evaluation to be made, and so on. However, there are degrees of teacher responsibility and freedom for action.

The following are other powerful groups which influence curriculum reform:

- the principal, as middleman between school board, parents and teaching staff;
- superintendents, formulating the curriculum demands of state and/or federal governments to render them acceptable to local populations;
- students, enjoy considerable informal influence over what is taught. Often they can "vote with their feet" by refusing to enroll in courses. Underground newspapers and absenteeism are other instances of student power;

- local school boards, serving as an advisory body, or sounding board, because of the lack of technical competencies they need to decide upon specific curriculum programmes;
- local communities, regional and state agencies, testing agencies;
- educational publishing houses, the most powerful agency in disseminating text-books and other curriculum material.[9] Bittlinger points out that in Bavaria (BRD) about 80% of primary and secondary school teachers use text-books as the prime source for teaching. Teachers remain extremely faithful to text-books.
- the federal government, there is the growing influence of national governments in determining the goals and content of education, even in those subjects where values are so prominent - social studies, moral education, and sex education. There is a strong conservative movement in most Western countries directed at a common core with fixed standards for the age groups between 4 and 16.[10]
- pressure groups

As with many political decisions, curriculum-decisions are usually a result of compromise, bargaining and other forms of accommodation. This might be an acceptable statement from the viewpoint of policy oriented research. It is certainly a descriptive statement, but it does not make clear how this bargaining will lead to decisions about value systems. Is it possible to compromise between competing values? How can we explain the fact that,in spite of compromise, national governments are striving for standardization and control: for a comprehensive, or common education for everybody, which leaves little room for individual differences. In short, national governments are striving to restrict the local autonomy of schools. Is the result to be a dominant concept of schooling dictated by the ever changing minorities?

FROM IDEAL TO EXPERIENTIAL CURRICULUM

In educational and curriculum theory the process of planning and constructing text-books and other aids to teaching always begin with some (implicit) notions of educating children for the future. Such notions are usually based on personal experience and confrontations with problems in family life and society. A systematic reconstruction of this process invariably

leads to a kind of modelling with a highly rational character. It is not surprising to learn that many people in the education profession began as teachers. The practice of teaching seems to be a rich environment and common ground for most professionals to enter into systematic reflection on concepts of schooling, value systems, individual differences, equality and equity, the relation between goals and means, between personal goals and the demands of society. Famous examples are Comenius, Herbart, Dewey, Klafki.

If we try to conceptualize the framework of most of these thinkers in curriculum theory, we should use a very condensed version of a model by John Goodlad et al.[11]

The domains of curriculum inquiry

societal domain	ideological curriculum
institutional domain	formal curriculum
instructional domain	perceived curriculum operational curriculum
personal/experiential domain	experiential curriculum

Goodlad tries to show the complex relationships between levels of decision-making pertaining to different curriculum products, and the different kinds of foundations and types of arguments needed for translating concepts of schooling, values and beliefs, as well as the demands of society. The model is based on a concept of deliberation at every level and presumes a correspondence between the kind of decisions and their operationalization in terms of products. It is not necessarily based on assumptions of hierarchy, but nor is this excluded. By taking goals and aims as a starting point for discussion to see the consequences for the instructional level it suggests a top down (logical deductive) process, although the reverse is, of course, also possible. Considering the arrangement of a learner environment, or to agree upon a teaching-learning unit, can lead to reflections on implicit criteria, values and beliefs.[12] There are, however, different development strategies for curricula, using the concept of technological curriculum-development or curriculumdesign as a kind of top down strategy (from goals to means to results). In this sense the model can be interpreted as a

heuristic device for legitimating and constructing different products at different levels with causal relationships.[13]

The ideological curriculum emerges from idealistic processes which are not necessarily ideological. This level of decision-making refers to those persons or agencies removed in time and place from the individual learner: boards of education, state departments of education, committees, foundations.[14] It takes the form of a proposal, a design, and requires a process of deliberation to transform it into a formal curriculum.

The formal curriculum is an official product and has been sanctioned at the institutional level. Deliberations are oriented within the framework of the ideological curriculum to obtaining and providing guidance to teachers and students. This is a written document of curriculum guides, state or local syllabi, units of study, etc.

The perceived curricula are those of the mind (teacher thinking processes). "What has officially been approved for instruction and learning is not necessarily what very interested persons and groups perceive in their minds to be the curriculum."[15]

Thinking about a curriculum (perceiving) and its actual practice in the classroom are two quite different things. The operational curriculum is a curriculum at work, hour after hour, day after day in school and classroom. Implementation research is focused on the curriculum as factual, empirical, and as a process of actions and interactions. It is the teaching staff in charge of day to day decisions at the instructional level in relation to the perceived formal curriculum regarding the group of children and their (instructional) needs. The experiential curriculum is the curriculum experienced by the students. It is very difficult to describe such a curriculum systematically because ideographic factors, questions of the validity of data gathering, will play a very important role, as is the case with the operational curriculum. For our purposes, however, it is important to show that there is a clear relationship between the different levels of curriculum decision-making and the different curriculum-products. This relationship will be the framework for further discussion.

SOURCES FOR (SOCIETAL) DELIBERATIONS

Curriculum planners must decide what value-concepts are to be taught in schools, and they must decide upon the vehicles to be used to help

students learn how to deal with value questions.[16] Here, we face a controversial issue. Are they the right persons to decide about value concepts? Is it correct that they should decide about values? Or should this be the responsibility of parents, teachers, local authorities, political parties, parliament, or agencies such as R&D centres, the former Schools Council, or the Ministry of Education. Curriculum planners generally use procedures and techniques to obtain judgements from the relevant respondents on building a curriculum. There is a strong relationship between curriculum design and curriculumengineering (development), for it is most unlikely that curriculum-planners will assist in the development of curricula based on value systems or valueorientations of which they disapprove. This would be a conflict situation.

Questions of what knowledge and skills are of most value, and which of them should be included in the curriculum is a value question. A curriculum planner cannot handle value-free or neutral material. He operates within a certain political context (democratic), in a community (with local values, beliefs and attitudes, demands), in a school setting with a specific pedagogical orientation.

The use of procedures and techniques - as in a technical orientation of curriculum development - tend to hide the values or at least to render them implicit. But such procedures can be used to hide personal values. "A teacher who has a high regard for rote and memory learning judges the pupils on evidence of their rote and memory performances. A teacher who places a high premium on the more heuristic techniques in learning judges the pupils on evidence of their ability to make observations, to collect information, to use resources, to reach rational generalizations, and so forth.[17] We can thus see that there is an intrinsic relationship between values and processes of learning, between content and values, between interaction patterns (school climate) and values. The selection of content, of pedagogy, of classroom-structure, grouping students, of time, the kind of testing, the allocation of students to different forms of education, depend on cultural values based on democratic ideals (improved citizenship), the equality of man, equal opportunity or equal access for all.

Smith, Stanley and Shores[18] have identified three elements in which the core of the American value system lies:

- the democratic tradition;
- belief in maximum development of the individual;
- the institutions established to perpetuate those values.

The educational system is one of those institutions. So the question is what should the school system do in order to educate students according to the values of society? It is an important question because some values are acquired through the processes of general enculturation. The significant question in most Western countries is: what can the schools do that is not already being done by other institutions? Let us now examine the different conflicting conceptions of curricula to see if we can find the answer.

CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF CURRICULUM

Values are often proposed as a beginning point in curriculum decision making. When this is the case, the values become the criteria for selection of curricular aims.[19] Goodlad[20], however, has stated "(...) (on the basis of extensive research in schools on curriculum deliberations) that although it is possible to formulate a set of values or assumptions about the good person in the good society as a beginning point in curriculum development, this happens in only a few, rather sharply circumscribed situations. Even when such are stated in the form of a philosophy (...), they usually serve rhetorical rather than curricular ends. (...) Over the years, it has become increasingly clear (to me) that identification of a level of values in the conceptual system is simply too neat and rational. (...) One is never done with values."

Clearly, Goodlad does not deny the existence and necessity of values, but he discusses the function of values as the leading principle for discussion at all levels in the area of curricula, and not only as a starting point of the curriculum process. Many publications give an overview of the so-called conflicting conceptions of curriculum which some writers term "design."[21]

In the early seventies many authors tried to find a map, or description, of the different conceptions in the curriculum literature as a guide to curriculum discourse and research. It does not describe a hierarchy of values or a sequence of prescriptive steps, it opens a wide variety of research questions, and it could help curriculum designers to make clear the kind of deliberation processes in development teams.[22]

A curriculum concept describes the rationale or principle as the main source for building a curriculum. Traditionally, we have three main sources: society (past, present and future, references to economics, work, local or national interests, parent group expectations and values, (references to a good life, the nature of man, point of view, philosophy): The learner: references to the nature of the child or adult, his needs and interests, individual differences. Knowledge: references based on information about man's accumulation of organized knowledge in terms of subject matter (mathematics, civics, foreign languages, science, or in terms of structure, concepts, generalizations, important concepts, learning techniques, ways of knowing. The references have two characteristics: the "should" references, "empirical" references, or a combination of both.

Several curriculum theorists have built curriculum conceptions on the basis of these sources by means of analysis of curriculum documents reconstructed by others as typical concepts or designs. If we take them for granted as the final possible choice then the construction is condemned to the waste paper basket. Combinations are possible, but some exclude each other. Let us take the 'classification' of Eisner & Vallance[23] as the most classical example: they describe five conflicting conceptions:

a. curriculum making as a technological problem
b. curriculum as a means of developing cognitive processes in children
c. curriculum as a means of reaching full self-actualisation
d. curriculum as a means for initiating social reform (the social reconstructionist concept)
e. the curriculum as a vehicle for the transmission of civilization's intellectual heritage (the academic-rationalist view)

Vallance's critical reflection on the development of the classification indicates that four of the conceptions refer explicitly to the ultimate purposes of schooling (the cognitive processes approach; self-actualisation, the social reconstructionist view, and the academic rationalist view).

The first conception is oriented to the development of cognitive skills (reasoning, analysis, criticism, problem solving, judgement). The academic view is the opposite of this, assigned mastery of the knowledge accrued through intellectual tradition and the transmission of culture. The social reconstructionist view has two dimensions: the innovative-aggressive

dimension, and the conservative dimension. The first asks the student to learn through the curriculum to criticize and improve society. The conservative dimension seeks to maintain existing social patterns and structures. The selfactualization perspective sees the purpose of schooling to be the full development of each child's full potential, with the curriculum being responsible for fostering the child's identity.

The original form of the technological concept is concerned not with purpose but with means. It claims to be neutral on the question of values and seeks instructional systems of curriculum development technologies that can be applied to any content and adapted to any purpose. It claims to encompass the other four conceptions and offers resources to all of them.

Do these concepts adequately describe curriculum discourse today? I do not believe they do. The model is not perfect and contains many imbalances. There is no clear-cut criterion, and the concepts have no discrete character. By application we need a strong relationship to substance, concepts, subject matter, and so on. Moreover, in the last two decades there have been many changes in public dialogue on education. Technological developments are pressing the public debate about the function of schooling, so is the development in Europe of migration from Mediterranean countries which, in turn, has led to a debate about social integration. Likewise, economic recession has led to new questions about the hours spent at work, questions about the mismatch between the education system and the labour market, and also as a consequence of new technologies (automisation, robotics).

Political discourse is dominated by thought about the new basics, basic skills, essential skills. The relationship between general and vocational education has been challenged again in Europe[24] at all levels of the education system, but especially in secondary and higher education.

"The computer revolution has made technological orientation stronger both as an educational means and as a new basic skill end in itself. It narrows the gap somewhat between the technological and the other four conceptions by tying the mastery of a particular technology to the explicit goals of schooling. The technological perspective is now even harder for non-technologists to ignore."[25] Text-processing skills, the use of graphics, a knowledge of programming languages, as well as the use of other data-techniques, will be common within five years. Computer literacy will be a necessary end in the coming years in order to communicate, and in order to

unite with other goals of education. Let me give you a good example from history:

> "(...) Since the renaissance, rhetoric had been the dominant school subject. It declined (...) because it was essentially oriented to the demands of an oral culture. (...) With the invention and spread of print, written expression became much more important, and many of the demands formerly made upon speakers to remember verbatim, to organize thoughts on the spur of the moment, were no longer essential."[26]

The content of schooling interacts with the forms of expression dominant in the culture.[27] This will mean that the technological concept is changing into, or integrating with, the cognitive processes model in terms of a cognitive information processing model. The new technologies will lead to new ends and means in education.[28]

In contrast the academic rationalistic model continues and seems likely to endure. The schools' commitment to teaching traditions of the Western cultural heritage remains strong. This view has been supported by numerous studies on how schooling strengthens liberal education in the k-12 curriculum, as will be shown in the following paragraph.

THE COMMON CORE DEBATE

The common core debate is in essence a conflict between competing values and concepts of education. Whereas social activism was a leading principal topic of discussion about schooling in the 1960s, the 1980s have seen the appearance of social conservatism which stresses the "new right," and the growing strength of the fundamentalists' social agenda.[29] This conservatism is based on different feelings and values, and finds some support among educational researchers using declining test results as evidence. The debate on quality in education - mostly rhetorical - is intended to encourage many people to re-think the function of schooling. In most Western countries this rethinking has led to a revival of liberal education approaches[30], and it seems to be a world-wide issue. The critics claim that schools offer a 'smorgasboard,' a cafeteria of choices, with the removal of

quality from the educational system. There are three major reasons for the debasement of school curriculum (in the USA):

a) excessive attention to the legitimate needs of those in the bottom band of the achievement distribution which has caused the neglect of the college bound and has lowered the instructional center of gravity;
b) a preoccupation with process, technique, procedural accountability, finance, and governance, with a consequent inattention to what content should be taught;
c) a lack of emphasis on the usefulness and relevance of our common cultural heritage and (...) other common concepts (...).[31]

Goodlad[32] exposes many problems which are more or less analogous to the Dutch situation. The general conclusion in most countries is that there is little consciousness among school authorities regarding the need to provide a curriculum balanced between the goals of schooling and the domains of knowledge, there is little agreement about the central elements of subject matter and ways of knowing; there is too much accommodating of individual differences by means of tracking, creating more inequities between and within schools curricular and pedagogical practices, some of which are clearly associated with low income and minority status. A lot of arguments are really true, but some are used in a very suspicious way, like declining test-scores and the content of education.[33]

Most proposals however stress quantity instead of quality by means of rationalisation of school time, more testing and evaluation, longer school days, more homework, more course work, longer school years, the addition of new subjects and upgrading of texts. Quantity is made an important criterion of quality.[34]

In table 1 I will show some time-tables of experts and groups showing their concept of schooling (secondary education, high school), and compare the Dutch situation with that of the USA.

The general procedure followed in both countries is that a group of scholars make a proposal for the government. The USA's national commission on Excellence in Education published the famour report Nation at Risk, the Imperative for Educational Reform, after almost two years of meetings, hearings, symposia and the reading of more than 40 research studies. The Reagan administration heartily welcomed the report. In The Netherlands the scientific council of the government (WRR) accepted the task

of working out a plan for a proposal for "basisvorming" (general education) for secondary education (age 12-15) for everybody. The council read more than 30 state-of-the-art papers on several specialized fields in education. After two years of work the council produced a proposal which found enthusiastic support from the Dutch government. National discussions followed the presentation of both reports, but the general trend - the conservative mood - seems to be sustained by the majority.

Both plans were accompanied by other reports from scholars, organizations and research foundations, although they didn't have the same impact as the "national solutions." Nevertheless, it is interesting to see the difference between some of these plans because they refer to different options of schooling.

The relative weight of time in percentages related to subject matter proposals is presented in table 1. Goodlad presents his plan after a thoroughly planned and executed research on more than 1000 high schools. Boyer has reported from the Carnegy foundation with the same objective and based on empirical research. The Dutch proposals originate from the WRR, the foundation for curriculum development in The Netherlands (SLO) and Leune (Erasmus University, Rotterdam), a sociologist on educational policy making. The Nation at Risk (NAR) is the most global report presenting recommendations. The WRR-report, however, is more detailed and has the character of a prescription: a very detailed time-table with circumscribed goals for the diverse subject matter and recommendations for graduation (examination standards). The different character of both reports can be attributed to the decentralized-centralized policy-making principles of the two countries. The NAR-proposal allows scope at state and local levels. The WRR-report makes little allowance for local schools to make their own adaptations. Where NAR accentuates the categories I, II, III (the dominant cognitive subject matter), the WRR-report strives for 14 disciplines spread over all categories for everybody at a minimum level (standard). Moreover, there may be some kind of graduation at a higher level for those students who are intellectually capable of achieving more. High school as a comprehensive form of schooling in the USA has been accepted since 1827 (Massachusetts Law), and since about 1890 the number of high schools in the USA has been substantial (n= 2.526 public high schools).[38] In The Netherlands the report must be seen as a vehicle to re-organize the categori-

Table 1: Proposals for a common (core) curriculum (in % of the time table)

		Goodlad	Boyer	*Nation at Risk**	*Leune*	*WRR*	*SLO*
I	LANGUAGE (mother tongue)	9	17	***	15	11	11
	FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S)	9	14	***	20	15	20
II	Science (Ph, B, Chem.)	9	14	***	15	9	10
	Mathematics	9	14	***		11	11
III	Social Studies (History, geography)	15	17	***	15	9	10
	Civics		7				
IV	ARTS (dance, music, etc.)	15	4	**	15	9	9
V	Computer literacy	15	4	**	8	1	3
	Vocational orientation						6
	Health Education		4				4
	Home economics					2	
	Technics (industrial arts)				8	5	9
VI	Physical Education	10	-	-		10	9
VII	Spiritual life				5		

* NAR does not specify time. Asterixs refer to the relative weight of time offered for curriculum subjects.

cal secondary education system into a comprehensive one, after the echec of the debate on restructuring secondary education since 1975, by prescribing a common core for every school. There are no precise prescriptions for this kind of structure, but clearly the introduction of 14 subjects (disciplines) for everybody, to be followed for three school-years, places heavy pressure on teachers and students compared to the seven disciplines nowadays (in four years) on which tests will be given.

So the reach of the WRR is far greater than the NAR-report. The NAR tries to repair derailments, so to speak, while the WRR-report tries to construct a comprehensive school in the Dutch situation based on a concept of liberal education. The impact of new technologies and industrial arts however is about as big as a raindrop. The integration of general and vocational education is in favour of a liberal education but at the cost of vocational education. But the same is true of the other proposals. Preparing youth to take its place in society is based on general intellectual skills. Vocational skills, industrial arts, home economics and health education are considered to be minor skills. Will this remain true in the future?

Both reports accentuate a dominant academic-rationalist view. The SLO-proposal shows a great parallel to the WRR-report, but the content of science and social studies is organized according to the concept of cognitive processes: integrated science and integrated social studies. The WRR has negated this proposal because of the argument that there is no substantial example of integrated science and social studies and, additionally, most teachers have difficulties in teaching them.

Two authors are very consequent in choosing disciplines. Their argument is that schools must do what other institutions in society cannot do: teaching cognitive skills. Moreover, schools have to compensate for families' shortcomings and make training more efficient by means of institutional schooling.

The allocation of time for all subjects or disciplines is almost equal. Goodlad suggests spending about 18% of the time on (foreign) languages, 18% on science and mathematics, 15% on social studies and 15% on arts, the other 15% should be spent on the introduction of vocational subjects including computer literacy, and 10% of the the time on physical education. For Leune the categories II, III and IV are equal. Because of the essential function of language Leune will spend some 15% of time on the mother tongue and 20% on foreign languages (English, French and German). The

WRR underlines this argument, but makes a selection: English as the "lingua franca", and German for economical reasons (trade). In the opinion of the chairman of the scientific council French is essential only for those people wishing to be a judge at the International Court of Justice in Strassbourg (sic!) (oral message, 2nd April 1986, Congres over basisvorming, Ede).

Leune adds some 5% of the time to aspects of spiritual life as a consequence of our growing multi-cultural society. It is a means for a better and mutual understanding of different religious convictions between the diverse groups with different denominations and ideologies.

Two proposals suggest time for individual differences: Goodlad offers the option of a variance of about 20% per discipline and an additional 9% for special interests. So the full time for individuals' interests varies between 9 and 21% of the school time. The WRR-report offers 20% time for individual interests, but part of this has to be allocated for a third foreign language and for enrichment and/or a quicker improvement in other curriculum offerings.

The Boyer proposal is a so-called Carnegie Unit and is related to 2/3 of the curriculum. The proposal accentuates a core for that part of the school-time for everybody. All of the proposals are oriented towards an academic road for everybody, a very broad road, with fixed standards, and with hardly any or restricted time allotted for individual differences.

The impact of new developments like technology - the integration of vocational and general education - will be at the cost of vocational education. The argument given is that preparing youth for a modern society demands highly cognitive trained/educated people. This means that the traditional disciplines have regained their former dominant position, while the developments of the sixties (integrated science, integrated social studies, the role of personal interests in learning) have lost ground. Preserving the old forms of knowledge dominates the challenge of the new cognitive information processes.

THE REVERSE? TEN TIPS FOR THE RAT RACE

Opportunities on the labour-market, economic recession and technology appear to dictate the future of young people. In medieval times the young knight had to excel in horse-riding, be skilled in the use of a

sword, recite poems, be trained in mathematics, rhetoric and so on. Nowadays young people receive advice in the following:

1. Take mathematics and/or economy as a major subject when you follow the medium line of general education. A queue of banks and assurance companies is waiting to offer you a job and/or a training.
2. If you are studying medium or higher level industrial economy, or if you have graduated, employers will compete to offer you a term of employment on trial.
3. If you are following a technical education (at a medium or higher level), specialize in electronics or civil engineering.
4. If you wish to go to university or to polytechnical institutes, study pharmacy, industrial economy, business administration, law or computer science. In any case, take computer science as a minor subject.
5. Take a course in computer science where and when you can, as quickly as possible, because within five years employees won't be worrying any more about automatization.
6. Don't seek a job in social welfare, teacher training, arts, medicine, education (including adult education), because relative unemployment is highest in these disciplines.
7. Don't take seriously such advice as given here. By the time you have graduated all shortages will have changed into a surplus, or the reverse. Be very secretive about your plans and work quietly. If other people have the same ideas, revise your own decision and take a new course of action.
8. Take a post-graduate study after your masters degree at a university in a foreign country. When applying for a function, your letter will get more attention.
9. Study, study, study as much as you can, the more the better, not because you really need the acquired knowledge, but to help you win the race. Be sure that employers make a selection very easy for them and as heavy as possible for you .
10. If other people have the same ideas as you, don't ignore this last advice: Study as hard as you can, and still more.[37]

Two serious questions arise from this cynical advice:

1. Labour-market prognostics are fairly far removed from reality, most of them are inconclusive and invalid but they are still used because we have no other means of predicting the future.[38]
2. What has happened to all those beautiful concepts and values expressed in terms of equity and equality? Coping behaviour, competitiveness, being evasive, conformistic behaviour instead of critical behaviour will be the result.

Is it not the strength of Western democratic societies that we are striving for a better life for everyone, for democratic ideals, for citizenship, for solidarity and trust, namely taking care for the weakest within in our society?

Do we ever hear anything about all those skills and accomplishments, and about caring for the weak, enjoying the arts, writing poems, singing ballads, playing the clarinet, or enjoying a piano-concert of Mozart's work?

During a lifespan of about 75 years, people dedicate an average of 25 years to studying, 25 years to working and another 25 years to enjoying retirement. Most of our leisure time can be spent in resting and enjoying life in quite different forms. It seems to me that schooling has become the key-function for preparing people only for their future employment and, as a consequence, for orientating or guiding our lives to fit the technological world.

The mismatch between educational systems in Western countries and the needs of the labour-market, especially in the field of computer technology, has led many countries to re-think the system. It seems to me that equity and equality are no longer the leading principles they were during the sixties of this century: now it is quality and efficiency leading to excellence. However nobody knows the real meaning of the terms quality, excellence and giftedness. The split between specialization and generalization is likely to be very vague, because the concept of schooling is opportunistic: learn only those subjects which give you a good chance to find a job. It is not important which job it is. Be adaptable and mobile, accommodate to new situations and circumstances. Thus, learn and study everything you are able to, take many academic degrees, Ph.D., BA's, so that you will become over-schooled. The old adage - the survival of the fittest - has been born again!

At first glance we consider that a better schooling will give more opportunity for work. If your have more knowledge and master many skills, you can undertake a lot of business and jobs. This may be true at the individual level, but when everybody is doing the same, we come into the spiral model.[39] This means, that every time a group of young people reach a higher level of goals and objectives, other groups are already striving to go further, so there will be always a new group lagging behind.

Automatization has led to some strange effects on jobs:

a. demands for jobs are growing ever higher;
b. polarisation at job level: the percentage of people with lower level (dirty) work and that of people with a high level job, are increasing, while the percentage of jobs in between is decreasing;
c. when confronting the requirements of a job with the qualification level of schooling we find too much over-schooling, especially among those people with a low or medium school-level. This has led to an inflation of certificates;
d. as a consequence of the automatization, we realize that the content of jobs are changing: upgrading, degrading, re-grading and polarisation. It is also changing for work: compositional change in the organisation;[40]
e. skills and attitudes are changing into general skills.

In a study on civil engineering and business administration carried out last year in The Netherlands, we found that these changes led to very general skills and attitudes like: problem solving behaviour, communication skills, accuracy, systems thinking, appreciation of quality, responsibility for equipment, appreciation of cost benefits, responsibility for colleagues, positive attitudes.[41] The new term for describing this is "flexidentity."[42] When polarisation has taken place, when unemployment is increasing, and when overschooling leads to the exclusion of jobs, we must ask if schooling is worthwhile? Do we need a new concept of schooling?

The concept of personal success is nowadays a dominant cyclical orientation which arises in times of economic turmoil. It is based on utility, competition, rationality, flexibility and mobility, is an opportunistic concept, based on adjustment and conformism.

If we take Klafki seriously, we need a concept of schooling based on self-determination, co-determination and solidarity. Namely we need a

concept focusing not on the ultimate social benefits, nor on the particular intellectual skills, nor even on the technology required to teach it. We need a concept based on multiple qualifications: personal, professional and social. We need a co-operative-instrumental concept in order to solve the key problems of our times.

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PLURALISM IN EDUCATION

Marcelo Dascal

1

My contribution to this discussion of education and cultural values may at first seem out of place. While the other contributors are either specialists in education or in the history of education, my only qualification is that of a participant in the educational process. First, as a 'client' and later on as a 'provider'. Of course, qua participant, I often reflected on the paradoxes and failures of the process, at all its stages. In fact, I was a rebel already in kindergarten and in primary school. But such reflections and irreflective actions never led me, qua philosopher, to engage in systematic thought of the kind known as 'philosophy of education'. Thus, my remarks are those of a nonprofessionally qualified observer and critic. Nevertheless, after reading the essays presented in this colloquium, especially those concerned with present day rather than historical considerations, and noticing the kind of puzzles raised - as well as those omitted - by my specialist colleagues, I came to the conclusion that an outsider's outlook is precisely what is most needed. In what follows, I will try to justify this claim, a task which will eventually require me to go slightly beyond my original role of 'discussant' of my colleagues' presentations.

2

I was enticed to participate in this colloquium because of the phrase 'cultural values', which, in my opinion, refers to a cluster of crucial problems that must be seriously tackled by any reflecting human being in these remaining years of the twentieth century, especially by someone involved in the process of education. In an era of mass communication, mass culture, mass education, and mass computerization, there are unprecedented

opportunities, as well as unprecedented dangers. Both are rather obvious, but worth recalling. Among the former, I would mention the possibility of access to 'information', 'education' and 'culture' by an ever increasing number of people everywhere, with the consequent possibility of their active participation in the generation and transformation of all such 'goods'. Politically this implies that, potentially, more people are in a position to play an active role in the collective decision processes of their societies. What prevented them from actualizing such a potential is, to a large extent, the other face of the same coin, namely the dangers underlying those very same possibilities: standardization and 'universalization' of the 'culture', of the 'information' and of the 'education' imparted to people everywhere in the world, regardless of their different specific needs; obliteration of cultural differences, except for folkloristic and touristic purposes; passivization of the 'consumers' of cultural goods; centralization of their production and distribution. Politically this implies, potentially, more rather than less control and power in the hands of the few, and consequently less rather than more participation of the individual members of a society in running their affairs.

Which of these potentialities will predominate in the coming years depends, at least to some extent, upon the kinds of options we, as individuals and groups, will take now, especially - though not only - regarding educational practices and policies. In my opinion, no discussion of 'ideals of education' today can bypass the issues mentioned in the preceding paragraph: Are we in favor of a real pluralism of standards of knowledge, institutions, values and cultural forms or do we pay only lip service to such ideas, while pursuing in fact a policy that promotes uniformity, hierarchization, and subordination of those that do not excell (if their achievement is measured by the elite-imposed standards)? Are we in favor of centralization and control of the educational system or do we accept the principle of cultural and institutional selfdetermination at all levels?

Since our choices in these matters have immediate political implications and presuppositions, no discussion of 'ideals of education' can avoid being, ipso facto, a political debate. Mere allegiance to 'democratic values', 'freedom', 'socialism' or 'humanism' is not sufficient, for, as we all know, these expressions are, unfortunately, liable to be interpreted in quite different ways. The real debate about 'cultural values' and 'ideals of education' is precisely about the content to be given to these and similar

slogans and about the practices that will lead to the implementation of the chosen content. Are those who live in the affluent North, and who blossom calmly in elite higher education institutions, going to pursue a policy that preserves their privileges and those of their children at the expense of those they call the 'underprivileged'? Or are they going to pursue a policy compatible with the right to full self-determination and human fulfilment of every individual and every society? Such questions cannot be asked in a way that dissociates 'education' from issues such as the management of the external debt problem, of trade agreements, of worldwide ecological concerns, and of the paradoxes of chronic famine in some areas coupled with the burning of food in others. Ultimately, the issue is whether one's educational and other concerns are only for a narrowly defined 'our' lot or for the destiny of all human beings and cultures, of whatever color, nationality, religion and geographic location.

3

Though philosophers - just like 'humanists', - have been forced by the circumstances to become specialists, many of them developed a rather peculiar specialty: that of hunting for the underlying presuppositions of more or less accepted opinions, theories and systems. That is one of the reasons why, in spite of Kant's efforts, philosophy has been and continues to be an endless succession of conflicting theories. This state of affairs suggests that philosophy is perhaps 'doomed' to be pluralistic malgre soi. In this respect, it exemplifies a 'world' in which partially incompatible and even incommensurable systems of thought must live side by side, without renouncing their attempts to criticize and assess each other, but without succeeding - and eventually without even attempting (in a spirit of real tolerance) - to suppress each other.

But it is not the virtue of philosophy as a model of pluralism that I intend to put to use here. It is rather the philosophical skill in detecting underlying assumptions. Of course, it is by no means the exclusive privilege of philosophers to do this. So, Professor Nijhof 's (this volume) thesis is that curriculum discourse, though presenting itself as rational and objective, is in fact essentially normative and political in nature. Different groups or 'political brokers' involved in the educational process have conflicting aims and interests, and it is their bargaining power that is ultimately reflected in

curriculum decisions, though the fight does not end at that level, but goes on at each step of implementation of such decisions. Given this situation, the problem - if I understand Nijhof correctly - is to identify clearly such aims and interests, and to set up an alternative set of goals or values, upon which to base, in a clearly articulated way, curriculum proposals and decisions. His choice is Klafki's trilogy of self-determination, co-determination and solidarity. Presumably, he would be able to argue for such a choice, as well as, given such a choice, to argue for specific curriculum proposals that would promote such goals. The latter could then be assessed in the light of their efficiency in achieving their purported goals.

Though I think Nijhof's thesis is a step in the right direction[1], it seems to me that it is unnecessarily restricted in scope. First, because he appears to assign to the term 'political' a very narrow meaning, having to do with conflicting interests of narrowly defined social groups, rather than pointing to the connections between the various forms of curriculum discourse and the broader political and economic issues confronting the affluent societies (on which his discussion is centered) both from within and without. Secondly, because it is not only curriculum discourse that is impregnated with political assumptions and choices, but also classroom discourse, career discourse, fundallocation discourse, etc.[2] The whole educational setting, as exemplified by the school, reproduces a political pattern of authoritarianism and dominance of those who <u>have</u> ('knowledge') as opposed to those who <u>have not</u> and supposedly want to acquire it. As pointed out by Paulo Freire, the existing educational systems function on the basis of the 'banking' concept of education:

> Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiques and 'makes deposits' which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the 'banking' concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits. They do, it is true, have the opportunity to become collectors or cataloguers of the things they store. But in the last analysis, it is men themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity, transformation, and knowledge in this (at best) misguided system (Freire 1972: 45-6).

A really 'political' critique of educational discourse, which is necessary for embarking effectively into the normative debate, should painstakingly uncover the overt and covert aspects of this 'banking' paradigm, its normative assumptions, and, eventually, suggest alternatives to it.

4

Underlying the 'banking' conception of education, there is an emphatic use of the notion of efficiency whose implications it is worthwhile to bring under sharper focus. This notion pervades Professor van der Klauw's (this volume) claims about the usefulness of computers in higher education, as well as part of Professor Teichler's (this volume) treatment of the conflicting conceptions of non-university higher education institutions. Even Professor Fuhrmann's defence of a humanistic education finally appeals to its efficiency in preserving the idea of freedom we allegedly inherited from the ancient Greeks and Romans.

To be sure, efficiency is perhaps the basic category in the entire field of means-ends rationality, and, as such, cannot be dispensed with in the description and evaluation of any goal-directed action. But it is a category that applies to the relation between ends and means. Exclusive concern with efficiency of the means tends to take for granted the ends, rather than fostering a critical discussion of these ends themselves. Furthermore, it tends to view the means as nothing but tools, instruments, or steps not valuable in themselves, but only derivatively, as a function of their role in achieving the aims.

The uncritical acceptance of efficiency as the basic criterion of assessment of educational practices and institutions implies allegiance to a conception of education as a tool, to be used in order to fulfill certain social 'needs'. In this view, the educational process is a kind of 'preparation for life' rather than being part (and what a big part) of life itself. Again, we have here a dichotomy between those who are already in full possession of 'life' and those who are only preparing themselves for it, the former being the providers, and the latter the recipients. Whether the recipients receive 'training' (including training in 'thinking') or ready-made 'knowledge' is immaterial: both are seen as tools whose value derives only from their further usefulness in 'life'. Such a conception makes it difficult - if not impossible - to view education as a dynamic and dialectical process of

interaction, in which both educator an educatee are simultaneously teachers and learners, jointly engaged in an act of cognizing. Consequently, it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to devise any significantly different alternative to the existing structures and practices, such as the one proposed, again, by Paulo Freire:

> In essence, one of the radical differences between education as a dominating and dehumanizing task and education as a humanistic and liberating task is that the former is a pure act of transference of knowledge, whereas the latter is an act of knowledge (Freire 1985: 114).
>
> Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry men pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other (Freire 1972: 46).
>
> Within dialogue and problem-posing educator-educatee and educatee-educator go forward together to develop a critical attitude. The result of this is the perception of the interplay of knowledge and all its adjuncts. This knowledge reflects the world: reflects human beings in and with the world explaining the world. Even more important it reflects having to justify their transformation of the world. Problem-posing supersedes the old 'magister dixit' behind which those who regard themselves as the 'proprietors', 'administrators', or 'bearers' of knowledge attempt to hide themselves (Freire 1973: 127).
>
> Education of a liberating character is a process by which the educator invites learners to recognize and unveil reality critically. The domestication practice tries to impart a false consciousness to learners, resulting in a facile adaptation to their reality; whereas the liberating practice cannot be reduced to an attempt on the part of the educator to impose freedom on learners (Freire 1985: 102).
>
> I was convinced that the Brazilian people could learn social and political responsibility only by <u>experiencing</u> that responsibility, through intervention in the destiny of their children's schools... They could be helped to learn democracy through the <u>exercise</u> of

democracy; for that knowledge, above all others, can only be assimilated experientially (Freire 1973: 36).

Furthermore, within the efficiency frame of mind, it is difficult - if not impossible - to consider education as a process valuable in itself, as a 'right' of every citizen. Even when acknowledged as a 'need' of citizens, it is so perceived only in so far as they are required to fulfill certain social functions (recall the talk about the need of the labor market for 'vocational skills', etc.). But, if considered in this way, I see no reason why one should not look for other 'new technologies', certainly more efficient than computer training, at least for some social needs. For example, genetic engineering, along the lines dreadfully described in 1932 by Aldous Huxley in his Brave New World:

Bokanovsky's Process is one of the major instruments of social stability! ...Standard men and women; in uniform hatches. The whole of a small factory staffed with the products of a single bokanovskified egg. Ninety-six identical twins working ninety-six identical machines! ... You really know where you are. For the first time in history... We also predestine and condition. We decant our babies as socialized human beings, as Alphas or Epsilons, as future sewage workers or future... And that is the secret of happiness and virtue liking what you've got to do. All conditioning aims at that: making people like their unescapable social destiny (Huxley 1945: 6, 14, 17).[3]

Who needs the time-consuming and expensive process called 'education' if it can be successfully replaced by these undeniably more efficient methods of providing for all social 'needs'?

5

Another presupposition of educational discourse, also illustrated by part of what has been said here today, to which I would like to call attention is its authoritarianism. In Nijhof's words, 'professional reformers' as well as curriculum planners and other specialized personnel set up not only the curricula, but also the goals, the needs, and finally the ways of assessing the results obtained. All this is done in an increasingly centralized way, due to the centralization of educational funding and research. Nowadays, pupils often no longer sit in the traditional desks exercising for hours, under the teacher's vigilance, callygraphic skills - in a way that would seem to be

designed to prepare them for the boring tasks they will later have to perform at the production lines. Nevertheless, though more subtle, the authoritarian impact of the educational system is no less impressive. The (certified) teacher, the (officially approved) textbook, or the computer program pose the questions and check the answers; they assign the grades and degrees; the latter must be 'objectively' comparable (hence centralized and standardized) to ensure universal realiability and acceptibility.

The replacement of the classroom desk by a computer terminal is seen by some as leading, in and by itself, to a basic change in this respect, mainly because of the possibilities for 'learning at one's own pace and level' and 'interactive learning' that computer technology makes available. But there is a tendency to overlook the fact that, in many of its current and prospective applications to education, computer technology tends to increase rather than reduce the reliance and dependence upon centralized production of educational materials and management of the educational process. Recall only the enormous investment required for the preparation of the software for any simple teaching program, with the consequent need for centralized financing, standardization, etc., as well as the resistance to modify or abandon such programs once they are in use. True, with the dissemination and accessibility of relatively cheap personal computers and programming skills, it may be possible for individual schools, classrooms, neighbourhoods, etc. to develop their own programmed teaching materials, and for the students themselves to participate in this process. But, as long as it is some 'authority' in the Ministry of Education or elsewhere that, 'knowing' what are the goals of education at each of its stages and institutions, sets up requirements and curricula, makes all the crucial decisions, and does the planning and programming, the new technologies are more likely to help entrench the authoritarian and centralistic 'banking' structure of current educational system, than to promote its radical transformation. The difficulty, pointed out by Teichler, in developing a system of higher education in which, instead of a hierarchical ordering of 'elite' vs. 'non-elite' institutions, real pluralism obtains, is also rooted in authoritarianism and centralism. If you emphasize the diversity of aims of various institutions (vocational/professional/applicational on the one hand vs. basic research/innovative on the other) you implicitly accept a division of labor and a ranking of 'first' vs. 'second' rate intellectual demands and achievements. If, on the other hand, you emphasize commonality of goals, you are going to judge all higher education

institutions according to the yardstick of excellence provided by the Ivy League ones. Implicitly or explicitly, it is this centralist assumption that there must be some unique and universal yardstick of excellence, applicable to all institutions, to all countries, to all cultures that prevents true pluralism. I entirely agree with Teichler when he says that a necessary condition for the latter to emerge is the abandonment of the former assumption. But I doubt that the institutional (again centralized) move of opening up post-graduate courses to graduates of all sorts of institutions provides a solution. For it just pushes the problem a step up the ladder. Whenever a 'higher' level institution relaxes its admission strictures and opens itself to a wider array of candidates diversely qualified, there arises even 'higher' institutions, such as 'Institutes for Advanced Studies', with tougher admission requirements, and there is a consequent degrading of the 'value' of those institutions that became more open and accessible.

6

Real pluralism, which I would take to be the deeper meaning of 'freedom', in education - as well as in any other cultural affair - requires, in my opinion, real tolerance[4], and this, in turn, implies a substantial measure of relativism. This brings me back to my opening topos of the outsider.[5] We must develop, as much as we can, an outsider's outlook of 'our' own culture, including our educational practices. Maybe we should all undergo the experience of exile, for its enlightening effect, in this respect:

> One of the first lessons exile taught me was that I could not and should not make value judgements about other cultures. We Brazilians have a particular style: the way we walk down the street, the way we turn a corner, typical expressions, facial gestures, and so forth. Of course, our style is no better or worse than any other (Freire 1985: 181).

Part of the historical work presented in this volume is an important contribution for the relativization of a society's perspective on its educational assumptions. By becoming aware of the historical changes in our practices and conceptions, we become aware of the fact that, though they possibly hadapart from their ideological functions - also, say, a survival value in

certain circumstances, there need not be anything eternal, absolutely true or sacred about them. But we must be able to see that this is also the case for our present cultural values and practices. This is only possible, of course, if we reject Hegelian or Comtian views of history as a continuous progression towards the perfection which is embodied in our present state or in some contrived ideal of the future society.

Another vantage point to gain the necessary relativistic outlook is a reflection about the contacts of 'our' praised civilization with other cultures. It is a commonplace that such a contact has been, for the most part, devastating for other cultures. But it is hardly appreciated to what extent, given our unquestionable material superiority (after all, our science and our economic system do 'work'), we have simply assumed our superority in all other respects. We 'sell' (or rather impose) to other cultures - quite literally - not only our goods and forms of production, but also our cultural practices and ways of thinking. The Romans felt entitled to repress the 'babarians' because they considered themselves to be intellectually superior and politically enlightened. The enlightened emperor Hadrian, for example, went to Palestine in order to supervise personally the crushing of the Jewish revolt, led by those 'fanatics' who did not want to accept the alleged superiority of Roman cultural standards over their own.

A few years ago, while visiting the Xavantes tribe, in Mato Grosso, Brasil, I had the opportunity of observing how the catholic missionary on site first celebrated mass behind the altar, then, undressing the vestment, went on to be the school teacher of the young Indians behind his magisterial podium, and finally, with the same naturality, took his position behind the counter of the mission shop where he exchanged the bird-feather ornaments laboriously crafted by the Indians for such manufactured products as candy-bars and canned sardines. This illustrates the kind of 'package deal' we are offering. But if we carefully reflect on this situation, trying - as much as we can - to see it from the perspective of the Indians, perhaps we might be able to unpack the deal, and to discover that our material success is nothing but precisely that. We might then begin to open ourselves not only to learning from other cultures, but also to respecting and accepting their own values.

There are many other ways in which the required outsider's point of view can be obtained. Interdisciplinary interaction is one of them. Maybe NIAS is forfeiting this possibility by not fostering more international and interdisciplinary interaction among its fellows, and yielding to the temptation

of merely allocating to each fellow individual cells for the conduction of his or her individual research, or, at most, by stimulating only the formation of narrowly defined disciplinary working groups.

7

To my mind, a relativistic and really pluralistic conception of culture and education entails a rejection of centralism on all its levels: planning, funding, decision-making, and selection of goals and criteria of assessment. Not only that: all these activities must be reduced to a minimum, and that minimum must be performed at the lowest possible level, of small communities, groups, and individuals. Ultimately, education must be - as Martin Buber pointed out, and Paulo Freire showed to be possible in practice a form of dialogue, in which two individual human beings face each other as subjects, rather than as subject and object, and interact. In such a situation, no one is supposed to 'shape' the other's personality (even if this is done with the purpose of shaping it as a 'rounded personality' - to use Teichler's words) nor to shape the other's 'skills'. Both teacher and student are humanly and cognitively 'shaped' by the event of the interaction.[6]

Several objections can be raised against this view. They range from charges of utopianism and impracticality to claims that, after all, at least in some disciplines there is knowledge, which it is the task of the teacher to impart and of the student to acquire. Those that stress this 'fact' may eventually temper their essentially 'banking' approach with some 'dialogical' elements (discussion groups, active learning, etc.), without thereby giving up its basic tenets. Most of these objections, however, boil down to some form of efficiency-based judgement of the dialogical proposal. Yet, as I have argued before, efficiency is not the appropriate - and certainly not the only -criterion for assessing such a proposal. Nevertheless, I think the proposal can stand even the most stringent efficiency test.[7]

Consider again, for example, the alleged miracles that the new computer technology can perform in education. It is argued, among other things, that by replacing speech by writing, a gain in objectivity and explicitness is obtained in the thinking process of the student:

> Writing is ... more objective than spoken words ... The printed book gradually led to a reorientation of the psychological attitude:

> objectivation of things and persons.... If explicitness of meaning is important to writing, it is absolutely essential to computing. Computers can only decode the meaning explicit in the text ... computers require a greater degree of explicitness in language. Education should create conditions to meet those demands (van der Klauw, this volume).

I cannot but agree with what this passage claims about the explicitness requirement for 'communicating' with computers. But this very same fact is the measure of the limitations of computers in handling natural language. For, unlike what happens when one employs rigidly regimented artificial languages, what characterizes the use of natural languages by humans - in speech or writing - is the fact that meanings are never conveyed in a 'fully explicit' way, if by this phrase one means that they are entirely 'contained' in the linguistic expressions uttered or written. It is only through the subtle interplay of the linguistic expression used with a wealth of contextual information that a (tentatively) correct meaning can be assigned to an utterance or to a text.[8] Explicitness is not a disembodied property of 'objective' linguistic expressions, but it is always situationally achieved, thanks to our ability to take into account that which is implicit in the context. If we do value explicitness, we must fully acknowledge this fact. But then, if education is concerned with human communication and human thinking, rather than with computer 'communication' and 'thinking', it is to the interplay between the two poles of explicitness and implicitness, rather than to the predominance of the one at the expense of the other that education should prepare. And for this purpose, I submit, the 'problematizing' conception of education defended by Paulo Freire, with its emphasis not on disembodied 'knowledge' but on the relationship between cognizing and context/action, leading to 'conscientization' instead of 'domestication', is the most efficient one. For, it is through practising a kind of problem-posing that is not a fake question-posing by a knower to a non-knower, that a student (and a teacher) acquire the ability to engage in a quest for the broad - and only valuable and truly explicit - 'contextual' meaning of any piece of linguistically crystallized 'knowledge'.

Another objection might consist in pointing to the fact that the dialogical conception, with its emphasis on a quasi-tutorial relation educatoreducatee seems to preclude the massification of education, and

hence its 'democratization', at all levels. In so far as the concept of 'mass' is totally alien to the notion of a truly dialogical I-Thou relationship, this is certainly the case. Education cannot be a 'mass' undertaking, because in a mass human beings are not truly subjects, but mere objects of manipulation. But the dialogical conception would imply the impossibility of access to education at any level to everybody only if it were adopted quite partially, i.e. in a way which is untrue to its spirit. For, if it is coupled with the rejection of centralism - as it should be -, the dismantling of the huge educational bureaucracy, the abandonment of expensive central planning and research, as well as other forms of savings would liberate the necessary funds for letting more teachers, at all levels, be available to more students. What about the very expensive training of specialists in medicine, engineering, etc? Well, you cannot expect me to give you all the answers, but I think the enormous social cost of high-tech medicine, for one, which seems to be prompted more by the marketing abilities of equipment producing firms than by the real needs of the profession and of the patients, suggests that we may not need as much expensive and centralized training as we think we do.

My remarks, on retrospection, look like those of a dilettante idealist. They are sort of loosely argued, rely on controversial sources, have no hard evidence in their support, and are full of normative 'musts' and 'shoulds'. But that is precisely how an outsider's remarks should look, if they are to fulfill their function of shaking and problematizing well-entrenched positions.

NOTES

1. It is not clear to me whether 'solidarity' characterized as 'identification with the group to which one belongs' and its corresponding skill of empathy, described as the ability 'to take the perspective of the other(s)' entail the required educational emphasis on the acknowledgement of the right of groups other than one's own to exercise their own selfdetermination, co-determination and solidarity, for Klafki and Nijhof.

2. For a detailed analysis of some aspects of classroom discourse, see Ehlich (1985).

3. It comes as no surprise to discover that, in this society, even the elite students, those destined to become the leading Alphas, are subjected to 'banking' education: "A troop of newly arrived students, very young, pink and callow, followed nervously, rather abjectly, at the Director's heels. Each of them carried a note-book, in which, whenever the great man spoke, he desperately scribbled. Straight from the horse's mouth" (p.2).

4. For a criticism of restricted versions of the principle of tolerance, see Dascal (1979).

5. For a more detailed analysis of the significance of this topos for intercultural relations, see Caws (1985).

6. For details of the dialogical conception of education, see Freire (1972) and for illustrations of its application in adult literacy programs, see the useful appendices in Freire (1973).

7. Freire (1973: 122ff.), discussing programs of agricultural training and technical aid, argues that the dialogical and conscientization approach is more time consuming and inefficient than the so-called 'extension' approach only apparently. If the aim is the most effective use, by the peasants, of those techniques that are applicable to their conditions and to their possibilities of transforming these conditions, then only if the peasants are able to problematize both the techniques and the conditions will they be able to benefit from the training program. But then, this is no longer a traditionally conceived program of technology 'transfer'.

8. See Dascal (1983) for further discussion.

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